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Dedicated to my Parents 
f 
"The r i che r you a r e , the more c red i t you can 
crea te by your own decision. The poorer you 
a r e , the harder must work to earn foreign 
exchange". 
"The problem of In te rna t iona l Monetary 
reform i s l ike having a leaking roof : \*Len 
i t r a i n s , one i s too busy dashing about with 
buckets to catch the dripping water to climp 
up on the roof in the r a i n and fix i t , and 
X'ih.en i t i s ra ining there i s no problem to 
..worry about". 
As above, the IMF playing with developing 
countr ies . 
( Harry G, Johnson ) 
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THE INTERNATIONAL MONBTARI FUND (I.M,F.) 
MH^ TrrNG ft^ DEPINITIPN ; 
According to Bandem House S ig l i sh Dictionary the 
IMP i s "itoi i n t e rna t iona l organisat ion t h a t promotes the 
s t a b i l i z a t i o n of the world*s currencies and mantains a monetary 
pool from which member countr ies can draw in order to correct 
a d e f i c i t in t he i r balance of payments," 
The Second Vforld \hr was the r e s u l t of conf l i c t s 
and tens ions and the absence of co-operation among countr ies 
p a r t i c i a a r l y a f t e r 1929. I t was to avoid these sources of 
conf l ic t and a l so to bring about co-operation among countr ies 
tha t a number of organisat ions were s t a r t ed even while the 
Second World Vfer was being fought. For p o l i t i c a l co-opera t ion, 
United Nations Organisation es tabl ished economic and monetary 
co-operat ion, the In te rna t iona l Monetary P\ind was brought i n to 
exis tence . The INF fur ther used as Fund. The Fund helps 
countr ies with short-term c o i t a l to t i d e over any temporary 
d i f f i cu l ty in t h e i r balance of payments. The Rmd helps in 
bringing anout smooth in t e rna t iona l t rade through fixed exchange 
r a t e s . Thus the purpose of which t h i s i n s t i t u t i o n was created 
complonentary. Besides, countr ies w i l l have to be members of i t . 
The Art ic les of A^eement of the Rind were formulated 
a t the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference held a t 
Bretton WDOds in the United S ta tes of America in July 1 9 ^ , 
The Rind came in to existence on 27th December ^9h5y and i t s 
readiness to commence exchange t ransact ions in March 19^7. As 
on ^ r i l 30, t978 the Fund has 13^ countr ies as i t s members. 
But a t p re sen t , tiie Fund has T ^ countr ies as members. The F i r s t 
Amendment to the Hind's a r t i c l e s creat ing the Special Drawing 
Rights (SDKs) took effect on 28th J u l y , I969 and the Second 
Amendnent took effect on 1st i ^ r i l , 1978> which increases the 
power of the managing d i rec to r of ttie IMF to s\irvise na t iona l 
exchange r a t e p o l i c i e s . 
ORQANISAHON OF THE HJND « 
The i n i t i a l c a p i t a l of the Fund was US $ 8,800 mil l ion 
(or $ 8»86 b i l l i o n ) . Each member of the PUnd was assigned a 
subscr ipt ion quota based on i t s na t ional income and i t s pos i t ion 
in in t e rna t iona l trade and the quotas ranged from $ 1 mi l l ion 
for Iceland to $ 2,750 mi l l ion for the United Sta tes of America. 
Each member country paid 25/2 of i t s quota in gold or do l la r and 
the balance in i t s na t iona l currency which was kept within the 
country in the name of the Rind. As on June 30, I978, the 
aggregate subscr ip t ion quota was SDR 38.8 b i l l i o n . 
7hB following diagram shows the correct and 
present ftmd quota's which are essential for the msiober 
Countries for the international l iquidity. 
FUND QUOTA'S 
How made up ? How much ? 
ZS^ (^o/a^ 
7s/ ^-^^'^^-z 
Cj6i. y^^'cT ^jcy 
The highest au thor i ty of the Fund i s the Board 
of Governors, consis t ing of one Governor and an a l t e r n a t i v e 
Governor for each member country. The Board of Governors has 
delegated many of ' i t s powers to the Board of Executive 
Directors which consist of ^ d i r e c t o r s appointed by the members 
having the l a r g e s t quotas ( c u r r « i t l y , the United S t a t e s , the 
United Kingdom, Wsst Germany, France and Japan) and 15 other 
d i r e c t o r s who are elected by the other mwnber-nations. The 
Managing Director i s the Chairman of the Board of Executive 
Directors as well as Head of the Staff of the PUnd (current ly 
Mr, Jacques de Larosiere of France i s Managing Director and 
Chairman of the Executive Board). His term i s for 5 years , but 
may be extended or terminated at the d i s c r e t i o n of the executive 
d i r e c t o r s . He i s responsible for the ordinary business of the 
fund, under general control of the executive d i r e c t o r s , and 
supervises a s taf f of 1 ,^-00. 
PURPOSES OF TBE F[JND : 
The purposes of the Fund as s e t fo r th in the Art ic les 
of Agreement are as follows : 
a) To promote in t e rna t iona l monetary co-operation 
through a permanent i n s t i t u t i o n which provides the machinery 
for cons-ultation and col labora t ion on i n t e rna t i ona l monetary 
problems; 
b) To f a c i l i t a t e the Mqpansion and balanced growth 
of i n t e rna t i ona l t rade and to cont r ibu te thereby to the promo-
t ion and maintenance of high l eve l s of anployment and r e a l 
income of member-countries; 
c) To prcanote exchange s t a b i l i t y , to maintain 
orderly exchange arrangements among member count r ies , and to 
avoid competitive exchange deprec ia t ion; 
d) Tb a s s i s t in the establishment of a m u l t i l a t e r a l 
system of payments in respect of cu r r en t , t r ansac t ions between 
member countr ies and in the el imination of foreign exchange 
r e s t r i c t i o n s which hamper the growth of world t rade ; 
e) To give confidence to members by making the fund's 
resources ava i lab le • • • • • , thus providing than with opportunity 
to correc t mal adjustments in the i r balance of payments without 
r e so r t ing tb aea^nd?e&rdestructive of na t iona l and in t e rna t iona l 
prosperi ty and; 
f) To shorten t^e durat ion and lessen the degree of 
disequil ibr ium in the int«n»at ional balances of payments of 
member countr ies . 
This l i s t of objectives requi res some i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
The IMF i s based on the promise tha t countr ies with a bas ica l ly 
sound economic pos i t ion and fixed exchange r a t e s may, from 
time to t ime, be faced with tenrporary balance of payments 
d i f f i c u l t i e s . In the abswice of the fund, these countr ies 
might attempt to co r rec t ttieir problems by r e s o r t i n g to d i r e c t 
exchange cont ro l s or bar ter ing arrangements vJhich would be 
inj^urious to tlie m u l t i l a t e r a l nature of world t r ade . The fund 
has resources that are made ava i lab le to member countr ies to 
allow them t o whether a stormy period without being forced to 
Impose r e s t r i c t i o n s on current t r a n s a c t i o n s . The IMF i s not a 
s u b s t i t u t e for a r e a l i s t i c valuat ion of currencies in the 
member-countries concerned. 
THE FaUD AND THE PAR ViiLUES 
The Par value means "the value pr in ted on the face 
of a s tock, bond or other f i n a i c i a l instrument or document." 
VBien the PUnd was e s t ab l i shed , the m«nber coiintries 
agreed upon the par value of t h e i r currencies in term of gold 
or do l l a r , Sich country was obligated to l i m i t exchange r a t e 
f luc tua t ion to ^0% on e i ther side of the par value . Most 
countr ies chose t o s t a b i l i z e the value of the i r currency by 
using the dol lar to intervene in spot foreign exchange market. 
I f a member country f e l l s t h a t i s present par value 
r e s u l t s in a fundamental balance of payments d i sequi l ib r ium, i t 
can p3?opose a chang*--ih the paa^ value to the fund. A change 
of l e s s than 10% does 'not need the approval of the Fund. Any 
greater change withoat approval^of the Flrnd can r e s u l t in the 
coant ry ' s loss of i t » r i g h t s to 'use the resources of the Fund, 
and th.e country may fee e x p e l Q ^ from the membership. The Pun^ 
h&09%Pi i s obliged €o approvljZall such proposals i f i t f inds 
t h a t such a change if. neeesssojy to cor rec t a basic d l sequ i l i l f ium. 
Most such proposals ^ the pos t war i^eriod have been devalued, 
but a few countr ies Jfiiose' cuEf encies have been in a strong 
demand have revalued the i r currencies upwairdt. 
TRANSAGHOHS OF THE ECTND s 'T 
According to the provis ion of the fund, a member-
coontry can purchase or draw f s ^ the Rind foreign currencies in 
exchange for i t s own currency vip %p X2$% of gold quota. During 
any one year, however, a country can purchase from the fund 
foreign ciorrencies onsLy up t o 25^ of i t s quota l imi t or t i l l the , 
purchase of country 's currency with the Flind becomes equal to 
200^ of i t s quota. We can illadl1a?ate t h i s po in t with the help of 
B id ia ' s membership of the IMP.^^India*s subscr ipt ion quota i s 
3 D R ; 9 ^ mi l l ion (As f!rom June 1978, I n d i a ' s subscr ip t ion quota 
has been ra i sed from SER 9 ^ mi l l ion to SDR Mk$ mi l l ion) of 
which 25% (SDR 235 mil l ion) ig in dol la r or gold with the IMF and 
75% (SDR 705'million) i s in the form of Indian rupees held by 
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the IMF with the Reserve Bank of India (RB3D • In any given 
year India can purchase foreign ^currencies up t o 2^% of i t s 
quota i . e . , SDR 235 mil l ion , \ i t caii continue to purchase 
foreign currencies year a f t e r year up to 125/^ of i t s subscr ip-
t ion in gold or d o l l a r ( i . e . 5;X SDR 235 mi l l ion = SDR 1T75 
m i l l i o n ) . Since India has t o purchase foreign currencies by 
paying i t s ovm currency ins t ead , the maximum i t could buy i s 
SDR 1175 mi l l i on ; t h i s i s the amount vdiich India would pay to 
the IMP in terms of I t s own currency I n d i a ' s t o t a l currency 
held by the IMP would be SDR 705 mi l l ion p lus SDR 1175 mi l l ion = 
SDR 1880 mi l l ion ; This i s 200^ of the t o t a l subscr ipt ion quota 
of India . 
aiie t ransac t ions of a membea?-country with the J\md 
a re of a pecul iar type - p a r t l y of tiie nature of borrowing and 
paBtly of purchases. Suppose India borrows SDR 190 mi l l ion from 
tiie fond to meet an adverse balance vi t i i Canada^ At the time 
of borrowing, India surrenders an equivalent amount of rupee 
to the Fund. After a given per iod , India w i l l have to pay 
i n t e r e s t for the foreign currencies borrowed from the fund. 
Pljrtiiermore, a t a l a t e r da t e , Ind ia w i l l have to r e tu rn the dol la r 
to the fund and buy back i t s rupee . Thus t ransac t ions between 
the fund and the member-countries are p a r t l y of the nature of 
loans and p a r t l y of the nature of purchases. 
Th.e fund grants loan of foreign currencies t o 
mwnber-countries to co r rec t any disequili l irlum in the i r 
balance of payments pos i t i on jirovided such equilihrium i s 
only of a temporary nature j l i k e l y to be removed in the 
e a r l i e s t poss ib le per iod . For example, a count ry ' s balance 
of payments pos i t ion may 'beicoiae adverse on account of usual ly 
la rge imports occasioned by crop f a i l u r e or econanic develop-
ment. This type of disequil ibr ium i s of a twnporary nature 
and w i l l disappear in the long run . The fund helps the 
member-countries in such cases . The IMF may a l so lend to 
countr ies to support the externa l value of the i r cur renc ies . 
STAHDBY R^ANGEMEWTS: t 
The Rrnd enters into "Standby arrangements" with a 
manber, under \ ^ i ch the member may draw upon the Fund's 
resources up to a specified l i m i t and within an agreed period 
without any fur ther reconsidera t ion of the member's p o s i t i o n . 
This i s t o help a country which intends to r e l ax i t s e®3hange 
controls but fears an extraordinary d ra in from i t s monetary 
reserves as a r e s u l t . The fund then agrees to stand ready to 
provide foreign currencies to meet the d r a i n . 
THE IMF AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES : 
The Rind has been p a r t i c u l a r l y in te res ted in the 
developing countr ies of the world and has been a s s i s t i n g them 
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to have a healthy balance of external paymaits and to 
maintain monetary s t a b i l i t y a t home, Whenever developing 
countr ies have asked for ass i s tance from the fand to meet 
t he i r adverse balances, the fund generally helped them. 
In recent yea r s , developing countr ies have s ta r ted 
looking to the fund to a s s i s t than in t h e i r economic develop-
ment. These countr ies find tha t they cannot finance the i r 
development schanes through the i r export surplus only. They, 
there fore , expect the fund to help them to sec\ire the necessary 
foreign currencies to enable them to import foreign equipments 
and raw mate r i a l s . I t i s for t h i s reason that many proposals 
^ v e been made recen t ly to increase in t e rna t iona l l i q u i d i t y 
so t h a t , among other t h i n g s , developing countr ies w i l l have 
necessary foreign reserves to help them in the i r econonic 
development, 
Most developing countr ies think of the IMF as a 
bank - a p o t e n t i a l source of loans to finance and implement 
development programme. Most i n d u s t r i a l countr ies on the other 
haflMlj think of the IMF as a pol icy co-ordinating i n s t i t u t i o n , 
working to maintain a s tab le in t e rna t iona l payments system. 
These divergent view about the IMF lead to major controversies 
over the condit ions at tached to fund lending. 
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Qiiotas of the 1^6 nat ions tha t are the members 
of the IMF current ly t o t a l some 61,000 mi l l ion SDRs, equivalent 
to roughly 66,000 mil l ion d o l l a r s a t cur ren t exchange r a t e s . 
Less than half the t o t a l i s ac tua l ly ava i lab le for lending 
because only funds represent ing the quotas of countr ies in 
sound balance of payments pos i t ion can be used. The IMF has the 
aut&ority to supplement i t s quota resources by borrowing, i t has 
obtained substaait ial sums by t h i s means. 
At the end of September I982, t o t a l use of the IMF 
.credit outstanding was a l i t t l e more than 18,000 do l l a r s and 
another 9,000 mi l l ion d o l l a r s had been committed but not yet 
drawn. The saaounts s t i l l avai lable for lending are not large 
in terms of the aggregate d e f i c i t s of f inanc ia l ly weak na t ions 
but are large enough to be of major s ignif icance to the substan-
a b i l i t y of the overa l l monetary system. Purtheimore, a major 
expansion of IMP lending resources i s under way. 
Under current IMF p o l i c i e s members are allowed to 
draw sums equal to the i r o r i g ina l contr ibut ions to the fund 
(25^ of the i r quotas) automatical ly . When a member requests a 
drawing that goes beyond t h i s "reserve tranche" a team from the 
IMF s ta f f v i s i t s the purposed borrowing country to study the 
economic s i t u a t i o n and to appraise the n a t i o n ' s econcxnic po l i c i e s , 
The IMF governor of the country, usua l ly i t s Minister of Finance 
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or C«. t ra l Bank governor, then addresses a l e t t e r to the 
managing d i rec tor of the IMF summarizing h i s government policy 
object ives with respect of growth, i n f l a t ion and "balance of 
in t e rna t iona l payments and out l iv ing pol icy ac t ions that the 
government has taken or i s prepar i^ t o take t o achieve these 
objec t ives . Performance c r i t e r i a a r e es tabl ished for drawings 
tha t involve c r e d i t in excess of country ' s quota. 
Most developing countr ies paid l i t t l e a t t en t i on to 
the IMF as long as they could meet the i r financing needs through 
recognised channel for o f f i c i a l a id through the p r iva t e c a p i t a l 
market. !I!he frequently drew as much money from the IMF that 
tiiey would be subject to "condi t iona l i ty" requirements , they 
usua l ly chose to pay higher r a t e s of i n t e r e s t and get the i r funds 
from the p r iva te lenders began to question the country ' s a b i l i t y 
to repay did they turn to the IMF. 
The leading borrowers from the IMF (1Q81- '82) 
Country Dollars in mil l ions 
India 1,925 
Jugoslavia 1 ,^-65 
Turkey 1,375 
South Korea 1,258 
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Pakistan 989 
Philippines; 867 
Morocco 723 
Zambia 652 
Thailand 62^ 
Peru 579 
Others 7,0^-3 
Tbtal 117,500 
EETSfDED FUND FACILITY : 
In September 1 9 ^ , the IMF establ ished an extended 
f a c i l i t y to provide , in ce r t a in circumstances, ass i s tance to 
m«nbea?s to meet t he i r balance of payments d e f i c i t s for longer 
periods and in amounts larger in r e l a t i o n to quotas than has 
been the pract ice, unde» normal c r e d i t p o l i c i e s . For example, a 
mOTiber might apply for ass i s tance imder th i s extended f a c i l i t y , 
i f i t has been suffering ser ious payments imbalances r e l a t i n g 
to s t r u c t u r a l mal-adjustments in product ion, t rade and pr ices 
and if i s prepared to Implement a comprehensive se t of correc t ive 
po l i c i e s covering a period of two or three years . Al te rna t ive ly , 
t h i s f a c i l i t y . is avai lable to countr ies suffering from slow 
growth and with an inherent ly weak balance of payments pos i t ion 
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tha t prevents pi i rsui ts of an ac t ive development p o l i c y . 
Many developing countr ies are character ized by dependence on 
one or two export ccMimodities and are inadequately equipped 
to mobilise and ef fec t ive ly a l l oca t e domestic savings . Such 
countr ies need long-term ass i s tance to carry out an economic 
programme including, among tother t h i n g s , a strengthening of 
monetary and f i s c a l instruments and appropriate trade and 
exchange p o l i c i e s . Extended f a c i l i t y arrang«n«nts a r e l imited 
to periods of not more than 3 years and purchases outstanding 
under t h i s f a c i l i t y w i l l not exceed t^-O^ of the member's quota. 
The r a t e of In t e r e s t under t h i s f a c i l i t y w i l l be from h% to 6^%, 
All the new menbeirs who have Joined the Fund during 
the l a s t few years are newly independent coun t r i e s . Most of 
them a re facing d i f f i c u l t problems in organising t he i r monetary, 
f i s c a l and excheuage syst«Ds, so as to provide a sol id base for 
t he i r economic growth. Over the y e a r s , the PUnd has provided 
technica l ass i s tance to i t s members. Bat the addi t ion of so 
many new members, many of them without su f f i c ien t trained 
personnel and a l l of them aspi r ing t o a rapid r a t e of economic 
development, has posed a new chal lenge. To meet t h i s chal lenge, 
the Fund i s subs tan t i a l ly expanding i t s capacity to render 
technical ass i s tance to i t s members. 
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Besidea,, the Fund has organised, since ^^6h•, a 
f i s c a l Affairs Department whose of f icers advise member-
countr ies on mat ters r e l a t i n g to tax po l i cy , tax system, tax 
adminis t ra t ion , ludget ing, e t c The fund has a lso orjgaiised 
the Central Banking Service to provide technical advice to 
those developing countr ies which wish t o e s t ab l i sh cen t ra l 
banks or t o improve or s t rengthen the ex is t ing one. 
FPHD'S CONDITIONAL IT Y t 
The IMF lays down that member-countries would be 
in a pos i t i on to draw subject t o "cond i t lona l i ty" requir«nents 
and they usual ly chose to pay higher r a t e s of i n t e r e s t to get 
t h e i r funds from the p r iva te l enders . Vftien the commercial 
lenders began t o question the count ry ' s a b i l i t y to repay they 
r e f e r the matter to the IMF. 
The objectives of IMF condi t lona l i ty i s adoption by 
the borrowing-country of the p o l i c i e s tha t w i l l i n s t i l l corifi^ 
dence that the borrowing country w i l l reduce i t s balance of 
payments de f i c i t to a level ttistn could be financed by sustainable 
flows of c a p i t a l from other sources* In ca lcu la t ing the r e g u i r e -
mentsi, the country takes in to account the need of repayment to 
the IMF within the specified t ime. I n i t i a l l y , IMF loans were 
to be repaid within three t o five years . Recently, repayment 
period have be«i extended to eight to ten years . 
16 
Bie IMF a r t i c l e s requi re spec ia l high major i t ies 
for votes on important i s sue . A 70J^  majority of the t o t a l 
vot ing power i s reqjiired on such operat ional questions as 
the r a t e s of changes on use of IMF resources and an S'^% majority 
i s required on basic matters such as changes in the s t ruc tu re 
of the IMF, changes in quotas and a l loca t ions of SDRs. Develo-
ping countries have enough votes to veto changes on any of 
the l e v e l together . 
In most instances d e f i c i t s countries (whether deve-
loping or indus t r i a l ) have resented IMF condi t iona l i ty because 
they believed that the i r f inanc ia l problems resu l ted pr imari ly 
from external developments over which they had no con t ro l . 
They argae tha t the countr ies whose po l i c i e s cause t h e i r d i f f i -
c u l t i e s (developing co'untries excuse tiie o i l exporting nations) 
should be the ones required to make the adjustment. Often the 
d e f i c i t s are in very subs tan t i a l p a r t (although almost never 
en t i r e ly ) the r e s u l t of external development and dramatic 
increases; in ttic p r i ce s of imports , i n d u s t r i a l country trade 
r e s t r i c t i o n s tha t prevent developing nat ions from expanding 
exports on manufacturers, a swing from negative to pos i t i ve r e a l 
i n t e r e s t r a t e s in lending count r ies , e t c . To the extent t ha t 
i t i s i n d u s t r i a l country po l i c i e s tha t are causing problems for 
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the developing count r ies . These po l i c i e s are l i ke ly to be 
wreaking hovoc in i dnsu t r i a l nat ions as well and those 
countr ies w i l l already be doing every thing to b e t t e r world 
economic condit ions that the i r votes w i l l approve. 
I f d e f i c i t countries simply wait for improved 
economic conditions to i n d u s t r i a l na t ions to solve the i r 
problems for tham they are l i k e l y to go bankrupt. There i s 
some p o s s i b i l i t y tha t i n d u s t r i a l country growth w i l l surge-^ 
i n t e r e s t r a t e s w i l l f a l l and developing manufacturers w i l l be 
welcomed in the United S t a t e s , Barope and Japan before deve-
loping countr ies exhaust the i r r e sources , but a prudent leader 
of a developing country should not s take h i s p o l i t i c a l l i f e on 
i t . Nor i s there any r e a l l ikel ihood that grasnts or loans wi l l 
be made avai lab le in suf f ic ien t qjiantity e i ther through 
commercial channel or o f f i c i a l a id . 
The hard r e a l i t y i s tha t many developing countr ies 
w i l l have to bear most of the adjustment whether the i r problems 
are of t h e i r own making or ex t rna l in o r i g in . They have no 
a l t e r n a t i v e , . Gradual adjustm«it involves much l e s s hardship 
then arudden bankruptcy and loans from the IMF provide resources 
which permit the adjustment to be gradual. In the presen t 
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unsat i s faa tory world economic condi t ions , i t i s in the 
i n t e r e s t of developing countr ies and i n d u s t r i a l count r ies 
a l ike tha t adjustment proceed a t a de l i ca t e ly balanced pace. 
If d e f i c i t countr ies do not i n i t i a t e adequate adjustment p o l i -
ci«a3 they are l i ke ly to "go bankrupt" with exceedingly nasty 
consequences both for the d e f i c i t countr ies themselves and 
for the banking system of the lending coun t r i e s . If they are 
forced to adjust too quickly and cut back to sharply on t h e i r 
inrportsi recession w i l l deepen both in the developing wid 
i n d u s t r i a l worlds. The IMF may be in the best pos i t ion of a l l 
to fos te r t h i s balance the rough i t s policy of cond i t i ona l i t y . 
Moreover, developing ccxintries tha t accept IMF condi t iona l i ty 
w i l l obtain more c red i t ( o f f i c i a l and commercial) than would 
otiierwise be ava i l ab l e , and the global monetary system to which 
the i n d u s t r i a l countr ies a t t ach so much importance w i l l be more 
l i ke ly to survive . 
PPMD'S^MBiBERSHIP 
Actually, the use of the resources of the Fund i s 
more a p r iv i l ege than a r i g h t of membership. The IMF w i l l seek 
foreign exchange to a member in small amounts with v i r t u a l l y 
no questions asked. In order to draw up to the maximum, however. 
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the country involved must demonstrate e f fo r t s to cor rec t 
i t s problems. 
Membership in the IMF a lso imposes some obl igat ions 
on countries with surpluses in the i r balance of payments. I f 
the Jtmd finds tha t i t s supply of a p a r t i c u l a r l y currency i s 
being dangeriously reduced because of la rge surpluses by that 
country, ttie Fund can declare i t a "Scarce currency". The Fund 
may attempt to borrow currency from the country whose currency 
i s scarce o r , i f the member i s unwill ing to grant a loan , the 
Ftmd may buy the currency for gold a t i t s es tabl ished r a t e . If 
liie s i t u a t i o n becomes more s e r i o u s , the Fond can r a t i on i t s 
remaining supply among members and authorize members to impose 
exchange r e s t r i c t i o n s on dealings in the scarce currency. The 
d e f i c i t countr ies are obliged not to Impose exchange r e s t r i c t i o n s 
on current t ransact ion except as authorized by the PUnd, 
VBiile the IMF quotas have been increased a p o t e n t i a l l y 
more i i ^ o r t a n t step was taken in I968 with the c rea t ion of new 
type of reserve a s s e t , book en t r i e s in a Special Drawing Account 
of the IMF, The "Special Drawing Rights" or SDKs, were to be 
divided among the member countr ies in proport ion to t h e i r present 
IMF quotas . 
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THE IMF AND INDIA 
\toa,t the IMF has been doing for developing countr ies 
can bes t be I l l u s t r a t e d by taking the case of I n d i a . India i s 
a founder member of the IMF. I n d i a ' s o r ig ina l subscript ion 
quota vas SDR ^00 m i l l i o n s . The present subscr ip t ion quota i s 
SDB 1 ,1^5 mil l ion of vftiich SDR 77* 5 mi l l ion cons is t s of gold. 
The i n i t i a l par value es tabl ished by India with the FUnd in 19M-6 
was Rs, 3.309 per U.S. d o l l a r ; the par value was changed to 
Rs. if.76119 per U.S. do l l a r in 19^9 to Rs. 7.50 per U.S. do l la r 
in 1966, to Rs. 7.28 in 1971 and Rs. 8.25 in June 1978. 
In order to meet the balance of payments d e f i c i t s , 
India borrowed $ 100 mi l l ion from the Fund during 19^-8-1+9, which 
was paid back by 1956-57. In 1957> India entered in to an agree-
ment with the Fund for | 200 mi l l ion to meet i t s tanporary 
balance of payments d i f f i c u l t i e s a r i s i n g out of i t s development 
programmes. India arranged for another drawing to the tune of 
$ 250 mi l l ion in 1962 from the IMF. The ass i s tance had been 
Invaluable to India which had dangerously low l eve l of foreign 
exchange r e se rves . During 1965-66, Indians balance of payments 
had become highly c r i t i c a l and India was faced with the problem 
of repayments due from India to c red i to r countr ies and to i n t e r -
na t iona l f inancia l i n s t i t u t i o n s . India has wiped out her out-
standing drawings from the IMF. 
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The crea t ion of addi t iona l In te rna t iona l l i q u i d i t y 
through the SDR scheme helped supplement I n d i a ' s reserve 
resources . The IMF a l l o t t e d SDR 326 mi l l ion to India . Part 
of the SDR have been used by India to pay off her i n t e r e s t and 
other obl igat ions to the IMF, The t o t a l holdings of SDRs by 
ind ias as on i ^ r i l 30, 1977 came to SDR 173 mi l l i on . 
The PUnd had a l so entered into the "General Arrange-
ment .to Brrow'*'(G,A,.B.) in 1962, under which ten i n d u s t r i a l 
countr ies provided t3ie fund with standby, c r e d i t s of $ 6.0 b i l l i o n 
to enable i t to meeting a t Washington JLn September, I978 decided 
on a new a l loca t ion of 12.0 b i l l i o n SDRs (one SDR i s equal to 
about 1.25 n . S . do l la rs ) , a t the r a t e of V.O b i l l i o n SDRs a 
year over the three years per iod 1979-83. I n d i a ' s share of 
th i s second SDRs a l loca t ion by the IMF i s estimated to be 35^ 
mi l l ion SDRs during 1979-83.. India added 1 f9 mi l l ion SDRs to 
i t s foreign exchange reserves a t the end of January 1979. In 
the beginning of January, 1979, India had i t s reserves about 
180 mi l l ion SDRs which was; the balance, a f t e r t r ansac t ions , out 
of the f i r s t SDR a l loca t ion of 326 mi l l ion SDRs to our country 
in the i n i t i a l three-year period T97O-72. 
India i s already indebted to the IMF to the extent 
of more than $ U-00 mi l l i on , This specia l drawing f a c i l i t y 
would make p r a c t i c a l l y no impact on her balance of payments 
s i t i i a t ion . Yet, t h i s i s not the whole p i c t u r e . I n d i a ' s advan-
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tage , so also of other developing coun t r i e s , i s i n d i r e c t . 
With Uie use of th i s new f a c i l i t y ( f a c i l i t y of Special Drawing 
Bights) I t may he reasonable expected tha t developed countr ies 
would not Tae required t o follow r e s t r i c t i v e t rade and aid 
p o l i c i e s due to the i r own balance of payments d i f f i c u l t i e s , 
Tfiis might u l t imate ly lead to a be t t e r balance of t rade s i t u a -
t ion and to a more l i b e r a l flow of m u l t i ^ t e r a l aid to developing 
coun t r i e s . Inc iden ta l ly , i t shoiiLd be noted tha t I n d i a ' s foreig^ 
exchange reserves rose from Rs# 732 crores a t the end of March, 
1971 to over Rs, 900 crores In the beginning of May, 1975i 
mainly due to the a l loca t ion of SDRs from the IMP and some appre-
c ia t ion of tile rupee value of reserves following the realignment 
in in te rna t iona l exchange ra tes and a l so due to boost in exports 
and greater remittances by India res id ing abroad. This r a i s ing 
trend in foreign exchange reserves:^ continued. In f a c t , I n d i a ' s 
foreign exchange reserves went \;^ rapd i ly during the period -
May, 1976 to January, 1!979> and the pos i t ion becomes so canfor-
table tha t the government decide to pay off some of the i n s t a l -
ments of IMF loans before they become due. But, due to heavy 
in^or t of crude o i l and f e r t i l i s e r s at a higher p r i c e , our 
foreign exchange reserlies f e l l by Rs. 96^.91 crores in the f i r s t 
half of 1980-81. Nevertheless, because of two loans to ta l ing 
Rs, 812 crores from the IMF in August, 198O, our foreign exchnage 
reserves were jus t about Rs. 5,000 crores by the end of October, 
1980. 
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The IMF has approved SDR 5 b i l l i o n loan to India 
in November, tl98l, imder i t s extended fimd f a c i l i t y . I t i s 
a l a r g e s t loan in the h i s to ry of the IMF. This IMF loan w i l l 
be made avai lable in three instalments t SDR 900 mi l l ion in 
the f i r s t year up to J\me 30 , 1982, SDR n 8 b i l l i o n in the 
s»cond year upto June 30, 1983 and the remaining SDR 2.3 b i l l i o n 
in the th i rd year up t o June 30, 198^-. The IMF i s t i t l e d 
*S)tat«nent of Economic Po l i c ies and Programmes* • These po l i c i e s 
arc for the promotion of exports a t a l l c o s t . The IMF and 
Ciovemment of India deal i s the opening up of the economy to 
foreign c a p t i a l and tiie t r ansna t iona l co-operation through the 
e levat ion of export growth as the foremost na t iona l goal , the 
l i b e r a l i s a t i o n of Imports and the f ree import of technology. 
On January 13 , 1983, the IMF i s understood to have 
recomiDended t o the Ctovemment of India ce r t a in guidelines 
wltii a view to a s s i s t i n g the Indian econcany to resucjfetes i t s e l f 
from the current imbalances, 
THE IMF AMD INTERNATIONAL LIQUIDITY : 
Meaning of Liquidi ty : -
Liquidi ty to the stock of i n t e rna t iona l ly acceptable 
means of payment, which must usual ly possess , or a t l e a s t be 
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thought to possess , the p roper t i es of s tab le and predic tab le 
va lue . Such a s se t s held by a country cons t i t u t e i t s "reserves'*. 
Before the IMF was s t a r t e d , countr ies had two methods 
ava i lab le to make payments to o the r s . One was thraigh gold 
and the other through in t e rna t iona l ly acceptable currencies 
such as pound-ster l ing and the d o l l a r . Every country, therefore 
accumulated and kept reserves of gold and/or pound and d o l l a r . 
Many coun t r i e s , in f a c t , preferred to keep the i r surplus in pound 
and do l l a r reserves in London and New York because of (a) s t a b i l -
i t y in the value of these currencies (b) f a c i l i t y in in te rna t iona l 
payments, and (c) i n t e r e s t income they brought for t h e i r owners. 
Hence, tiie pound-sterl ing and do l l a r came to known as in temat ioasd 
reserve cur renc ies , ikfter the IMF was s t a r t e d , one more method 
was ava i lab le to countr ies to make in t e rna t iona l pa3nnents, v i z . , 
the f a c i l i t y of drawing on the fund's reserves of various curren-
cies to make in t e rna t iona l payments. The problems of in te rna t iona l 
payments and l iqu id reserves had five d i f fe ren t a spec t s , 
(a) In te rna t iona l t rade had been increasing r a p i d l y , 
and during the I96O, i t had more than doubled. This had neces s i -
ta ted an increase of gold and other currency reserves to f a c i -
l i t a t e in t e rna t iona l payments, 
(b) Monetary gold reserves had been increasing a t a 
lower r a t e than the increase in world production and t r ade . One 
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important reason vhy gold production had not Increased, was 
the low p r i ce of gold a t $ 35 per ounce, fixed in 193^. At 
$ 35 an ounce, i t was not p ro f i t ab l e to mine gold in la rge 
quan t i t i e s except in those countr ies which had exceptional 
advantages or cheap labour . 
(c) Countries had come to depend increasingly on 
the key currencies had been highly xinstable in recent yea r s , 
e i the r because of p e r s i s t e n t d e f i c i t s in t h e i r balance of 
paym«its or because of rumours of poss ib le devaluat ion. Hence, 
these currencies did not serve as good monetary reserves a s 
they' did before. 
(d) Hi ther to , i t was not poss ib le for a l l countr ies to 
increase the foreign exchange reserves in l i n e with world t r ade , 
lijhenever any country, such as Germany, had shown a ne t r i s e in 
i t s foreign exchange r e se rves , some other country some where 
had to show an equal net f a l l . 
(e) In the meantime, developing countr ies in Asia, 
JGfrica and South America were requir ing currencies of advanced 
countries ' to finance thei r economic development. 
An idea of the growth of in te rna t iona l l i qu id i t y can 
be had from the following table : 
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Official In te rna t iona l Reserves a t the end of 
years 1955-69 ( in b i l l i o n of SBRs) 
Year 
1955 
I960 
1965 
1969 
Gold 
3 5 . ^ 
38.0 
1+1.5 
36-9 
Reserve Posit ion 
in the IMF 
1.9 
5.6 
5.h 
6.7 
Foreign 
Exchanee 
t8.5 
20,2 
2$.k 
33.0 
Total 
55.8 
61.8 
72.3 
78..7 
Sdurce : Annual r epor t of the IMF, 1976. 
Thus, while the danand for gold and in te rna t iona l 
currency reserves had been ever increas ing , the supply had not 
increased cOTrespondlngly, This was the problem of in te rna t iona l 
l i q u i d i t y and r e se rves . 
The establishment of SDRs through the IMF, c l a r i f i -
ca t ion of the (decling) ro l e of gold, and growing recognit ion 
of the do l l a r as the key in t e rna t iona l reserve currency have 
ccaabined to brighten hopes that the in t e rna t iona l reserve 
probl«a i s on lUie way to bring solved in the year ahead. 
Continued in t e rna t iona l co-operation w i l l be required to assure 
smooth functioning of the system, but no fur ther major changes 
appear to be required now. 
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According to the annual r epor t of the IMF, I982, 
the IMF has taken c r e d i t for the fac t t h a t , during the f inanc ia l 
year ending June , the l i q u i d i t y , provided hy i t , increased 
subs t an t i a l l y in terms of aggregate commitBients as wel l as in 
gross and n e t purchases. The repor t emphasise* went to non-oi l 
developing count r ies . The increase i n new ccanmitments under 
standby and extended arrangemaits rose frcxn SDR 10.3 b i l l i o n 
in I98O-8I to SDR 11.3 b i l l i o n in I98I-82. 
^ l l e the number of arrangements concluded declined 
from 32 to 2hy the new commitments included extended arrangement 
with India for SDR ? b i l l i o n - the l a rges t commitment in the 
h i s to ry of the fund. Again, the sharp increase in the r i s e in 
ne t purchases by members from SDR 1,9 b i l l i o n in the previous 
ye€UP to SDR 5 b i l l i o n , the highest l eve l of ne t purchases since 
197*+. During the period 1971-|0> the developing countr ies with 
fund-supported programmes generally achieved a s ign i f i can t 
improvement in the i r balance of payments in conparison with a l l 
non-oi l developing coun t r i e s . The r a t e of In f l a t ion i s observed 
to have r i s e n l e s s in countr ies in that group. 
The Rind, na tu ra l ly f inds great v i r t ue the re fore , 
i n i t s establ ished p resc r ip t ion for the hea l th of developing 
count r i es ' economicsbeleagured by an advarse externa l environment 
as well as by lax domestic p o l i c i e s . More p a r t i c u l a r l y , i t s t resses 
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the need for appropriate exchange r a t e p o l i c i e s which, i t poin ta 
out , can help minimise the adverse ef fec ts on these econcaaics of 
f luc tua t ions in exchange r a t e s between i n d u s t r i a l ctnintriea, 
besides a s s i s t i ng in the i r s tMc t l i r a l adjustanent ih other wa^is. 
TgS aPECTlL DRA-MING RI(2ITff. (SDRs) 
The f i r s t Jmendment to the f\md's Ar t i c les c rea t ing 
the "Special drawing right'*' (SDR) took effect on July 28, 1969. 
Vtttii the creat ion of t h i s new type of reserve a s s e t , book 
en t r i e s in a Special Drawing Account of the IMF, The SDKs were 
to be divided among the member countr ies in proportion to t h e i r 
present IMF quotas. 
The f i r s t a l loca t ion of SDRs were made on January 1 
of 1970, 1971 and 1972 - t o t a l l i n g about SDR $ 9.3 b i l l i o n . 
Tinder the SDR p lan , the Fund wrote in to i t s bocfics new reserMPes 
of nabout 3.5 b i l l i o n per year . for three years . Each m«nber-
country Was given a prcpoKtionate share in th i s reserve poo l , 
the share depending upon a country 's subscr ipt ion to the Rmd, 
U.S.A. was a l lo ted the l a rges t share in ttie reserve poo l , v i z . , 
SDR 2.3 b i l l i o n , followed by United Kingdom with an a l loca t ion of 
SDR 1 b i l l i o n . This meant tha t the leading members of the IMF 
received the l a r g e s t share of SDRs created during 1970-72. 
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Allocation of SDKs to member-countries was the 
f i r s t attempt to c rea t i n t e rna t iona l l l q t t id i ty . Member-countries 
did not have t o t ransfer the i r currency or other resources against 
the SDRs received in a l loca t ion ; the SDHs are simply credited to 
p a r t i c i p a n t s accounts on the basis of the i r quotas in the Fund 
a t the date of the each a l l o c a t i o n , and are then avai lable for 
use in accordance with tiie ru le s of the scheme. The SEERs r e p r e -
sent en t i r e ly a new foim of proper money, uncondi t ional ly and 
automatically c rea ted , as i f out of thin a i r . The SDRs al located 
to pa r t i c ipan t -coun t r i e s thus increased the in t e rna t iona l reserves 
of the r e c i p i e n t and, consequently, liie sum of t o t a l of global 
l i q u i d i t y . The new reserve a s s e t proved read i ly acceptable , 
pa r t i cu l a r l y in the l a t e r year of the 1970-73 pe r iod . P a r t i c i -
pa t ion in the SDR scheme had also been widespread, with only 8 
members not pa r t i c ipa t i ng in the Special Drawing Account. The 
Board of Governors approved a r e so lu t ion autiiorizing the a l loca t ion 
of SDR M-,000 mi l l ion in each of the 3 years 1979, 1980 amd 1981, 
Under the SDR syst«n a member-country can use SDRs 
to s e t t l e i t s debts to other member coun t r i e s . The most r ad i ca l 
aspect >is that 70^ of these new u n i t s need never be repa id . 
They a r e , in e f fec t , newly created money. Gold, d o l l a r s and 
pounds and normal drawing r i g h t s with the IMF would continue to 
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t»e used for in te rna t iona l payments and reser-?es, bat the SDRs 
would serve an addi t iona l reserve u n i t s . A country running 
in to d e f i c i t on i t s balance of payments need not rush for 
immediate a id , or take hasty r e s t r i c t i v e act ion provided i t s 
d e f i c i t was l e s s than i t s a l l oca t ion of SDRs. Thus, SDRs helped 
to solve the problem of in te rna t iona l l i q u i d i t y . 
OIL CRISIS AND THE RSCYCLING OF PETRO-DOLLARS 
!I3ie Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
{OPSO r a i sed the p r i ce of o i l a number of times since October, 
T973. This has created sane ser ious probUiiBs for the world 
economy and tiie i n t e rna t iona l monetary system. Inf la t ionary 
pressures have Increased tramendously; la rge sh i f t s in the balance 
of p a r e n t s s i tua t ion have taken place in the o i l importing 
count r ies , p a r t i c u l a r l y in the developing count r ies ; and the 
in t e rna t iona l l i q u i d i t y s i tua t ion has de te r io ra ted . At the same 
time the members of the OPEC have acquired large foreign exchange 
resources popularly knownn as ' ^ e t r o - d o l l a r s " , the disposal of 
which i s causing serious headache. The o i l c r i s i s ha s , thus , 
posed ser ious problems for the countr ies of the OPEC, the developed 
economies and developing countr ies and above a l l the IMF. 
PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE RISE IN OIL PRICE 
The r i s e In tJie p r i ce of o i l has worsened the i n f l a -
t ionary s i t ua t i on In a l l count r ies . The pr ice of o i l goes in to 
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the cos ts of many commodities and services and there fore , 
a r i s e In o i l brings about cost-push I n f l a t i o n . Countries 
that have to pay for o i l four times as much now as they did 
before October, 1973, liave to incur higher cos ts for t r anspor t , 
for energy, for production in may Indus t r i e s , and for production 
of various oi l-based products such as F e r t i l i s e r s , chemicals, 
e t c . The general l eve l of p r ices has the re fo re , r eg i s t e red a 
sharp upward trend throughout the world since the hike in o i l 
p r i c e s . 
The r i s e in o i l p r ices has created huge balance of 
payments d e f i c i t s for o i l importing coun t r i e s . Where the payments 
balance was already adverse or where there was only a slender 
surplus as in tiie case of developing countr ies , the s i t ua t ion has 
become very c r i t i c a l . Even advanced Indus t r i a l countr ies had to 
cut down tiieir imports of o i l d r a s t i c a l l y . These conditions 
could be expected to continue and the payments s i t ua t i on of the 
o i l Importing countr ies would beccMne far more se r ious . These 
have created a pecul iar s i t u a t i o n : 
(a) The o i l importing countries did not have the 
necessary means to pay for the i r Imports of o i l . Either they had 
to cut down their imports of o i l or of other goods. Any sharp 
cut in Imports would reduce the volume of i n t e rna t i ona l t rade and 
would cause a world-wide depression. 
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(b) At the same t ime, thrcoigh hike in o i l p r i c e s , 
the o i l exporting countr ies have acquired huge foreign balances, 
known as the "petro-dollars?*. These are foreign exchange 
reserves acquired by o i l exporting countr ies from the i r ; ~ 
large balance of payments surpluses . The countries, of the OPEC 
are facing the problem of how to u t i l i s e t he i r p e t r o - d o l l a r s 
to the i r bes t advantage. 
(c) Many i n d u s t r i a l countr ies have managed to a t t r a c t 
OPEC funds e i the r by borrowing or by get t ing long-term investments 
in the i r i n d u s t r i e s , to pay for the i r purchases of o i l . But t h i s 
may not continue for long. 
This seriousness of t he problem can be understood 
frcan the fac t that in a s ingle year (197M OPEC members accumulated 
something l i k e $ 70 b i l l i o n . In three years Arab members had 
increased the i r o i l revenue by 10 times. On the other hand, the 
o i l importing countr ies are facing heavy d e f i c i t s which are p i l i n g 
up every year. The attempt to meet the s i t u a t i o n by d r a s t i c cuts 
in the i r Imports i s not in the i n t e r e s t of i n t e rna t iona l t r ade . 
These coun t r i e s , therefore , must have the means of payment for 
their o i l imports. At the same t ime, the lenders should have an 
Opportunity to put th ie r pe t ro -do l l a r s to p ro f i t ab l e u s e . There 
can be t ransfers of pe t ro -do l l a r s d i r e c t l y through loans and 
investments or through IMF arrangemaits . I n d u s t r i a l coimtries 
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have borrowed d i r e c t l y and they have a t t r a c t e d the funds 
of the OPEC through the i r i n d u s t r i a l concerns. Some mu l t i -
na t iona l giants of West Germany and USA have already been 
acquired by members of the OPEC. This method of recycl ing 
pet ro-dol lars -have obvious l i m i t a t i o n s . I n d u s t r i a l nat ions 
may not l ike for p o l i t i c a l reasons any la rge-sca le acquis i t ion 
of i n t e r e s t in some indus t r ies by the members of theoOPEC. 
Moreover, as tiie volume of pe t ro -do l l a r s grows, the means of 
investment may not grow in the same propor t ion . Bat in the case 
of loans and investments to developing coun t r i e s , the lending 
countr ies might find the degree of r i sk too much. Besides, 
the borrowing countr ies of the i r economies; nor w i l l they l i k e 
a subs tan t i a l degree of control of indus t r i es passing in to 
foreign hands. Necessar i ly , the re fore , some other arrangement 
has to be made for recycling p e t r o - d o l l a r s . 
gP^qi^;, OIL FACH,ITY 
The IMP has formulated ce r t a in schemes under which 
specia l funds have been s e t up with contr ibut ions from o i l -
e3cporting countr ies and i ndus t r i a l countr ies and from which the 
oil-Importine ountries could borrow to meet t he i r d e f i c i t s 
a r i s i ng out of o i l imports. The IMF s e t up the Oil Fac i l i t y 
in June 197^ with SDR 2 ,? b i l l i o n mostly contributed by o i l 
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exporting coun t r i e s , to provide loans to countr ies h i t 
hard by the hike in o i l p r i c e s . Total borrowings made in 
connection witii the o i l f a c i l i t y amctunted to SDR 6.9 b i l l i o n . 
The loans are given for a period of 3 to 7 years at i n t e r e s t 
ranging between 6-7/8 and 7-1/8 per cent . On June 30, 1977, 
the amount of o i l f a c i l i t y loans to t a l l ed SDR 6,6 b i l l i o n . 
The o i l f a c i l i t y was transmitted in Iferch 1976, During the 
year I98O-81, the IMF had given aid to 23 poor countries to 
help them to pay for o i l over the pas t s ix years . Among the 
poor countr ies e l i g i b l e s for the subs id ies , India i s one of 
them. Over the years subsidies received by India from the IMF 
i s $ 31.8 mi l l i on . 
THB SUBSIDTY ACCOUNT 
IhB IMF establ ished the "Subsidy Account" in August 
1975, to a s s i s t the Fund's most ser ious ly affected (MSA) members 
to meet the cost of using resources made ava i lab le under the 
1975 o i l f a c i l i t y . The Subsidy Account i s funded by ccxitributions 
from 2h members and Switzerland-contr ibutions received by June 
1978 came to SDR 101 mi l l i on . El ig ib le members to receive 
ass i s tance fjrom the Subsidy Account were those F\ind members on 
the l i s t of countries-prepared by the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations tha t had ser iously affected by the increased pr ice 
of petroleum and petroleum products . Diis l i s t included 39 FVind 
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memIjer-countries. The objective of the subsidy Account was 
to reduce the ef fec t ive r a t e of i n t e r e s t by 5% - approximately 
2,7% as agains t 7,7% for other coun t r i e s . So far 18 most 
ser iously affected countr ies have received ass i s tance from the 
Fund tinder the Subsidy Account. 
THE TRUST FUND 
lii May 1976, the IMF se t up a '•Trust Fund"(TF) 
for the purpose of providing specia l balance of payments 
ass i s tance to developing member-countries with the p r o f i t s 
from the s a l e of gold (The Fund's f i r s t publ ic auction of gold 
was held in June 1976 and by April I977 the FUnd has held 8 
gold auctions involving a t o t a l of 5.73 mil l ion ounces of gold 
and the p r o f i t s r ea l i sed frcxn these auctions came to SDR -^36 
mil l ion) and with any finances tha t may be avai lable from 
voluntary contr ibut ions or from loans . Sixty-one countr ies would 
be e l i g i b l e to receive a s s i s t ance . The balance of payments 
ass i s tance tha t w i l l be provided on concessional terms w i l l 
to support the e f for t s of ;e l ig ible m«nbers that qualify for 
ass i s tance to carry out programmes of balance of payment ad jus t -
ment. The loans from the Trust Fund w i l l bear i n t e r e s t of ^ to 
1^ per annum and each disburs«nent of a loan wi l l have to be 
repaid in 11 equal instalments s t a r t i ng a f t e r f ive years from 
the date of disbursement. By July 1977, 33 out of the 61 
member countr ies have recieved loans from the Trust Fund. 
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Thus, on the one hand, there a r e c o u n t r i e s with 
huge "balances of f o r e i g n c u r r e n c i e s , wanting t o i n v e s t a l a r g e 
p a r t of t h e i r ba l ances i n o the r c o u n t r i e s ; on the o t h e r hand, 
t h e r e a r e c o u n t r i e s i n need o f f o r e ign exchange r e s o u r c e s for 
meeting t h e i r l a r g e o i l b i l l s . T h i s , i n subs t ance , I s the 
probl«n of r e c y c l i n g of p e t r o - d o l i a r s . The problem i s being 
solved by making the su rp lu s r e s o u r c e s of the f i r s t group of 
c o u n t r i e s a v a i l a b l e t o the second group by loans and inves tmen t s . 
This s o l u t i o n has been a t tempted on a c o - o p e r a t i v e b a s i s through 
the good o f f i c e s of IMP . 
COMPENSATORY FINANCING FACILITY 
The IMF e s t a b l i s h e d t h e "Compensatory Financing 
F a c i l i t y (CFF) i n 1963, has so fa r provided " a s s i s t a n t to 
c o u n t r i e s exper ienc ing temporary ba lance of payments d i f f i c u l t i e s 
a r i s i n g ou t of expor t s h o r t f a l l s l a r g e l y a t t r i b u t a b l e to 
c i rcumstances beyond t h e i r c o n t r o l " . 
During 1976, ¥+»«] iber c o u n t r i e s used the compensatory 
f inanc ing f a c i l i t y , drawing ammounts of c u r r e n c i e s t o t a l l i n g the 
equ iva len t of SDR 2,268 m i l l i o n , compared with SDR 239 m i l l i o n 
during 1975. This i n c r e a s e i n purchases was p a r t l y due to the 
c o n s i d e r a b l e expor t s h o r t f a l l s exper ienced by Fund m«nbers dur ing 
the r e c e s s i o n i n World t r a d e , and p a r t l y due to an e x t e n s i v e 
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l i b e r a l i z a t i o n , agreed upon a t the end of 1975, of members' 
access to the f a c i l i t y . 
NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (NIBD) 
The need for fu l l and equal pa r t i c ipa t i on by 
developing countr ies in the formulation and appl ica t ion of a l l 
decis ions concerning the i n t e rna t i ona l community was discussed 
a t the 6th specia l session of the United Nations General 
Assembly in 197^. The c a l l for the New In te rna t iona l Economic 
Order (NIBD) seeking to es tab l i sh a more adjust and equi table 
system of i n t e rna t i ona l cooperation between the developed and 
developing countries on the bas i s of sovereign equali ty and the 
removal of the disequibrium exis t ing between them was given a t 
t h i s session. The 7th specia l session of the UN General Assembly 
in 1975 adojjted a further reso lu t ion ca l l ing for acced-erated 
development of developing countr ies through in t e rna t iona l 
economic co-operation. 
During 1976, decision on development and a nevr 
i n t e rna t iona l economic order were taken by the Economic and 
Social Council and by the General Assembly, which on 22 Decenber, 
suspended i t s 1976 session in order to await the r e s u l t s of the 
Conference on In te rna t iona l Economic Co-operation being held 
in P a r i s . 
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CONCLUSION 
The IMF was ser iously engaged In f inding a permanent 
solu t ion to the problem of in t e rna t iona l l i q u i d i t y as far back 
as 1959« After a s» r ies of adhoc ^ e p s , the IMF introduced the 
system of SDKs and created add i t iona l i n t e rna t iona l l iqu id 
reserves to the tune of nearly SDB 9.3 b i l l i o n . The SDRs have 
become qui te popular with member countr ies and have thus eased 
the prObion of in t e rna t iona l l i q u i d i t y . 
I t i s wrong to c r i t i c i s e the ro l e of the IMF in the 
recent i n t e rna t i ona l c r i s i s . Pe r s i s t en t d e f i c i t balances of 
USA, and equally p e r s i s t e n t favourable balance of payments of 
countr ies l i k e Pi'ance and West Germany and the i r r e fusa l to 
tteadjust t he i r exchange r a t e s were iiqportant causes for i n t e r -
na t iona l monetary c r i s i s . The IMF se t up "The Conmittee on 
Reform of In t e rna t iona l Monetary System and Related I s sue" (also 
known as Committee of Twenty) in July t.972, to advise and repor t 
with respect to a l l aspects of reform of the i n t e rna t i ona l 
monetary system. The Committee of Twenty submitted i t s f i n a l 
r epor t in June 197^ and i t s recommendations are being in^lemented 
by the IMF. 
I t January 1976, an Interim Committee of the Board 
of Governors on the In te rna t iona l IJonetary System and a ^oint 
Min i s t e r i a l Committee of the Board of Governors of the Fbnd and 
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the World Bank on the "Transfer of Real Resources" to 
Developing Countries (Development Committee) was es tabl ished 
and held their i n i t i a l meeting from time to time and since 
then has met on a semi-annual bas i s . The s a l i e n t fea tures 
of the agreement are as follows : 
i) Members are allowed to borrow h^fo more frcro the 
Rind through i t s normal c r e d i t channels. This w i l l make more 
than $ 3,500 mi l l ion ava i lab le to developing countr ies a lone . 
i i ) The IMF i s to set up a spec ia l t r u s t fund to 
help the poor coun t r i e s , i . e . , those which per c a p i t a l annual 
incomes of l e s s than $ 36O. This fUnd wi l l i n i t i a l l y be 
financed by s a l e of IMF gold and contr ibut ions by other member-
s t a t e s . 
i i i ) The IW i s to s e l l 25 mi l l ion ounces of gold 
amounting to one-sixth of tiie IMF holdings . The ant ic ipated 
p r o f i t of $ 1.7 b i l l i o n would go in to the Trust Fund which w i l l 
provide between # UOO mil l ion and $ 500 mi l l ion annually over 
the next four years to the poorest na t ions . 
iv) The Min i s t e r i a l Committee of the IMF has given 
formal sanction to the f loa t ing of currencies as a l ega l system, 
specif iying tha t no currency values need be se t any longer in 
terms of gold. 
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v) Paper gold in the form of SDR would now be 
p r i n c i p a l reserve asse t in the in te rna t iona l monetary system. 
The IMF has taken keen i n t e r e s t in the problem of 
recycl ing p e t r o - d o l l a r s . I t se t up the "Special Oil F a c i l i t y " 
in 197^, and the "Subsidy Account" in 1975» to a s s i s t the Fund's 
most seriously affected members to get funds- from o i l f a c i l i t y 
a t lower r a t e of i n t e r e s t . A Trust PHind has been se t up to 
a s s i s t 39 most ser iously affected coun t r i e s . I t i s thus clear 
that the IMF had done i t s best to solve the current monetary 
proiaems. If the solut ions are not spectacular or i f the e f for t s 
have not borne immediat^e f r u i t , the f a u l t does not l i e with the 
IMF. 
In th i s connection, we may r e f e r to the special 
d i f f i c u l t i e s which have increased because of the tremendous 
hike in o i l p r i c e s . The IMF f a c i l i t i e s ava i lab le to the develo-
ping countr ies are l imi ted . Their quotas are small and, there fore , 
t he i r normal drawing r i g h t s are a l so r e l a t i v e l y small . The SDR 
a l loca t ion to them are not s i g n i f i c a n t , as they are based on 
t h e i r subscr ipt ion quota to the IMF, The foreign exchange 
reserves of these countr ies a r e a lso very l imi ted . Under these 
condi t ions , the Oil F a c i l i t y , the Subsidy Account and the Trust 
Fluid have been se t up by the IMF spec i f i ca l ly to help the 
developing count r ies . 
41 
The Fund has been helping the developing countries 
in many other ways. I t has provided them technical advice 
through i t s experts . Besides, i t s t ra in ing programmes for 
o f f i c i a l s of cen t ra l banks i s being Improved upon and expanded. 
During I981-82, cord i t iona l l i q u i d i t y provided by 
IMF through i t s General Resources Accoxmt increased subs tan t i a l ly 
in terms of both aggregate commitments as well as in groos and 
net purchases, according to the IMF Annual Report, 1982. All 
of the new balance of payments ass i s tance made avai lab le by the 
P\ind during the f inanc ia l year , as well as new commitments, was 
to non-oi l developing coun t r i e s . 
Daring 198I-82, for the f i r s t time, the Fund's commit-
ments involved a higher proport ion of borrowed resources . Tlie 
Fund i s l i ke ly to continue to supplement i t s ordinary resources 
by borrowing in the next few years . In addi t ion , since quota 
subscr ipt ions are the primary source of the Fund's f inanc ia l 
r e sources , the Executive Board assigned high p r i o r i t y to i t s 
work on the eighth general review of quotas, with a view to 
completing t h i s not l a t e r than December, ,1983. On the other hand, 
there was no addi t ion to the stock of SDR af te r the l a s t SDR 
a l loca t ion of SDR h b i l l i o n in I98I . 
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Q:oss purchases by member-countries of the Rind 
increased from about SDR k,h b i l l i o n in 198O-8I to SDR 7.06 
b i l l i o n in 1981-82 and net purchases from SDR 1,9 b i l l i o n 
to SDR 5*0 b i l l i o n the highest l eve l of net purchases since 
197^. New commitments by the Fund under Standby and extended 
arrangement increased from SDR 10,3 b i l l i o n in I98O-8I to 
SDR $1,3 b i l l i o n in I98I-82. These canmitments included SDR 
5.0 b i l l i o n in an arrangement with India , the l a rges t commit-
ment in the h i s tory of the Fund. By the end of the f inanc ia l 
year on April 30, 1982, the aggregate commitments under eirrange-
ments outstanding had r i s en to SDR 16,2 b i l l i o n . 
Under-drawn balances under the aggregate commitments 
amounted to about SDR 11,2 b i l l i o n at the end of I98I-82, or 
about 68^ of commitments. This leve l re f lec ted the fac ts that 
(i) member's purchases are subject to phasing over the l i f e of an 
arrangements, which may be up to three years , and ( i i i ) ar range-
ments can beccane " inoperat ive" in tha t a m«nber may be unable 
to draw for reasons other than phasing of purchases. In most 
ca ses , standby arrangements have become inoperat ive because 
domestic c r e d i t expansion has exceeded the quantat ive ce i l ings 
se t in the prograwae, in seme cases , as the r e s u l t of unforeseen 
exogenous f a c t o r s . 
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The fund's review of upper c red i t tranche 
arrangements during the period 1971-8O shows tha t : Developing 
countr ies with Fund-sup ported programmes generally achieved 
a s ign i f ican t improvement in t h e i r balance of payments, and 
the r a t e of in f l a t ion rose l e s s in countr ies with Fund progra-
mmes than non-oi l developing countr ies as a whole. 
The Rmd commitments during I981-82 involved 
about SDR 6,0 b i l l i o n in borrowed resources under the pol icy 
of enlarged access , compared with SDR k,5 b i l l i o n in ordinary 
resources . To finance these growing commitments, the JUnd 
entered in to borrowing arrangements with the Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency and with the Central banks and o f f i c i a l agencies 
of ce r t a in i n d u s t r i a l and developing coun t r i e s . 
On 11th February, I983 the IMF increase the lending 
pool for member-countries, t-jhich are having f inanc ia l t rouble 
to about $ 99 b i l l i o n . This would be an increased of about k7% 
in the Fund's resources , compared with kO% sought by US delegate 
Treasury Secretary Donald T, Regan. Developing countr ies affirmed 
that quotas must "at l e a s t " be doubled in order to meet the 
financing requirements of o r i s i s - s t r i cken countr ies in the years 
immediately ahead. 
On February 12, I983, The Governor of the Reserve 
Bank of India , Dr. Kanmohan Singj^^who took p a r t in the jus t 
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concluded meeting of the interim Committee of the IMF, as 
an a l t e r n a t i v e Governor for Ind ia , welcomed ^e agreement on 
the expansion of the Fund's resources as a construct ive s t ep . 
The Committee has recommended an increase of about 
h7% in quota from the current level of SDKs 61 b i l l i o n to 
SDKs 90 b i l l i o n ( $ 9 9 b i l l i o n ) . At the same time he said that 
developing countries^ would have been happier had the increase 
been double the present size of the quotas as had been urged 
by than. 
In the case of India spec i f i ca l ly the quota has 
f a l l en from 2,8% to 2,h%, The effect i s tha t the voting power 
i s a lso reduced, the drop being fran 2,7% to 2,kfa, Another 
adverse effect i s t h a t ; the share of the country in any future 
issue of SDRs - which a re resources credi ted to the members of 
the Flind, which tiiey can draw without any condi t ional i t y r e q u i r e -
ments - w i l l a l so be adversely affected. However, as Dr. Manmohan 
Singh explained, because of the agreed increase in quotas, which 
has resu l ted in I n d i a ' s share going up from SDR 1,7 b i l l i o n to 
2.2 b i l l i o n , the country 's access t o PUnd f a c i l i t i e s has improved 
in absolute terms. 
Both Dr. Kanmohan Singh and Mr. R.N. Malhotra, 
Indians Executive Director of the Fund made i t c lear that Ind ia , 
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along with other developing coun t r i e s , attached the greates t 
importance to the access of t h i s group to the Rind f a c i l i t i e s 
being kept unimpaired. 
The IMF has co-operated with many in te rna t iona l 
organisat ions such as the World Bank and the GATT (The General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) to promote economic development 
of primary goods producing coun t r i e s . I t has introduced the 
scheme of Compensatory Financing to help developing countr ies 
whose export earning decl ine temporari ly. This move i s v/eloomed 
by observers since i t broadens the a c t i v i t i e s of the I^ Und on 
constrijctive l i n e s , I,t i s thus, c lear tha t the Fund has played 
or playing an important r o l e in the f i e l d of in t e rna t iona l 
f inance. 
Managing Director (At Present) : Jacques de Larosiere (France) 
Headquarter : 19th & l i s t N¥, Washington D,G, 20^31 
1. IMF, European Office, 2 . IMF represen ta t ives 
6^-66 avenue d ' l ena 58, rue de Moile bean, 
75116, Paris (France) 1202, Geneva (Switzerland) 
3 , IMF Office 
Room 2^-35, UN Headquarters 
New York, N,Y, 10017, U.S, 
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47 
SaOPE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE TOPIC 
The IMF i s a most inqportant f i nanc i a l i n s t i t u t i o n 
es tabl ished by the United Nations. The IMF has been playing 
a s ign i f ican t r o l e in a s s i s t i ng i t s member countr ies to cope 
with the d i f f i c u l t i e s and complex adjustment problems. The 
IMF's recent adjustment p o l i c i e s , which sha l l touch on the 
Fund's r o l e in exercis ing survei l lance over the exchange r a t e 
po l i c i e s and re l a t ed po l i c i e s of i t s member countr ies^ 
Due to the huge l i t e r a t u r e on the BIF, I am wr i t t ing 
few more l ines on the topic to show the importance and scope 
of i t . 
The IMF lending has a spec ia l character that 
d i s t inguishes i t from lending by other f inanc ia l i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
The I1«IF financing i s linked to cor rec t ive policy act ion in 
the borrowing count r i es -po l ic ies tiiat promise to put the 
econcany back on trade over medium term. The IMF seek to help 
and encourage i t s member countr ies to adjust in an orderly 
way tha t i s , before a c r i s i s has occurred and the country i s 
l e f t with no option but to take draconian ac t ion . Experience 
shows that the d is rupt ions tha t follows po l i c i e s born of 
c r i s i s are inevi tably damaging to na t iona l and in te rna t iona l 
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being The expansion in the IMF's 
f inanc ia l operation has been matched by a much greater 
emphasis on condi t ional f inancing. After the f i r s t wave 
of o i l p r i ce inc rease , some two th i rd of Fund lending was 
made under specia l f a c i l i t i e s not requir ing important 
measures of adjustment. But condit ions have changed, and 
th i s pol icy has been put to an end. Over the pas t two year 
more than 80^ of resources provided by the IMF to i t s members 
went in support of programs involving r igorous adjustment 
p o l i c i e s , 
Sound f i s c a l and monetary po l i c i e s are always a t 
the hear t of the programs. But since the balance of payments 
problems of many countr ies today are af te r a t t r i b u t a b l e to 
deep-rooted weakness, the IMF i s p lacing emphasis on measure 
to improve economic efficiency and to strengthen and productive 
base of members economies. Because of the more s t r u c t u r a l 
character of payments d e f i c i t s the P\md has strengthened i t s 
col laborat ion with World Bank. So as to ensure that over 
adjustment programs with member countr ies are consis tent with 
proper investment and production s t r a t e g i e s . 
The s c i e n t i f i c u t i l i t y of bibl iographic research i s 
paramou^. The savings in e f fo r t and time of a person reaps 
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in having ava i lab le comprehensive l i s t i n g of various 
types of documents. I was given the task of preparing a 
se lec t annotated bibliography of more than 2^0 a r t i c l e s on 
the IMP and i t s ro le in developing count r ies , as i t was 
supposed tha t i t might be great use t o the Researchers, 
Economists, S t a t i s t i c i a n s , Data Col lec to r s , and Financialmen. 
I^ THOD OF COMPILATION t 
Ihis survey i s based on the l i t e r a t u r e ava i lab le 
on the topic (The IMF and i t s r o l e in developing countries) 
in important l i b r a r i e s Viz. Maulana Azad Libra ry , Seminar 
Librar ies of Department of Commerce and Economics, A.M.U,, 
Aligarh, Delhi Public Library , Delhi , J.N.U. Library, Uew 
Delhi , Delhi IMiversi ty Library System, Delhi, Indian Council 
of World Affair L ibrary , New Delhi, Indian Council of Social 
Science Research Library, New Delhi, Indian I n s t i t u t e of 
Bcojanic Growth Library , Delhi, I n s t i t u t e of Foreign Trade 
Library , New Delhi, Indian I n s t i t u t e of Public Administration 
Library , New Delhi , Ratan Tata L ibra ry , Delhi School of 
Economics, Delhi Univers i ty , Delhi , B.H.U, Library, Yaranasi 
e t c , were made. All the important pe r iod ica l s and other 
re levant documents covering the subject f i e l d , were selected 
for t h i s purpose, Althisough th i s bibliography i s e s s en t i a l l y 
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se lec t ive in n a t u r e , I have t r i e d my leve l best to cover 
a l l aspects of the top ic . 
The re levan t bibl iographical notes from secondary 
sources were noted down on cards of 7" x ^" s i z e . Thereafter 
the primary sources were consulted and the annotation v/ere 
wr i t t en . 
The annotation has been taken to mean "notes" which 
go with the t i t l e and supplement t h i s information in i t , as 
dist inguished from an ' a b s t r a c t ' which i s a summary of the 
whole a r t i c l e containing the maximum poss ible and important 
information, arguments and conclusions. The secondary sources 
consulted are : 
T, Guide to Indian Per iodica l L i t e r a t u r e , 
2 , Index India , 
3 . Indian News Index, and 
h, Indian Press Index, 
A l i s t of primary per iod ica l s consulted including 
S e r i a l Humbera, Abbreviations used. Their r epresen ta t ive 
place of or ig in and frequency arranged a lphabe t ica l ly has 
been given on the page No, 
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STANDJiRD FOLLOWED : 
I have followed the Indian standard recommended 
for b ib l iographica l reference (19:2381-1963), the c l a s s i f i e d 
cataloguing Code of Dr. S.R. Ranganathan (CCC: M 5, 196?) 
repr in ted in 1965 and Indian standards recommended for 
abbreviat ion for t i t l e s of per iod ica l s (13:18-19^9) 1969 
repr in ts , 
ARRANGEMEaJT : 
Efforts have been made to arrange th« e n t r i e s 
under co-extensive subject headings. For th i s purpose a 
comprehensive l i s t of subject headings based on the termino-
logy used in Colon. Class i f i ca t ion , Library of Congress L i s t 
of Subject Headings, and Sear ' s L i s t of Subject Headings 
has been compiled. 
IJider the heading the en t r i e s a re arranged alpha-
betically by authors and then by t i t l e s . The entries are 
ser ia l ly numbered. The following items of information are 
continued in the various ent r ies , 
a) Serial number 
b) Name of the author/s 
c) A full Stop (.) 
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d) T i t l e of the contr ibut ion including s u b - t i t l e 
followed by colon (x) 
e) A PUll Stop (.) 
f) Ti t le of the pe r iod ica l in abbreviated form as 
far as poss ib l e . This i s to be under l ined. 
g) A Full Stop (.) 
h) Volume number 
i ) A comma ( ,) 
j) Issue number 
k) A semi colon (j) 
1) Year of publ ica t ion 
m) A comma (,) 
n) Month of Publicat ion 
o) A comma ( ,) 
p) Date of publ ica t ion 
q) A semi colon (;) 
r ) Inclusive pages 
s) A bracket ( ) 
t ) Column number : in case of News paper ' s published 
a r t i c l e . 
Specimen Eh t r y 
1. MAHROTRA (KN). In te rna t iona l monetary issues and the 
developing count r ies . For Tr Bui. 10, 1j 1979,J1; 1-5, 
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Ebcplanatlon : 
Mr. K.N. Mahrotra's a r t i c l e appears in the Foreign 
trade b u l l e t i n , having volume number 10 and i t s i ssue 
number i s 1. I t was published in July 1979, from page 
number 1 to 5» 
2, BEDI (Soresh). IMP loan & recession : An analys is of 
r e l a t i o n s h i p . Boon Times. 9, 2^3; I982, Nv, 26; 5 (3 -6 ) . 
Egplanation : 
Hr. Soresh Bedi 's a r t i c l e appear in Economic Times 
da i ly Biglish news .paper. I t s volume number i s 9 and issue 
number i s 2^3 on Nov«nber t982, on page 5 from column number 
3 to 6. 
ALPHABETICAL INDEX 
Bibliography contains an exhaustive author , t i t l e 
and subject index. 
54 
LIST OF PERIODICALS DOOTMBNTED ( A l p h a b e t i c a l l y ) 
S.Ho. Abbreviated form Name of per loc l ica l P l a c e of Frequency 
P u b l i c a t i o n 
1, Awrita Baz P a t 
2, Banker 
3, Can J Eco 
k. Cap i t a l 
5. Century 
6. Chl l Econ Rep 
7. Commerce 
8. Dev & Socio-Econ 
Prog 
9. Eas te rn Econ 
10. Econ Affair 
1 1 . Econ'& Po l WKLy 
12. Scon Dig 
13. Boon Rev 
1^-. Econ Stud 
15. Econ Times 
Amrita Bazar P a t r i k a Ca lcu t t a Daily 
The Banker 
Canadian J o u r n a l 
of Economics 
C a p i t a l 
The Century 
Chi le Economic 
Report 
Commerce 
Development and 
So c i o - EcJonofflid i 
P r o g r e s s 
Eas te rn Economist 
Economic Affair 
Economic and 
P o l i t i c a l Weekly 
Economic Diges t 
Economic Review 
Economic S t u d i e s 
Economic Times 
New Delhi Monthly 
Canada Quarter ly 
Ca lcu t t a ^ e k l y 
New Delhi Weekly 
Chile Quar ter ly 
Bombay Weekly 
Afro-Asian Quar ter ly 
Peop le ' s 
S o l i d a r i t y 
Organ iza t ion 
New Delhi Weekly 
Ca lcu t t a Quar ter ly 
Bombay Weekly 
A B r i t i s h Quar ter ly 
ReviewCim) 
Welwyn Quarter ly 
Garden City ' 
New Delhi Daily 
New Delhi Bi-monthly 
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16. Boon Trnd 
17. Econ VSdy . 
18. Pin & Dev 
19. Pinan Ejcpr 
20. For Tr Bui 
2 1 . Hindu 
22. HT 
23. Bndian J . Comm 
2^. I n d i a n & Fbr Rev 
2 5 . I n t e r Econ 
26. J a n t a 
27. Jan Bui 
28. J Dev Stud 
29. l i n k 
30. Mainstream 
3 1 . Margin 
32. Mys Econ Rev 
33. Or i s Indus 
3^-. Pak Adra 
Economic Trend 
Economic Weekly 
Finance and Devel-
opment 
F i n a n c i a l Express 
Foreign Trade 
B u l l e t i n 
The Hindu 
The Hindustan Times 
The Indian Journal 
of Commerce 
Indian and Foreign 
Review 
Inter-Economic s 
Janta 
Janta Bulletin 
Journal of Develop-
ment Studies 
Link 
Mainstream 
Margin 
The Mysore Economic 
Review 
Or i s sa I n d u s t r y 
P a k i s t a n 
Admin i s t ra t ion 
New Delhi Bi-monthly 
Bombay Weekly 
A q u a r t e r l y Quar ter ly 
P u b l i c a t i o n 
of IMF & 
WDrld Bank 
New Delhi Daily 
New Delhi Monthly 
Madras Daily 
New Delhi Daily 
Commerce Quarter ly 
Assoc ia t ion 
Luc know 
New Delhi F o r t n i g h t l y 
Hamburg Monthly 
Bombay Weekly 
New Delhi Weekly 
London Quarter ly 
New Delhi Weekly 
New Delhi Weekly 
New Delhi !:2^arterly 
Banglore I 'onthly 
Bhuna shwar I'on th ly 
Lahore "ia I f -Year ly 
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35. Pak & Gulf Econ 
36. People' s D«ao 
37. Socia Persp 
38, Southern Econ 
39. Sunday 
Pakistan and Gulf K?.rachi Vfe'^ kly 
Economist 
People ' s Democracy New Delhi Vfe Jcly 
S o c i a l i s t 
Perspect ive 
Council 
for 
P o l i t i c a l 
Studies, 
Calcutta 
Southern Economist Banglore 
Sunday 
i^arterly 
~>A i -monthly 
Calcutta Weekly 
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L i s t of Other Abbrevia t ions Used 
A Annual Number 
Ag August 
Ap r Apr i l 
OFF Compensatory Financing F a c i l i t y 
De December 
EEC European Economic Community (Cooanon market) 
EFF Extended F i n a n c i a l F a c i l i t y 
Fe February 
GAB General Agreement to Borrow 
GATT General Agreement on Tar i f f and Trade 
GDP Gross Domestic P roduc t s 
GNP Gross Na t iona l P roduc t s 
IBRD I n t e r n a t i o n a l Bank for Recons t ruc t ion and 
Development (World Bank) 
IDA I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund (Fund) 
J a January 
J e June 
J l J u l y 
LDCs L e s s A ' e a s t Developed Countr ies 
ra Killlon 
MDCs More Developed Count r ies 
Mr March 
MSA Most Se r ious ly Affected 
5S 
My 
NIBO 
Nv 
Oc 
OECD 
OPEC 
RBI 
SDRs 
Se 
SFF 
TF 
UK 
UN 
US 
USA 
UNCTAD 
£ 
May 
New I n t e r n a t i o n a l Economic Order 
November 
October 
Organ i sa t ion for Economic Co-operat ion and 
Development 
Organ iza t ion of Pe t ro l ium Export ing Countr ies 
Reserve Bank of I n d i a 
Spec ia l Drawing Rights 
Sep tember 
Supplamentary Financing F a c i l i t y 
Trus t Pand 
United Kingdom 
United Nat ions 
^United S t a t e s 
United S t a t e s of America 
United Nat ions Conference on Trade and 
Development 
Pound 
Dol lar 
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 
CREDIT CANCELLATION, BANGLADESH 
1. SHIRAZE (A ZakaTia) • IMF freezes aid to Bangladesh. 
Commerce. 1M, 3716; 1982, Ag, 28? 3^1. 
Bangladesh w i l l hot get the remaining 580 mil l ion 
SDR out of 800 mil l ion SDR which the IMF had committed in 
December 1980. The IMF fond had been meant for financing 
Bangladesh's balance of payments d e f i c i t for three months 
and the l imited purpose ass i s tance was no longer opera t ive . 
So far IMF has disbursed 220 mil l ion SDR in three ins ta lments . 
The remaining 580 mil l ion SDR was not disbursed desp i te 
reminders. Under the agreement, 31930.30 mi l l ion SDR was 
under extended fund f a c i l i t y and ^80.70 mil l ion SDR was 
under supplementary fund f a c i l i t y . This aid freeze by IMF 
has caused siirprise in f i n a n c i a l c i r c l e s , espec ia l ly since 
Bangladesh had lmpl«nented some of IMF's cont rovers ia l 
cond i t l ona l i t i e s • 
CREDIT CANCELLATION, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
2. IMF OJTS loans . Econ I m d . 11 , 9; 1982, >fy, 1; 1^-. 
The IMF has cut off more than l A t h of the loans 
made by i t to f inanc ia l ly troubled countr ies due to the 
i n a b i l i t y of the borrowing countr ies to meet i t s requirements. 
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The cut offs involve an estimated $ h,9 b i l l i o n in undrawn 
por t ions of one and three year balance of payments loans 
to 15 countr ies Including Romanift and the Solomon I s l a n d s . 
The f igure amounts to almost 27% of the $ 18.M- b i l l i o n in 
loans that the IMP had authorised in the current year . 
CREDIT, BALAHCE OP PA:2MBNTa 
3 . COLTER (David S ) . T' G^ iqu id i ty of the IMF. Fin & Dev 
16, 2; 1979, J«; 36-9. 
Since the beginning of 197^, the IMF has provided 
uprecedentedly large amounts of balance of paym«nts financing 
to i t s members. In doing so , i t has made extensive use of 
borrowing and drawn heavily on i t s o\ii resources . As a r e s u l t , 
increased a t t en t ion has been focused on the l i q u i d i t y of the 
fund. That i s , the re la t ionsh ip between the demands tha t 
might be made on the fundus resources and the means the fund 
has ava i lab le to meet these demand. 
If, DOLLARS ONE hundred mi l l ion c red i t from IMF. Eastern Beon. 
^ 1 , 2; 1963, J l , 12; 8 l . 
The IMF made a standby arranganent with government 
of India for the drawings of $ 100 mil l ion from the fund over 
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the next twelve mcaiths. Net drawings from the fund on the 
p a r t of Indian Government cur ren t ly amount to $ 250 mi l l ion . 
Indians iqpiota In the fund la 600 mi l l i on , of ^ I c h $ 77.5 
mi l l ion has been paid in Gold. The standby arrangement w i l l 
help the Indian a u t h o r i t i e s to meet any temporary d i f f i c u l t i e s 
in the count ry ' s balance of paymmts s i t u a t i o n . 
5, GDLATI ( I S ) . Interim measures in In te rna t iona l finance 
and development. E6on and Pol Vflclv. 12,19; 1977, My, 7; 
768-72. 
Proposals are current ly under d iscuss ion , under the 
aegis of the IMF, to crea te a new fund or c r ed i t f a c i l i t y to 
a s s i s t n a t i o n s , developed as well as developing, with acute 
balance of payments d i f f i c u l t i e s . Create add i t iona l SDR*s 
of tJie order of -3t b i l l i o n and subs tan t i a l ly expand IMF quotas, 
What do these proposals add up for the developing countr ies ? 
Even if these proposals do Imply sane gain for the developing 
coun t r i e s , do they go for enough to meet the balance of 
pajnnents d i f f i c u l t i e s vrtiich these countr ies are l i ke ly to face 
In the foreseeable future ? 
6 . HBJNBSSY (Joss leyn) . Vietnam: The Pres iden t ' s s ix th p o i n t ? 
Eastern Bgon. 50, 3; 1968, J a , 19; 101-3. 
After world war I I , under TCeynes' i n s p i r a t i o n . 
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determined e f fo r t s were made to avoid a r e p e t i t i o n of the 
inter-war depression and autorky and to r e s t o r e in t e rna t iona l 
t r ade , Bie IMF emerged. I t was not qui te what Keynes 
wanted. I t s i n i t i a l resources were $ 8,000 mil l ion instead 
of 25,000 mi l l ion . Keynes wanted the IMF to c rea te depos i t s , 
instead Iftiey consisted of member count ry ' s subscript ion to 
the IMF. Each country 's was one quar ter in gold, three 
quar ters in i t s own currfflicy. Ultimately i t could draw cut 
the ^ o l e of i t s quota in gold or forgign exchange, i . e . four 
times as much gold as i t had subscribed. This was how the 
IMF added to in t e rna t iona l l i q u i d i t y . The IMF lends money 
to a country for a period and on condi t ions . Vlhile the IMF 
does a f ine job in helping countr ies over tenqDorary balance 
of payments d i f f i c u l t i e s , i t i s not equipped to solve pe r s i s t en t 
d e f i c i t s and t h i s for the Ixs ic reason tha t the countr ies of 
the world w i l l no longer accept . A s ingle world monetary 
au thor i ty CCMItrolling c r e d i t hf means of a world reserve 
currency attached to gold. 
7. IMF CREDIT to Ind ia . Eastern Eeon. 50, 1; 1968, J a , 5; 19^ 
The IMF has approved a drawing of an equivalent of 
$ 90 mil l ion by India to meet payments d i f f i c u l t i e s caused by 
a temporary s h o r t f a l l In export earnings during the year ended 
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August 3 1 , 1967. I n d i a ' s t o t a l quota in the fund I s $ 750 
mi l l ion . Outstanding drawings current ly t o t a l $ ^17.5 mi l l i on . 
8. KONRAD (Anton) . Should the IMF r e s o r t to p r i v a t e c red i t 
markets for refinancing ? In te r Ecoa. 17> 2; I982, Mr-/^, 
7 t - ^ . 
The IMF i s a t present examining the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
borrowing on p r iva t e c a p i t a l markets in order to meet i t s 
growing refinancing needs. Reservations concerning such a step 
have been voiced in pa r t i cu l a r by the oii- importing developing 
coun t r i e s . The IMF t r i ed to meet the Increased demand for 
o f f i c i a l balance of paymoita financing by means of the policy 
of enlarged access . Vhereas the use of the c r ed i t tranches 
was o r ig ina l ly r e s t r i c t e d to 100^ of the quota, i t was extended 
in Magr.j I98I to an annual- level of 1^0% of the quota or k50% 
over a ttiree-year period. Cunsilative borrowing can amount to 
600J^ of the quota. The fund with SDR 1.1 b i l l i o n over a period 
of two years to finance the pol icy of enlarged access . The 
IMF i s a t present viewed only as a means of bridging the gap 
u n t i l con^letlon of the next quota Increases . 
9. LAKSHMANAN (TJN) . I n t e rna t i ona l l i q u i d i t y and monetary 
measures. Econ Affairs . 20, 12; 1975, De; 1+85-9^. 
In recent years has been the slow growth of i n t e r -
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na t iona l l i q u i d i t y compared to the growth of i n t e rna t iona l 
t rade . The IMP ohser-wea tha t althDOugh the ncminal value 
of global reserves increased by ^S% during 197^j r e a l reserves 
decl ine as expert pr ice rose by 35^ to hO%. Vbrld reserves 
which were 57% of the value of imports in 1958 had dwindled 
to 36% by 1967. The present monetory arrangement under the 
IMF to c rea te enough l i q u i d i t y for financing world t rade . 
The IMF to adopt a l t e r n a t i v e s teps to meet the in t e rna t iona l 
l i qu id i t y could be increased by through ra i s ing the quota of 
every member country of the IMF, which would enable the fund 
to grant l a rge r accomodation to the countr ies suffering from 
balance of payments problems. The IMF to mobilise quickly 
large addi t iona l resources in defence of the in t e rna t iona l 
monetary system. 
10. LARGE IMF c r e d i t , other announced. Chile Econ Rep. 
135; 1982, Jl-Ag; h. 
The C3iilean Government has negotiated on $ 8OO 
mill ion standby c red i t with the IMP. The loan, in the form 
of SDRs, wi l l be used to strengthen the count ry ' s reserve 
pos i t ion to compensate for lower exports and a favourable 
balance of payments r e su l t ing from the i n t e rna t i ona l recession. 
The loan i s expected to case other Chilean e n t i t i e s ' acess to 
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in te rna t iona l c r ed i t markets. A number of other s igni f icant 
c r e d i t s was announced in recent year. 
11. RAI (Kar t ik) . IMF and the thi rd world : The case of 
Jamica. People ' s Demo. 5, 21; 1981, My, 2^; h. 
The Association of the Third T^rld Economists, 
meeting recent ly in Havana, referred to the IMF and the IBRD 
as the "self appointed gendarmes of the in t e rna l l i f e of 
nat ions seeking the i r a id" . The growing power of the IMF and 
"the i r r e spons ib le and arrogant way in vAiich i t i s being 
wielded agains t the poor", the story has repeated i t s e l f over 
and over again. The l a t e s t example of successful sabotage 
attempt by the IMF i s Jamica. Between 1950 and 1970 Jamica 's 
extennal debt increased by 1 b i l l i o n do l l a r s and the servicing 
of t h i s growing debt contributed to the payments d e f i c i t and 
made further borrowing necessary. In shor t , Jamaica, pr ior 
to 1972, was a typ ica l example of neo-colonial explo i ta t ion 
with growing poverty and unemployment for the people and the 
growing s t rangle hold of in t e rna t iona l finance c a p i t a l and the 
iffiiltilinger be covered. The IMF, as u sua l , put forward i t s 
pet diagnosis that Jamaica 's payments c r i s i s could be over come 
by ' cu r t a i l i ng supply, imposing d ra s t i c r e a l wage-cuts and 
reducing public invesianent as well as welfare and r e l i e f 
expenditure. The IMF promptly agreed to give 698 mill ion do l l a r s 
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to the new, "acceptable" Government vdiich replaced Manley's. 
CREDIT, BALANCE OF TRADE, DEVELOPING COQNTRIES 
12. IMP WARNING against protect ionism. Eastern Econ. 
69, 12; 1977, Se, 16; 556-7. 
The IMF has warned tha t continued protectionism in 
some countr ies w i l l harm the open in t e rna t iona l t rading system. 
The domestic and external economic d i f f i c u l t i e s of many count r ies , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y , unemployment, have r i s e to presures for p ro tec t ion i s ' 
measures. The o i l -expor t ing countr ies emerged as the 
pr inc ipa l surplus group. The combined current account d e f i c i t 
of non-oil developing countr ies w i l l be about the same as the 
resealed d i f i c i t for 1967-72. These countr ies and the more 
now concentrated in a an a l l number of countr ies whose capacity 
to expand imports i s comparatively low in r e l a t i o n to the i r 
export earnings. Non-oil producing countr ies reduced their 
current account d e f i c i t from 38 b i l l i o n do l l a r in 1975 to $ 26 
b i l l i o n in 1976. 
13. LITTLE (IMD). Import cont ro ls and exports in developing 
countr ies Fin & Dev. 15, 3; 1978, 3e; 20-3. 
The use of import cont ro ls by developing countr ies 
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i s enshrined in m u l t i l a t e r a l trade agreements and i s 
supported by an i n f l u e n t i a l body of l i t e r a t u r e and thought 
vAiich has emerged since 19^5. The main aspects of the 
t heo re t i c a l debate and p r a c t i c a l experience with cont ro ls . 
On the bas is of recent research and ana lys i s . The view i s that 
poor export performance and i ne f f i c i en t production for 
domestic markets can be d i r ec t l y re la ted to the excessive use 
of trade controls by developing countr ies . 
1!^ . MANJAPPA (HD). Recent teends in terms of t rade . 
Eastern Econ. 11^ 10; 1981, Se, M-; 1+59-60. 
Even as the trade between the non-oi l developing 
countr ies and indus t ra l i sed countr ies has expanded considerably, 
the balance of trade has gone markedly against the LDCs, This 
has been due mainly to the depressed p r i ce of primary products 
exported by these count r ies . We can go a long way in mit igat ing 
the imbalance in the trade between the non-oil exporting 
countr ies and the r e s t of the world. 
t 5 . SEIfGUPTA (ABjun), Trade problems of developing economics. 
Scon Wkly. 17, 5-7; 1965, Fe; 187-92. 
The most important p re requ i s i t e for progress in any 
theoris ing about the i n t e rna t i ona l economics of development 
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today, the problems of foreign trade and c a p i t a l flows 
associated with the economic growth of the developing countr ies 
i s a clear awareness of the problems faced by the developing 
economics and a careful sor t ing out of the basic issue involved. 
The net inflow of long-terin cap i t a l i n to the developing 
countr ies looks br igh te r . The annual average of such t o t a l 
ne t inflow was $ 2.6 b i l l i o n during 1951-55, $ ^ . 7 b i l l i o n 
during 1956-59, and $ 6.0 b i l l i o n during 1960-62. Bat t h i s 
has not bas ica l ly modified the dependence of the developing 
countr ies on merchandise exports as the i r p r i nc ipa l source of 
foreign exchange. 
16. SRI RAO-International Economic r e l a t i o n s . Mvs Econ Rev. 
67,8; T982, Ag; 3-5. 
The changes in IMF regula t ing , recognit ion of the 
need for t ransfer of resources for development purposes, 
negot ia t ion r e l a t i n g to code of conduct on t ransfer of 
technology are p a r t of these e f for t s to r ec t i fy the 
asynometrical r e l a t ionsh ip between the Developed and the 
Developing countr ies . But these e f for t s have remained feeble. 
Most of the gains tha t the developing countr ies have made in 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l negot ia t ions has been conceptional. I t has 
sprouted a des i re to a t t a i n economic development and equal i ty . 
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This has led to a meet to bring about changes in the pa t t e rn 
of t rade and economic r e l a t i o n s . There i s increasing perception 
tha t the present economic system need to be reoriented to take 
in to account the developments in the l a s t two or three 
decades to make i t responsive to the trade and development 
needs of the developing countr ies . 
CREDIT, BALAJTCE OF TRADE, INDIA 
17. IMF AID. EC on Trnd. 9, 17; 1980, Se, 1; 15. 
The IMF has granted a c red i t of Rs. 2 8 2 . ^ crores 
to India towards meeting balance of t rade problems. The slack 
demands for Indian products abroad and growing in t e rna t iona l 
protectionism has effected country ' s foreign currency earnings 
with Indian ag r i cu l t u r a l production having declined by 10^ due 
to l a s t y e a r ' s draught. 
T 8 . RAI (Kar t ik) . ^ i ; Massive trade d e f i c i t : Search for "Aid" 
and Loan. People ' s Demo. 5, 2^; 198l, J e , ^h',h. 
In 1979-00 and 198O-81, India has witnessed a sharp 
in f la t ionary upsurge, an upsurge affect ing a wide range of 
commodities including foodgrains. A second implication of the 
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growth trade d e f i c i t i s the f ran t i c search for foreign loans 
and "aid". jHie economic survey, on the basis of an estimated 
R&, HOOO crores trade d e f i c i t , had predicted a Rs. 2000 crores 
d e f i c i t in current account of the balance of payments. Since 
the ac tua l trade d e f i c i t has turned out to be much l a rge r , the 
current d e f i c i t has obviously a lso been correspondingly l a rge r . 
Despite the IMF loan vAiich India took l a s t year , as well as the 
la rger cotemercial borrowing than even before, reserves has 
obviously been depleted to a much la rger extend than was 
an t i c ipa ted . 
19. RAI (Kar t ik) . : New export-import pol icy . People ' s Demo. 
6,16; 1982, Ap, 18; h. 
The new export-import pJilicy, announced on April 5, 
marks an important step in the process of the t ightening of 
the IMF grip on the economy. In the secret agreement signed 
between the IMF and the Indian Government, i t was e x p l i c i t l y 
s ta r ted tha t the IMF loan would be terminated, among other 
th ings , i f "India imposes or i n t e n s i f i e s import r e s t r i c t i o n s for 
balance of payments reasons". As a further c l a r i f i c a t i o n , the 
Indian Government had promised to the IMF in i t s "statement of 
pol icy", tha t "the import p o l i c i e s for 1982-83 and 1983-8lf wi l l 
contain s igni f icant steps aimed a t l i b e r a l i s i n g imports". Now 
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i t has made good tha t promise made to i t s IMF masters,Our 
balance of payments c r i s i s , far from get t ing a l l e v i a t e d , i s 
worsening. The trade d e f i c i t in 1981-82 i s going to be about 
6000 crores of rupees. 
20. UMMAT (RG). Trade bet t t f i , payment worse. Eastern Econ. 
78, 3; 1982, J a , 22; 119-22. 
The sharp de te r io ra t ion in I n d i a ' s external t rade 
balance since 1976-77 should get mitigated t h i s year a t l e a s t 
to some extent notwithstanding the growth i n export as well as 
the decl ine in imports leaving much to be desired in terms of 
pro jec t ions . The trade gap narrowing down to Rs. 2,923 crores 
from Rs, 3,lMf crores during the corresponding period l a s t 
year. 'Qie adverse t rade balance in 198O-81 aggregated to over 
Rs, 5j700 crores . The external t rade d e f i c i t , through modestly, 
indeed, i s a matter of some g r a t i f i c a t i o n . But, surely, t h i s 
ought not make us canplacement. Only recent ly accommodation 
has been secured to as l a rge an extent as SDRs 5 b i l l i o n from 
the IMF, under i t s extended f a c i l i t y arrang«nent for a period 
of three years during \^4iich the balance of payments pos i t ion 
has to be restored to the even kee l . The SDRs holdings a t the 
end of March, 1981, were of the order of h•^0.5 mi l l ion , and 
gold holdings to the tune of Rs. 225.58 crores . 
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21 . VERGHESE (SK). In t e rna t iona l monetary c r i s e s and the 
Indian rupee. Econ Jl Pol Vtelv. 8, 30; 1973, J l , 28; 13^2-8. 
India i s affected by the current i n t e rna t iona l monetary 
d is turbances , pa r t i cu l a r ly because of t h e i r u n s e t t l i n g effects 
on i t s exports and in^or t s and because of i t s increased burden 
of servicing and repayment ob l iga t ions in strong currencies 
such as yen or the D-mark-Howeverm developing countr ies l i k e 
India are not in a pos i t ion to s ign i f ican t ly influence the 
course of events in the i n t e rna t i ona l monetary scene, except 
perhaps by a j o i n t stand. In the circumstances, they have no 
other immediate option but to adjust their exchange r a t e p o l i c i e s 
and prograjnmes to the emerging exchange market s i tua t ion with 
a view to minimising the adverse effects of the monetary 
upheavals on thei r own trade and payments pos i t ion . Exfllange 
r a t e s and exchange controls are not p o l i c i e s persue but j u s t 
too ls to be used effect ively to serve the best i n t e r e s t s of the 
country. I t i s naive to take exchange r a t e s as sacrosanct . 
Devaluation has acquired an ©motive connotation in Ind ia , so 
tha t unless we begin to look a t the i ssue involved with an 
open mind, we wi l l deny ourselves the advantages a r i s ing from 
the use of one of the most important tools for managing our 
balance of payments. How has the Indian rupee fared during 
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the recent monetary upheavals; i s the current rupee exchange 
r a t e r e a l i s t i c j -what impact do the current r a t e s have on I n d i a ' s 
balance of payments; what considerat ions are re levant for 
evolving a r e a l i s t i c rupee exchange r a t e policy? 
CREDIT, BALAJTCE OF TRADE, NORWAY 
22, BALASSA (Bela). I n d u s t r i a l development in an open economy: 
The case of Norway. Fin & Dev. 7 , 1 ; 1970, Mr; 28-33, 
Norway has successfully pursued policy tha t might be 
followed wi+h advantage by developing countr ies that have 
already b u i l t an i n d u s t r i a l base , tha t of expanding manufacturing 
indus t r i e s in the framework of an open economy with low t a r i f f 
b a r r i e r s . 
CREDIT, BALANCE OF TRADE, TUNISIA 
23, CALAMITSIS (Evangelos A). S tab i l i za t ion problssns and 
po l i c i e s in Tianisia. Fin & Dev. 7 ,3 ; 1970, Se; ^3-8 . 
Tunisia a t ta ined independence in 1956 as a beylik 
or monarchy, and was proclaimed a republic the following year. 
The Tunisian Government devoted much of i t s a t t en t ion to the 
task of defining and consolidating the count ry ' s economic and 
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p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n with the r e s t of the world an<i wanted to 
improved t r a d e b a l a n c e , r a i s i n g fo re ign exchange r e s e r v e s , 
and a comfortable budgetary p o s i t i o n . The government launched 
i t s f i r s t o p e r a t i o n a l p l a n , the Three-Year-Plan cover ing t h e 
per iod 1962 through 196^. T u n i s i a ' s c r i t i c a l f i n a n c i a l 
s i t u a t i o n i n mid 196^- posed a grave t h r e a t , not only to the 
ga ins a l ready achieved under the three-Year P lan but a l s o to 
the p r o s p e c t of f u r t h e r e f f o r t s to promote the growth of the 
economy. In October 196^ a comprehensive s t a b i l i z a t i o n program 
for t h e gradual r e s t o r a t i o n of i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l ba lance . 
The IMF approved a one-year s tand-by arrangement for Tunisia 
i n the amount of $ 1^.25 m i l l i o n , which was f u l l y u t i l i z e d . 
The par va lue of DI = US $ 1.90^76 was agreed with the IMF 
and become e f f e c t i v e on September 28 , 196M-, The exchange 
r a t e adjustment was accompanied by c e r t a i n changes i n expor t 
and import d u t i e s , 
CREDIT, OIL FACILITY 
2*+, GULATI ( I S ) . Oil p r i c e s and Inibrld monetary scene : IMF's 
a b d i c a t i o n , Eco and P o l . Mclv. 15 , 5-7; 1980, Fe; I+07-8A. 
The IMF organised a s u b s t a n t i a l r e c y c l i n g of funds 
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from the countr ies with payments surpluses to the countr ies with 
payments d e f i c i t s under m u l t i l a t e r a l auspices and for the 
purpose was the o i l f a c i l i t y . Compared to ttie gross i n t e r -
group imbalance of $ 101 b i l l i o n in 197^ and 1975, This special 
IMF f a c i l i t y couM only come for th with something l i ke | 7.9 
(SDR 6.5) b i l l i o n . Other drawings fron the fund in the course 
of the same two years , amounted to $ 6.3 (SDR 5.2) b i l l i o n . 
The IMF e i ther i s prepared or i s preparing to meet the possible 
new demands for f inanc ia l intermediat ion. True, PUnd quotas 
w i l l soon be revised from SDR 39 b i l l i o n to SDR 59 b i l l i o n . A 
new SDR a l loca t ion of SDR 12 b i l l i o n wi l l have been made 
between 1979 and 1^1 and a supplementary financing f a c i l i t y has 
been set up with funds amounting to SDR 7*75 b i l l i o n to a s s i s t 
members with balance of payments tha t are la rge r e l a t i v e to 
the i r quotas. 
25. IMF : Use of o i l f a c i l i t y . Capi tal . 17^, ^3^7; 1975, 
Ja^ 23; 111. 
During the pas t yea r s , 33 m«nber countr ies of IMF 
used the o i l f a c i l i t y , drawing amounts of currencies which 
t o t a l l ed the equivalent of 1,716 mill ion SDRs. Of t h i s the 
purchases were made by India t o t a l l i n g SDR 200 mil l ion. 
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26. INDIA TO seek IMF aid. Econ Trnd. 9 ,1^ ; 1980, J l , l 6 j l5 . 
India w i l l seek the IMF for a c r ed i t of about Rs. 300 
c rores from i t s o i l f a c i l i t y . This wi l l be in addit ion to 
Rs. 5^ crore loan from the IMF Trust Fund already granted. 
CREDIT REPA2MEHT, INDIA 
27. IMF GRANTS repayment concessions. Eastern Econ. 50,3; 
1968, J a , 19; 111. 
The IMF has agreed to I n d i a ' s request for adjustment 
in the repayment of some of i t s c r e d i t s . I t wi l l a lso accept 
repayment in easy insta lments . Repayment of the $ 187.5 mill ion 
loan, drawn in April 1966 and repayable by December 31, l a s t 
year has been extended u n t i l March, 1971. A stand-by 
arranganent of $ 200 mi l l ion , drawn in March, 1965 and 
repayable in October t h i s year , has been extended by ti-zo years 
to October 1970. Normally, IMF loan run for a term of three 
to five years . The March 1965 stand-by arrang«nent of f 200 
mi l l ion , i n i t i a l l y for three yea r s , but payable only in October 
t h i s year a f t e r taking in to account ce r ta in adjustment, i s being 
extended by another two years to make a fu l l -year term. 
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28. NATH (SK). : •• ^coaomy in 196V65. Econ 14cly. 17,9; 
1965, Fe, 27; H03-6. 
The r a t e of growth of i n d u s t r i a l production during 
1 96lf-65 may a t best work out to be 8^, t h i s wi l l be ^% l e s s 
than the r a t e for 1963-6^. During 1963-6*+ there had been some 
opt imis t ic developments. Our foreign exchange reserves had 
increased a l i t t l e (by Rs. 10.8 crores) and we had also repaid 
a modest sum of Rs. 23.8 crore to the IMF, During the current 
f inancia l year our exports have continued to r i s e , but a 
la rge pa r t of t h i s increase has earned no free foreign 
exchange, because i t has gone to the rupee payment countr ies . 
This i s a c r i t i c a l posi t ion pa r t i cu l a r l y because the next six 
months are going to be lean season for exports and became 
over the next I6 months there i s a repayment obl igat ion of 
Rs. 95 crores to the IMF. 
29. SWAMY (Subramaniam). IMF loan cause of recess ion. H. T. 
59, 196; 1982, J l , 18; 8 (1-2) . 
The termination of the Rs. 5,000 crore IMF loan, 
a l leging tha t i t had led to a recession in the country 's 
economy. Kie country 's economy had been h i t by recession 
following a c r ed i t squeeze d ic ta ted by the IMF. The d isas t rous 
implicat ions of the loan would be f e l t only a f te r 1 9 ^ when the 
- j^,' ^ix: No ^ \ '*^\ 
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nation begins repaying i t along with the i n t e r e s t of 12^ per 
annum. This would work out to Rs. 10,000 crore per annum for 
nine years . Besides the IMF loan, the country would have to 
pay a foreign debt of Rs. 15)000 crore. This would mean that 
^0% of the country 's export earnings would be used for 
repayment. 
EXCHANffE RATES 
30. ACHIEVLI (Bijan B). Exchange r a t e po l i c i e s of selected 
Asian count r ies . Fin & Dev. 19, 2; I982, J e ; 39-^2. 
The varying experience of seven Asian countr ies 
facing similar r a t e s of Imported Inf la t ion shows the importance 
of coordinating monetajpy and exchange r a t e p o l i c i e s in these 
count r ies . The exchange r a t e p o l i c i e s of Ind ia , Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, the Phi l ipp ines , Singapore and Thailand in 
1973-78 reveals tha t countr ies with higher r a t e s of in f l a t ion 
pegged t h e i r currency to the U.S. do l l a r and those with lower 
in f l a t i on r a t e s adopted managed f l o a t . The exchange r a t e i s 
generally regarded as affect ing resources a l loca t ion through 
i t s Impact on three section : the export , import competing, 
and non-traded sec t ions . 
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3 1 . BROV*I (Brendan) . New tasks for the IMF. Econ Dig. 
1; 1977, Se; 10-2. 
With the demise of the era of fixed p a r t i e s , the 
IMF entered a period of t r a n s i t i o n . Describes some of the 
changing ro l e s of the IMF, the new code on f loa t ing exchange 
r a t e s , and the witleveen fund for lending to less-developed 
count r ies . Members must not manipulate exchange r a t e s in 
order to prevent effect ive balance of payments adjustment 
or to gain unfair competitive advantage. Maintenance of an 
Mshange r a t e in terms of the SDR, or another denomination. A 
currency vdiosc exchange i s t ied to the SDR i s the Saudi r i y a l 
i s an example. Co-operative arrangement by which members 
maintain the value of the i r ciirrencies of other members. 
32. BRHARDT (Barbara). Floating exchange r a t e s and the i r 
problems for the developing count r ies . In te r Econ. 12, 1/2; 
1977, Ja-Fe , 29-3^-. 
The f i e rce r e s i s t ance of the developing countr ies 
to the syst«n of f loat ing exchange r a t e s which the indust r ia l ize( 
countr ies are favouring a t p resen t . The consequences of floating 
r a t e s for the foreign t rade , indebtedness and reserves of the 
developing countr ies and the i r implicat ions for the s i tua t ions 
in the i r danes t ic economies as a whole. In early 1976 has se t 
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the sea l on viliat had been common p r a c t i c e : I t la id down 
tha t IMF members may choose the i r owi exchange r a t e s syst«n. 
Floating exchange r a t e s are thus no longer contrary to the 
IMF s t a t u t e s . 
33 . GOLDSTEIN (Morris) and ^UNG (John H). Exchange r a t e 
pol icy: Some current i s sues . Fin & Dev. 16, 1; 1979, _ ^ r y 
7-10. 
Over the pas t few years there have been subs tan t i a l 
changes in the s t ruc tu re of exchange r a t e s and a lso marked 
short - run f luc tua t ions . Aggregate pr ice Indices for the 
various groups of countr ies show tha t the exchange r a t e system 
has been operating in recent years in the context of high and 
var iab le in f l a t ion . The average r a t e of i n f l a t i on for the V^ 
i n d u s t r i a l count r ies , as measured by the de f l a to r s of gross 
nat ional product, was about 12^ in 197^, 11^ in 1975 and was 
s t i l l close to 7% in 1977 and 1978. These may be compared 
with an average in f la t ion r a t e of these countr ies in the period 
of 1961-6if of about 2,5% and in 1965-69 of 3*7%, The in f la t ion 
experience for other group of count r ies over recent years has 
been even l e s s encoucaging, with average i n f l a t i on r a t e s in 
the non-oi l developing count r ies , having been roughly twice as 
high as in the i n d u s t r i a l coun t r i e s . 
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3 ^ . GULATI (IS) and MODY (Ashoka) . In te rna t lon gold p r ice 
movement, 1972-1982. Econ & Pol Vfclv. 17, ^6-1+7-, I982, 
Nv, 13-20, 1861-70. 
During the decade 1972-82 which witnessed large 
f luc tua t ions in gold p r i c e . Gold p r i ce traced out two 
p r inc ipa l cycles during the decade, moving yxp from 1971 i t 
reached a peak in December 197^, then f e l l t i l l the th i rd 
quarter of 1976, rose again t i l l early I98O, af te r which i t 
f e l l upto June 1982. Several developments in world economy 
coTild have influaiced these movements in gold p r i c e s . The 
study, ha s , however, led them to conclude tha t the gold price 
cycles in the l a s t decade were generated p r inc ipa l ly by 
speculat ive behaviour which, in tu rn , was influenced by 
cyc l i ca l forces in the world economic system. Spec i f ica l ly , 
the Impact- of three f a c t o r s , inf la t ionary expectat ions , 
exchange r a t e f luc tuat ions and changes in i n t e r e s t r a t e s . 
35. HOOD (WMC). Reflections on the in te rna t iona l monetary 
system. Canadian J of ^oim^ '^^ hi 1970, Nv; 525-^0. 
!llhe present-day in te rna t iona l monetary system concern 
the arrangement governing the r a t e s a t which domestic monies 
of individual countr ies may be exchanged for one another. 
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This arrangement i s in fac t an undertaking by s igna to r ies 
of tile a r t i c l e s of the IMF to r e s t r i c t the va r i a t i ons of the 
spot r a t e s of exchanges of t h e i r currencies for currencies of 
other s ignator ies taking place within borders to a ra r^e of 
1^ point e i ther side of a par value defined in terms of gold 
declared to the fund. As has been the t r a d i t i o n for cen tu r i e s , 
co\mtries hold a p a r t , a t l e a s t , of t h e i r foreign reserves in 
the form of gold. Gold i s generally acceptable among monetary 
a u t h o r i t i e s that i t can read i ly be converted to US d o l l a r s . A 
th i rd form in which a u t h o r i t i e s hold reserves in claims on the 
IMF or on i t s members, ^ e in te rna t iona l monetary system i s 
to avoid unnecessary changes in exchange r a t e s in the i n t e r e s t 
of fur thering the growth of in te rna t iona l t r ade , pe r s i s t en t 
surpluses or d e f i c i t s in the balance of payments of individual 
countr ies must be avoided. 
35. LIPSCHITZ (Leslie) and SONDABARAJAN (V) . Pegging to a 
currency basket In a world of f loa t ing r a t e s . Fin & Dev. 
17, 2; 1980, J e ; 2^-8. 
In an attempt to minimize f luc tua t ions in the i r 
exchange r a t e s , ma?y coun t r i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y in the developing 
coun t r i es , peg t he i r exchange r a t e s e i the r to a s ingle currency 
or to a basket of the currencies of the i r major t rading 
83 
p a t t e r n . A method of der iving an "optional basket based 
on r e l a t i v e p r i ce and exchange r a t e movements. 
37. NAYJSK (Satyendra S) . Exchange r a t e pol icy under a regime 
of f loat ing r a t e s ; A c r i t i que of the Indian experience. 
Scon & Pol Trfklv. 12, 3 ; 1977, ^ ^ ; 5 5 - 6 l . 
The exchange r a t e pol icy pursued by India since 
August, 1971. Ebcchange r a t e pol icy has a v i t a l influence on 
the s t ruc ture and balance of a country ' s t r a d e , the magnitude 
of the t ransfer i tems, the overall balance of payments s i t u a -
t ion , the foreign exchange reserves pos i t ion and the burden 
of external debt and i t s sarvicing. The impact of Ind i a ' s 
exchange r a t e policy w i l l be s tudies from sane of these angles . 
An effor t wi l l a l so be made to compare the s t ruc tu re of exchange 
r a t e s of the rupee v i s - a - v i s some major currencies under the 
present policy with the s t ruc ture would have prevai led under 
an a l t e r n a t i v e po l icy . 
3:8. RAJENDRA KPMAR. Sid of the old IMF. Econ & Pol \felv. 
8i ^0; 1973, Oc, 6; I8O8-IO. 
The IMF's enforcement of the r u l e s of exchange r a t e 
s t a b i l i t y and c o n v e r t i b i l i t y , was not r e spons ib i l i t y towards 
i t s members. The Fund Agreement, r e l a t i n g to "pranotlon and 
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maintenance of high leve ls of employment and r e a l Income 
and the development of the productive resources of a l l members 
as primary objectives *of economic po l icy" . I n d i a ' s amend-
ment would have required the fund "to a s s i s t in the fu l l e r 
u t i l i s a t i o n of the resources of economically under-developed 
count r ies" . The IMF which are now in progress must devote 
considerable a t t en t ion to the probl«ns and needs of the l e s s -
developed countr ies must have an ef fec t ive voice in the fund's 
decision-making process . 
39. RAl^ GARAiTAn (C) . Desirable fea tures in a new in te rna t iona l 
monetary system. Eson & Pol Vtelv. 6, Vl; 1971, Oc, 9; 2159-62. 
The new in te rna t iona l monetary system tha t i s being 
hammered out . Beginning ear ly s i x t i e s a major concern with 
in t e rna t iona l monetary experts has been the adequacy of i n t e r -
na t iona l reserves to enable in te rna t iona l trade to grow without 
r e s t r i c t i o n s . Many steps taken in the pas t indicate that the 
shortage of reserves i s not a myth. The present do l la r c r i s i s 
more than any other indident that occured previously has forced 
a t ten t ion on the adjustment mechanism tha t must go along with 
a system of fixed exchange r a t e system. Another complication 
noted in the working of the IMF system arose from the dol la r 
being , t reated as a reserve currency. To crea te add i t iona l 
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reserves through SDRs, when necessary; In t roduct ion of the 
'band' proposal so tha t r a t e s are allowed to f luc tua te over 
a wider margin than is permitted now, and a machinery for 
e xamining and advising the proper pa r i t y among currencies . 
The a b i l i t y to enlarge the reserve coupled with the scope for 
larger f luc tua t ion in the exchange r a t e would make the system 
more v iab le . A modified fixed exchange r a t e system such as 
the one envisaged alone would requi re India to decide on the 
currency to which the rupee should be t i e d , 
ifO. TYSON (Geoffrey). Br i ta in : Sett ing the p o l i t i c a l scene. 
Capi ta l . 163, ^082; 1969, Oc^ 2; 617-8. 
The IMF i s an indicat ion that the fund endorses 
the present par value system and i s opposed to any introduction 
of floating exchange r a t e s . The f a i l u re of the U?S, economy to 
cool off i s described as "a ma^or disappointment of the year" . 
Now, as in the pas t year and a half , the c r u c i a l problem for 
the UK i s to "d iver t resources" to the exporting sec tor , although 
elsewhere in the repor t the d i r ec t ion are quite conplimentary 
to t h i s country. 
''•'• • EXTENSION OF CREDIT QUOTA, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
^ 1 . BALASUBRAKANIAN (V). US alone opposes quote iiike. HT. 59, 
2hh', 1982, 3e, 6; 1 (2-3) . 
The United States gave the i r support to a subs tan t i a l 
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increase in IMF quotas for augmenting fund resources for 
the needs of the e ightees . The i ndus t r i a l countr ies joined 
hands with the developing countr ies for immediate act ion on 
Impl«nenting the proposal for quota increases . The developing 
coantr ies which may be responsible to a considerable extent 
for t h e i r own t roub les , thanks to the i r pursui t of 'unduly* 
expansionary f inanc ia l p o l i c i e s , which have generated domestic 
in f l a t ion and misdirect ion of resources , as well as external 
imbalances which nothing tha t many o i l -expor t ing developing 
count r ies , however, are making e f fo r t s to adjust the imbalances 
in the i r economies. 
If2. BALUSQBRAMANIAN (V). US climb down on IMF quotas. HT. 
59, 313; 1982, Nv, ^h', 5 (7 -8) . 
The Regan administrat ion would agree to an increase 
of hQ% in the aggregate IMF quotas, no t standing a t $ 6? b i l l i o n . 
The agreement on quota increase should be worked out by April 
next year and put in to ef fec t by the end of 1985 (The bankers 
are demandlag the fund should pay an "umbrella r o l e " in ensuring 
the safety and l i q u i d i t y of the huge loan) . The bankers now 
have to agree to the rescheduling of instalments of i n t e r e s t or 
replacement of c a p i t a l . The fund to do by entering Into 
extended financing arrangement with the countr ies concerned and 
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enforcing on them the monetary, f i s c a l , t rade and other 
s t r u c t u r a l adjustment d i s c i p l i n e s which are worked Into such 
agreements. A few days , ago, the IMP approved a $ 1 . 0 7 b i l l i o n 
loan to South Africa and i t has in the works on appl icat ion 
from Hungary for a $ 580 b i l l i o n loan. Thus, one year a f t e r 
the IMF had made the l a rges t single loan in i t s h i s to ry to 
India , The Regan administrat ion assumes a forth-coming on i t s 
f inanc ia l support to developing countr ies for their i n d u s t r i e s . 
h3, RISE IN IMF loans . Boon I rnd. 10, l 8 ; I98I , Se, I6 ; 22. 
The t o t a l amount approved under the stand by and 
extended arrangement and other commitments by the IMF in the 
f i r s t half of 198I reached an unprecedented SDR 10.1 b i l l i o n 
compared to SDR ^.1 b i l l i o n in the same period of 1980 and 
SDR 9 b i l l i o n for the whole of I98O. The member purchases in 
the s ix months of the curre n t year amounted to SDR 3.8 b i l l i o n 
as agains t SDR 1.6 b i l l i o n in the same period of 198O including 
reserve tranche purchases. 
EXTENSION OF CREIttT QQOTA, INDIA 
hh, F0REIC2J AID. Eastern Econ. 50, 8; I968, Fe, 23; 318. 
Credit agreements for a t o t a l amount of $ I87.09 
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mill ion (Rs. IMO.32 crores) were signed with foreign 
countr ies and i n s t i t u t i o n s during the quarter October- December, 
1967, compared to $ 13O.T7 mil l ion (Rs. 97.63 crores) In 
July-September, 1967. The t o t a l amount authorised by the 
lending coun t r i e s / i n s t i t u t i ons for Ind ia ' s economic develop-
ment come to $ 10,1 22. 59 'mil l ion ($ Q250,hS or Rs. 3976. V 
crores before devaluat ion, and $ ^772.^^ mil l ion or Rs. 1329.08 
crores a f t e r devalua t ion) . This excludes US commodity a s s i s -
tance and a l l grants and drawings from the IMF. Of the fresh 
ass i s tance of f I87.O9 mi l l i on , % 1 ^ mil l ion was non-project 
aid and the balance of $ ^-3.09 mil l ion for various projected. 
The t o t a l amount of non-project aid canmitted, in terms of 
agreements sigaed, so far by the consortium countr ies for 
1967-68 amounts to % 298,76 mil l ion (Rs. 22^-.07 c ro res ) . In 
accordance with IMF's pol icy of compensatory f inanc ia l 
ass is tance to member-countries. On December, 29,51967) IMF 
acceded to Ind ia ' s request for a rescheduling of repurchase 
commitments t o t a l l i n g the equivalent of $ 387*5 mi l l ion . 
According to the repurchase schedule agreed by tiie IMF, India 
would have to effect repurchases to the extent of $ 97»5 mil l ion 
during the calendar year 1968. 
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^•5. MISRA (GlPish). IMF loan : The other s i de . Mainstream. 
20, 16; 1981, Dc, 19; 7 , 31-33. 
IMF deal i s tha t i t seeks to abridge I n d i a ' s 
economic sovereignty. In other words, the people have voted 
the Ccngress-I to power so tha t i t can take policy decis ions 
and run the economy within the frame work of i t s e lec t ion 
manifesto and the declared na t iona l po l i c i e s and goals . I t 
has not been authorised to surrender th i s viholly or p a r t i a l l y 
to any external agency. Including the loan deal with the IMF, 
the government has agreed to per iodica l r epor t s and take into 
account the IMF's advice and suggest ions. Moreover, if the IMF 
executive board fee l s tha t India i snot abiding by the performance 
c lauses , i t can suspend fur ther ins t a lma i t s of the loan. The 
IMF management accepted our programme derived from the s t ra tegy 
of our s ixth Plan as appropriate measures to adjustment for our 
economy to overcome the problems of balance of payments and 
development. Domestic c r e d i t expansion in I98I-82 i s proposed 
to be l imited to about 19 per cent . This i s highar than the 
c r ed i t in 198O-81 which was 18 per cent. The Congress-I 
document then goes on to add, "Out policy should, in f a c t , 
have been to keep the c r ed i t expansion well below t h i s l i m i t . 
The IMF loan wi l l be ava i lab le a t an average r a t e of i n t e r e s t 
of 9 to 10 per cent whereas a commercial loan in Ehro-dollar 
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market would have come to us a t an i n t e r e s t r a t e of above 
16 to t 7 per cen t . 
EXTENSION OF CREDIT (JJOTA, MEJ^BER COUNTRIES 
lf6* SHAH (Hasmukh). IMF resources for western banks ? 
Commerce. I W , 3735; 1983, J a , 1; 8. 
The IMF i s scheduled to lend to i n d u s t r i a l countries 
l e s s than $ ^h- b i l l i o n . I t was f e l t tha t i f developing nations 
do not have access to enough new funds. The US offered a plan 
to increase the fund's resources by hO% frcm the present 
$ 67 b i l l i on to about $ 95 b i l l i o n , but i t i s lil^ely that the 
IMF wi l l get an Infusion of almost $ 30 b i l l i o n in addi t iona l 
hsJEJd, 'hisable" currencies for loans to need count r ies . Some 
of the funds may be doled out e a r l i e r than planned. The IMF 
would consis t of a -^0 to 5*0 per cent increase in IMF quotas 
and a new or expanded spec ia l lending f a c i l i t y to which the 
major r i ch nat ions would make addi t iona l cont r ibu t ions . The 
new c red i t s w i l l be ava i lab le to a l l IMF members and not as a t 
p re sen t , only to members of the indus t r i a l i s ed group. 
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EXTHTSION OF CREDIT QUOTA, PANAI'A 
k7* LABRAVIDE (AJ-varo E) . Monetary d i s c i p l i n e and growth : 
The c a s e of Panama. Fin & Dev. 7 , 2 ; 1970, J e ; hh-^0, 
Panama employs the U . S . dolllar a s the c i r c u l a t i n g 
medium; i t d e l i b e r a t e l y r e f r a i n s fr<xn excercislng the c o n t r o l 
over topreney c i r c u l a t i o n t h a t i t would have i f i t were to 
p r i n t cu r r ency . By exposing i t s e l f in t h i s \fay to the r i g o r s 
of c l a s s i c gold s tandard mechanism i t ga ins s u b s t a n t i a l advan-
t a g e s . The fore ign r e s e r v e s a v a i l a b l e for such emergencies: 
i n February 1965. Panama's quote In the IMF was r a i s e d from 
$ 0 , 5 m i l l i o n to $ 11.25 m i l l i o n , and for the f i r s t t ime 
a I 7 , 5 m i l l i o n standby arrangement ^^ /as g ran ted by the DIF 
to Panama in J u l y of the same yea r . 
EXTENSION OF CREDIT QUOTA, SAUDI ARABIA 
^ 8 . AGREEKENT V/ITH Saudi Arabia on quota i n c r e a s e and 
borro\d.ng arrangement . Fin & Dev. 18 ,2 ; I 9 8 1 , J e ; 2. 
The IMF be inc reased the Saudi A r a b i a ' s quota 
from i t s p r e s e n t l e v e l of SDR 1,0tf0.1 m i l l i o n to SDR 2,100-
m i l l i o n . This w i l l I nc r ea se Saudi A r a b i a ' s share in t o t a l 
quotas from 1.7^^ to approximately 3*5%. The Saudi A r a b i a ' s 
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quota "was out of l i ne a t the present ime, taking in to account 
the r e l a t i v e importance of Saudi Arabia in the world economy. 
The increase in Saudi Arabia 's quota w i l l r e s u l t in a 
subs tan t i a l increase in the fund's immediately usable resources , 
which can be used in support of the fund's expanded l eve l of 
operations a t t h i s time. The fund of SDR h b i l l i o n in the 
f i r s t year of the agreement and a fur ther SDR h b i l l i o n in the 
second year. The Saudi Arabian au tho r i t i e s have a l so indicated 
the i r in tent ion to enter in to a fur ther commitment for the 
thi rd year i f the i r balance of payments and reserve pos i t ion 
so permit ted, 
^ 9 . IMF BACKDOOR entry in to p r i v a t e c a p i t a l market ? 
Boon & Pol Vklv. 16, 20; I981 , My, 16; 878. 
The IMP l a s t year to make i t poss ib le for the fund 
to play a some what large ro l e than before in helping i t s 
member countr ies to overcome the s i t ua t ion created by the 
d r a s t i c increases in o i l p r i ces on to contr ibute to the 
recycl ing process necessary for orderly t ransfer for funds 
from the surplus countr ies to the d e f i c i t ones. The IMF had 
been t ry ing to negot ia te loans from the o i l exporting Arab 
coun t r i e s , especia l ly Saudi Arabia. The fund has agreed to r a i s e 
the Saudi quota from i t s present l eve l of SDR 1,0^ bi l l ion to SDR 
2,1 b i l l i o n , r a i s ing thereby the Saudi share in t o t a l quotas from 
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1.7^^ to 3,5% and making i t s quota t h e s i x t h l a r g e s t . 
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 
50. BHATT (VR). Dim p r o s p e c t s for "Wbrld economic r e v i v a l . 
Eas tern Econ. 7 8 , 2 1 ; 1982, My, 28; 12^+3-6. 
The IMP assessment of the world economic s i t u a t i o n 
and the f e a r s expressed hy the group of 2h developing 
c o u n t r i e s f inance m i n i s t e r s , r e p r e s e n t i n g 116 c o u n t r i e s of 
Asia. The r e c e s s i o n i n the i n d u s t r i a l c o u n t r i e s has proved 
exceedingly s tubborn , thus worsening the terms of t r a d e and 
the expor t volume of the developing c o u n t r i e s . And d e s p i t e 
a slowing of i n f l a t i o n and a s lackening world demand, r e a l 
i n t e r e s t r a t e s have remained very h igh by h i s t o r i c a l 
s t anda rds . Debt payment burdens , a c c o r d i n g l y , have continued 
to grow sharp ly . In a d d i t i o n to t h e s e g e n e r a l f e a t u r e s of the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l economy, the re i s the p r o s p e c t t h a t the grol^rth 
of p r i v a t e c a p i t a l flows to the developing c o u n t r i e s w i l l be 
much In the days ahead. P r i v a t e l end ing provided an I n c r e a s i n g l y 
impor tan t source of funds for Investment in developing 
c o u n t r i e s dur ing the 1970 ' s . But repayments have begiin to 
absorb a r i s i n g p ropor t ion of new loans so t h a t over the 
medium term n e t d isbursement of p r i v a t e l o a n s to developing 
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countr ies are l i k e l y to drop sharply in r e a l terras. The slow 
growth and high budget d e f i c i t s in the OEGD count r ies , =ind 
the disappearing surpluses of the o i l exporting countr ies , i t 
i s l i ke ly tha t in the next few years . 
51 , BBDOK (EB). IMF, the t r i e d and t rus ted lender. 
Eastern Econ. 69, 15; 1977, Oc, 7; 695-6. 
The i n d u s t r i a l l y developing countr ies should, despi te 
the i r r i t a t i o n of the IMF requirement for borrowers, support 
t h i s t r i ed independent source of i n t e rna t i ona l finance than go 
to the Eurocurrency market v;hich i s awash with cash ready for 
lending a t dangerously invi t ing terms. 
52. DAGLI (Sad i l a l ) . Annual confrontation between haves and 
have-nots. Commerce. 139, 356lf; 1979, Oc, 6; 656-7. 
The IMF wi l l be rem«nbered for the most pronounced 
confjPontation between the r ich and the poor nat ions . The IMF 
in the seventees, i t therefore ref lec ted the disappointment of 
a decade which was supposed to reduced the gap between the r ich 
and poor soc ie t i e s of the world. A case for a r e t rospec t ive 
appl ica t ion of such softening of terms of ass i s tance i f 
developing countr ies were not find the already heavy burden of 
debt servicing increasingly d i f f i c u l t to bear. The reduction 
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of in te rna t iona l l i qu id i t y surpluses could become a new 
cause for constrant in the already weakened economic r e l a t ion -
ship between developing countr ies and r ich economics. The IMF 
should play the ro l e only a ca t a ly s t in t h i s process. Most 
of the problfflns of debt servicing of poor nat ions have ar i sen 
because they borrowed from pr iva te banks for a short duration 
and a t exorbi tant r a t e s of i n t e r e s t . The IMF should play a 
moTe ac t ive par t in recycling cap i t a l towards the d e f i c i t 
countr ies . The IMF shoudd play a cen t r a l ro l e in financing 
balance of payments d e f i c i t s of developing countr ies . 
53. DAGLI (Vad i l a l l ) . Gloom eightees for poor world. 
Commerce. 139, 3?6if; T979, Oc, 6; 652-3. 
The IMF have' expressed concern about the r e l en t l e s s ly 
widening gulf between the r ich and the poor. '*iether i t i s 
i n f l a t i on or recession in the western world; whether i t i s 
p r ice r i s e in o i l imposed by the OPEC on whether i t i s the 
question of lowering trade ba r r i e r s or providing debt r e l i e f 
to the poor world. The serious s i tua t ion in the world economy 
and the p l igh t of the developing countr ies and cal led on 
i n d u s t r i a l nat ions to help the developing count r ies , get out 
of stagnation which they face. The exis t ing system of 
i n t e rna l economic r e l a t ions \i^ich we so r e l e n t l e s s l y 
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detr imental to developing countr ies . The eightees should be 
the decade of the poorest countr ies of the developing world. 
The aff luent nat ions should subs tan t i a l ly increase their 
development ass i s tance and l i b e r a l i s e the i r trade p o l i c i e s so 
that the poorest developing countr ies grew a t nearly ^% a year. 
The manufactured exports from the developing countries to 
affluent nations should grow a t about ^^% a year during the 
next decade, 
5if, FORREST (G). IMF : Do i t s functions con f l i c t r . Econ Dig. 
16; 1981; Ag; 6-7. 
Borrowing by the developing count r ies , together with 
the i r general indebtedness, have become a key i ssue in 
i n t e rna t i ona l banking. The IMF as s i s t ance , in par t the 
res idua l imbalance, f luctuated from net repayment of a $ 1 b i l l i on 
to $ 3-J- b i l l i o n contr ibut ion. The dramatic sh i f t to borrowing 
from the in te rna t iona l banking system ra i se s many i s sues and 
in p a r t i c u l a r the ro le of the IMF. The IMF i s seen Increasingly 
as a vehicle for channelling large amounts of funds to 
developing countr ies on what-is l i t t l e more than an expediency 
bas is . There i s a fundamental conf l i c t between the B^IF's ro le 
as an " In te rna t iona l f inanc ia l policeman" and that of a major 
supplier of c red i t . The IMF i s compounding the problems 
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r e l a t i n g to developing countr ies maturity p a t t e r n s . The IMF 
i s e s s e n t i a l for a resheduling agreement, the fund's power over 
smaller countr ies i s subs tan t i a l . I f i t i s unacceptable to 
developing countr ies to been seen to have the i r borrowing 
guaranteed by another country, a new intermediary i n s t i t u t i o n 
may be necessary. 
55. GERAKIS (AS) and RONCESVALLBS (0) . Bahrain 's offshore 
banking centre . Fin & Dev. 17,2; 198O, Je ; 29-32. 
During the l a s t five years , Bahrin t r a d i t i o n a l l y an 
o i l producing s t a t e , has b u i l t up an offshore banking centre 
which has become one of the l a rges t in the developing v/orld 
with the help of IMF. This c e n t r e ' s having impressive growth 
and i t s effects on the economy of Bahrain as well as on the 
money and exchange markets in the Gulf region. 
56. IMF FOOD f a c i l i t y . Econ & Pol l/felv. I6 , 25-26; 198I, J e , 
20-7; 1078. 
The IMF's compensatory financing f a c i l i t y , 
es tabl ished in 1963, bas so far provided "ass is tance to 
countr ies experiencing tanporary balance of payments d i f f i c u l -
t i e s a r i s ing out of export short f a l l s la rge ly a t t r i b u t a b l e to 
circumstances beyond the i r control" . Under a decision taken 
in 1979, the a s s i s t ance , which i s in addit ion to other forms 
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of fund ass is tance was avai lable upto 100^ of a member country 's 
fund quota. The compensatory financing f a c i l i t y may be said to 
represen t , going by the experience of financing of export 
s h o r t f a l l s , i t i s extremely doubtful tha t the countr ies facing 
increased costs of cereal import can expect to receive more 
than nominal fund ass i s tance to developing count r ies . 
57* KAUL (PN). Technical ass i s tance from the Il-IF : Central 
banking department. Fin & Dev. 18, 2; 198l, J e ; 3^-7. 
•^lile the contr ibut ion tha t the fund's f inanc ia l 
ass i s tance has made to the strengthening of members' economics 
i s general ly recognised, i t s accomplishments in the f ie ld of 
technical a s s i s t a n c e , vjhich i s no l e s s useful to the 
developing countr ies are not as well known. The evolving ro le 
of the cen t ra l banking department of the IMF in i t s e f for t s to 
meet the need of member countr ies for technical a s s i s t ance in 
a growing number of areas . 
58. KHIJT (AHafeez). Increased ass i s tance to Pakis tan. PAk & 
Gulf Econ. 1 , 3^; 1982, Nv, 13-19; 12-5. 
The IMF and the World Bank have been playing an 
important r o l e in not only t ransfer r ing c a p i t a l resources but 
a lso modern technology to the developing coun t r i e s . The Pakistan ' 
99 
achievements on the economic front and the pace of economic 
progress , would be further accelerated in the years ahead. 
The existence of the Aid to Pakistan Consortium has , undoub-
ted ly , proved a great help for Pakis tan 's economic progress . 
Die Pakistan Government's task in the formulation of appro-
p r i a t e po l i c i e s with a view to removing def ic ienc ies and 
achieving desired r e s u l t in various sectors of development. 
59. KINCAID (G Russell) . Condit ionall ty and use of fund 
resources : Jamaica. Fin ^ Dcv» 18, 2; I981, J e , 18-21. 
Pol ic ies re la ted to the use of fund resources ( i t s 
condi t ional l ty) have evolved as a r e s u l t of the fund's 
experience with i t s membership and of changes in the i n t e r -
na t iona l economic environment. In the d i f f i c u l t years from 
1977 through 1979» the IMF had a p a r t i c u l a r l y close r e l a t i o n -
sthip with Jamaica, providing i t with a high leve l of f inanc ia l 
a s s i s t ance . This col laborat ion was especia l ly important 
because the volume of support extended by the fund was 
unprecedented a t the time in terms of the s ize of the Jamaican 
economy. !nie fund's d i r e c t contr ibut ion w i l l be access to i t s 
resources over the three years period of the extended arrange-
ment about US $ 625 mi l l ion , or equivalent to h^O'j^ of Jamaica's 
quota. The maximum permissible under the new pol icy for 
enlarged access . 
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60. LIA(?JAT Alili] . Financing new and renewable sources of 
energy. Boon & Pol Wklv. 16, 20; I981, My, I6 ; 913-21. 
The longer-term t r ans i t i on of the under-developed 
countr ies to an energy regime much less dependent on o i l and 
gas. Over the next two or tiiree decades, wi l l l ike ly invcQ.ve 
a 'qa ick ' s h i f t away from o i l and gas to greater dependence on 
coa l , tarsandsnj and o i l sha le , nucleur f i s s i o n , geothermal 
energy and on renewable forms of energy such as hydro, so la r , 
biomass , and wind; a l l of vrtiich could be made avai lable in 
secondary energy ^brms which w i l l c a l l for modest, manageable 
changes in the in f ras t ruc ture system. The sustainable energy 
supply would then have to be expanded to include breeder 
r e a c t o r s , fusion, large scale solar and other renewable forms, 
a l l of which are nov/ ident i f ied as proven or promising in terms 
of technical f e a s i b i l i t y and economic v i a b i l i t y . Among the 
many cons t ra in t s on the evolving energy system in the under-
developed coun t r i e s , the fiiM^ncing of energy production i s 
among the more s ign i f i can t ones. 
61 . LOUIS (Arul B) . IMF World Banking working a s sa i l ed . HT. 
^9, 267; 1982, 3e , 29; 16 (^--5). 
Developed and developing countr ies called for urgent 
measures to save what they cal led a ser ious in te rna t iona l 
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economic s i tua t ion and for an ear ly s t a r t to global negot ia-
t ions for a new world economic order as the UN assembly began 
i t s gttieral debate. Brazi l ian President Joao Baotista 
Firueiredo, said that there was no c r i s i s between the deve-
loping south and toe indus t r i a l i sed North, but ra ther a 
profound c r i s i s in the In te rna t iona l economic system i t s e l f . 
The 157 member UN General Assembly, voiced the i r concerns over 
the in t e rna t iona l economic s i t u a t i o n . Another common thread in 
the i r addresses were the events in Lebanon. Most of them 
condemned I s r i i e l . Tlie e s s e n t i a l condit ion for reac t iva t ing 
world trade was the recovery of a minimum s t a b i l i t y in the 
in te rna t iona l monetary system, wftiLch liust not be subjected to 
u n i l a t e r a l changes in economic p o l i c i e s of a few great power. 
The t o t a l debt of the developing countr ies would be more than 
the "incredible amount" of $ 600 b i l l i o n (Rs. 60,000 crores) 
th i s year . This'would increasingly make countr ies insolvent . 
The magnitude of the f inanc ia l d i f f i c u l t i e s many countr ies faced 
made i t imperative for the IMF to have adequate funds. 
62, MEHTA (Balra;)) . Out look for the next yea r ' s budget. 
j torit Baz Pat , t ^ - ; I982, Nv, 29; 6 (3 -6) . 
The budget for the current year was framed was tha t 
the economy having rev ive* in 1 981-82 from a depressed condition 
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in the previous two years and inf la t ionary pressure having 
moderated w i l l e i t e r in the year 1982-83 a period of steady 
and s table growth. With t h i s , the s t r a in on the budgetary 
balance would also ease. On the side of the external account, 
the IMF support would provided the needed cushion. 
63 . NOWZAP (Bahram) . Debt in developing count r ies ! Some 
issues for the 1980s. Fin and Dev. I 9 , 1; I982, Kr; 13-6. 
AS an increasing number of developing countr ies 
encounter d i f f i c u l t i e s in debt service payments, the substan-
a b i l i t y of the volume of t he i r debt , i t s term, the mechanian 
of i t s t r ans f e r s , and any rescheduling arrangement required , 
the questions a r i s e about the above mention problens . So the 
IMF i s c losely in teres ted in external debt issues and has over 
20 years ass i s ted t o , i t s members developing countr ies with 
the i r debt problems. The IMF's e f for t s are aimed at avoiding 
the emergency of debt problems and i t seeks to promote be t te r 
management of external borrowing and greater a t t en t ion to debt 
i s sues . The IMF plays a s ign i f ican t r o l e in a s s i s t i ng both 
credi tor and debtors to achieve a successful rescheduling. 
6^-. PILLAI (Vel) . External economic dependence and f iscal-
policy imbalances in developing countries? A case study of 
Jordan. J of Dev Stud. 19, 1, 1982, Oc, 5-18. 
A model i s developed to determine the f i s c a l impact 
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of three s e t s of fac tors in a l e s s developed comitry se t t ing : 
l a rge-sca le public sector out lay , foreign t r ade , and foreign 
a id , I t was found that in Jordanian case , the f i r s t of these 
three fac tors adds more to current expenditure than to 
domestic revenue indicat ing a f i s c a l imbalance, vrfiile the 
two externa l fac tors have pos i t i ve ne t f i s c a l \ e f f e c t s . Based 
on these r e s u l t s Important t rade-offs between the growth of 
public sector investment and future external dependence are 
a lso derived. 
65« RAI (Kar t ik) . IMF loan and balance of payments. People 's 
Demo. 6, 12; 1982, Mr, 21; h. 
The IMF loan could be u t i l i s e d to finance the 
larger investment needed to develop petrolium production, i t 
was r e a l l y only a means to enable us to overcome our payments 
c r i s i s and move towards se l f - suf f ic iency . The country get t ing 
into a d e b t - t r a p , i f o i l output increased rapidly enough, we 
might even do without the third and the l a rges t instalment of 
the IMF loan. The Government of Ind ia , c l ea r ly showed that 
a f te r 1983-8^, the l a s t year of IMF drawings we would balance 
our payments only through massive and growing commercial 
borrowings, 1.5 b i l l i o n SDRs in 198^-85 and 3.27 b i l l i o n in 
1985-86, and that such borrowings had to increase not 
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withstanding the revised and ambitious o i l production t a rge t s . 
The country has l o s t Rs. 1292 crores of reserves between April 
1, 1981 and January 3 1 , 1982, i . e . over a span of ten months. 
This l o s s , moreover, i s despi te the drawing of 60O mill ion 
SDRs or Rs. 637 crore from the IMF. India had drawn Rs. 8l5 
crore from the Trust fimd and compensatory Financing F a c i l i t y . 
Addit ionally, our reserves were depleted by Rs. 3^2 crore . So 
IMF loan i s necessary because our payments pos i t ion i s so bad. 
66. RAJ (Kartik) . - Budget and the s ix th p lan . People 's Demo. 
5, 11; 1981, Mr, 15; h. 
The recent ly adapted s ixth plan for the period I98O-
81 to 198lf-85 provides for a t o t a l public sector outlay of 
Rs. 97,500 crores a t 1979-80 p r i c e s . Of th i s sum, Rs. 8^-,000 
crores cons t i tu te investment outlay and Rs. 13,500 crores 
current development outlay, IHiis t o t a l public sector outlay 
together with the proposed outlay of Rs. 7^,710 crores in the 
pr iva te sector makes upr the t o t a l Sixth Plan outlay of Rs. 172,210 
crores . Against t h i s t a rge t of public sector outlay for the 
f u l l f ive yea r s . The Economic Survey makes the statement that 
"the current account d e f i c i t i s l i ke ly to be over Rs. 2,000 
c rores" in I98O-81 and that external ass i s tance wi l l cover less 
than half of th i s amount". One can infe r , there fore , tha t net 
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"foreigQ a id" Inflows in I98O-8I would have been of the 
order of Rs. 1000 c ro res . This f i gu re , however excludes 
the loan from the IMF which amounted to Rs. Q^5 c rores . 
67 . STUART (Brian C) . S tab i l i za t ion pol icy in Por tugal , 
t 9 A - 7 8 . Fin & Dev. 18, 3; 1981, Sej 25^9. 
Por tuga l ' s balance of payments shifted from a 
s izable d e f i c i t to surplus within two yea r s , with ass i s tance 
from and a s t a b i l i z a t i o n program agreed with the IKF. The 
Portuguese economy had experienced high r a t e of growth, low 
unemploymoit, r i s i n g i n f l a t i o n , and subs t an t i a l surpluses in 
i t s external accounts. The 11^ and Portugal maintained close 
con t rac t s , Portugal made several purchases of foreign exchange 
from the fund, including purchases under the 1975 o i l f a c i l i t y 
early in 1976 and a purchase under the compensatory financing 
f a c i l i t y in the summer of I976. Real output rose by over 2% 
in 1978 and by almost 5% in 1979. 
FOREIGN EXCHANGE, INDIA'S SUBSCRIPnONS 
68. IMF PUND f a c i l i t y . Econ Trnd. 9, 13; 1980, J l , 1; 17. 
Government of India wi l l be ava i l ing ass i s tance of 
Rs. ^kO crores from the IMF th i s year . This can be u t i l i z e d 
tobols ter i t s fo re ig i exchange pos i t i on . 
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69. INDIA AND the IMF. Econ Mclv. 16, 26; I96if, J e , 27; 10^2. 
India should t ry to reduce i t s gold subscription 
by 5^ to ^0%. If i t s permanait seat on the board of d i r e c t o r s 
of the IMF i s to be re ta ined . The IMF has permitted some 
countr ies to pay the i r subscript ion in gold, when they were 
in d i f f i c u l t i e s . India w i l l have to take resources to such 
device because of i t s t i gh t exchange pos i t i on . 
70, MDNBTABY REFORMS : Third world told to a s s e r t r i g h t . Fin an 
fiSEL* 13 , 9; 1973, Mr, 26. 1 (6-8) . 
India deplored in fo r th r igh t terms the a t t i t u d e of 
the af f luent na t ions in "by passing" the developing countries 
and reaching c ruc i a l decision on the monetary system to meet 
the new currency c r i s i s . Understanding had already produced 
"highly unfavourable e f fec t s" on developing economies, on the 
purchasing power of the i r reserves and on the problem of 
external debt servic ing. The developing countr ies to r a i s e 
the i r "co l lec t ive voice" and a s s e r t the i r r i g h t s for f u l l 
pa r t i c ipa t ion in decision-making processes in ttie evolution of 
a new monetary system. 
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FOREIGTT RESERVE, DOLLAR 
71 . SEJW (Sudhlr) , U.S. dilemma about the decl in iag d o l l a r . 
Eastern Econ. 7 1 , 12; 1978, Se, 22; 578-82. 
The do l l a r problem., long in the marking , has come 
to iirhaunt the USA and the world. After months of studious 
p a s s i v i t y , the psychology in Vfetshington has changed in respect 
of the decl ining dol la r . As a big gain in the defence of the 
dol la r for another thing that the do l la r has already gone too 
far dovzn that in purely economic terms i t i s already under-
valued. This should s t imulate exports and balance the currency 
account. The vast Eurodollar market cons i s t s of do l l a r s and 
other currencies on deposit in banks outside the i r countr ies 
issue and uncontrolled by monetary a u t h o r i t i e s . The US also 
has r e se rves , t o t a l l i ng over $ h b i l l i o n , \irith the IMF, which 
i t could use for the same purpose. 
FOREIGN RESERVE, GOLD 
72. HBWESSY (Jassleyn) . lAftiat's wrong with gold ? Eastern Econ. 
50, U-; 1968, J a , 26; 11+1-3. 
The USA's s i tua t ion i s dangerous because i t s con t i -
nuing payments d e f i c i t are p i l ing up foreign claims on a 
dwindling amount of US gold. The gold which i s not eeJmarked 
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as backing for the money in c i r c u l a t i o n , recent ly stood a t 
approximately $ 2,000 mill ion ($ 22,000 mil l ion minus $ 11,000 
mil l ion) against a net amount of a t l e a s t $ 22,000 mil l ion of 
short-term l i a b i l i t i e s held by fo re igners . The 25,^ backing 
requirements could, of course, be reduced or waived, but i f 
the Payments d e f i c i t did not d isappear , the s i t ua t i on would go 
from bad to worse and u l t imate ly end in an embargo on gold, 
I h i s i s a dangerous process , which, the precedent of 193I 
showed, leads to recess ion . The share of the annual production 
of gold going to monetary reserves has s teadi ly diminished 
from $ 8ifO mil l ion in I963 to | 250 mil l ion In I965. For the 
f i r s t t ime, in t966, there was a ne t loss of $ U-0 to 90 mi l l ion . 
To postpone the def la t ionary e f fec ts of th i s trend and to help 
to finance the US balance of payments d e f i c i t s without much 
loss of gold, various expedi«its have been devised since I96I , 
e .g . the general agreement to borrow, swaps, Roosa bonds, and 
the increase in quotas in the IMF. The gold as an instrument 
of foreign exchange i s bound to disappear because of i t s scar i ty , 
How i t would be possible to get enough gold to meet the increa-
sing need of in t e rna t iona l media of payment. 
73. WETTICH (Gunter). Gold in the fund today. Fin & Dev. I 9 , 
13; 1982, Se; 36-8. 
One of the changes introduced by the Second Amendment 
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was the almost complete el imination of gold from the IlIF's 
a r t i c l e s , although i t ranains an important a s s e t . The ro l e 
of gold in thefund today i s valued. The various obl igat ions 
of member countr ies to use gold in t ransact ion v/ith the fuad 
would be abolished. That p a r t of the fund's gold holdings 
would be sold for the benefi t of developing member count r ies . 
The gold would be sold to a l l fund members a t the o f f i c i a l 
p r i c e . Gold continues to form a subs t an t i a l p a r t of i n t e r -
na t iona l reserve holdings of a number of c e n t r a l banks. The 
fund continues to i t s holdings a t SDR 35 an ounce. 
POREICST RESERVE, SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS 
7h. B5I.ASCJBRAKMIM (V) . US may soften stand on SDRs i ssue . 
H£. 60, 22; 1983, J a , 22; 1 (3 -^ ) . 
!Die US stand on a new issue of SDRs, the paper 
money created and managed by the IMF. The SDRs are intended 
primarily to provide a measure of reserve l i g u i d i t y to the 
in te rna t iona l monetary system and hopefully to serve as an 
in t e rna t iona l monetary reserve a s se t of choice . The developing 
countries in the IMF have been since then demanding regular ly 
that the process should not only continue but a much larger 
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issue authorised the next period. Bae US wi l l nov/ take the 
lead in pushing for a new issue of SDKs. Never theless , i t 
does amount to a s i tua t ion in which the US may fee l a ce r ta in 
obl igat ion to go along with other members of the Il-IF should 
there by a broad support in the organisation for an add i t iona l 
creat ion of SDRs. Meanwhile, the developing countr ies may 
hope to be conipaigning for their object ive from a pos i t ion of 
improved s t rength . The Regan Administration has been openly 
concerned about the p o s s i b i l i t y , as i t sees i t , of developing 
countries using SDRs as a source of investment f inance. A 
process of world economic recovery, the developing countries 
could reasonably welcome th is awakening as the bes t thing that 
has happened to them In te rna t iona l ly during the current recession, 
75. BIH^E (mi l iam J ) , Evolution of the SDR, 197^-8l. Fin & 
[. 19, 3 ; 1982, Se; 31-5. 
A. review, with specia l attenticai to the refinement 
of. the basket method of va lua t ion , increases in the i n t e r e s t 
r a t e , and measures to make the SDR a more usable reserve a s s e t . 
The SDR was introduced in I97O by the IMF. The Fond a l loca tes 
SDRs to p a r t i c i p a n t s in proport ion to t he i r quotas. Hie Jlrnd 
created SDR 9*5 b i l l i on over the three years 1970-72, a l locat ing 
them to 112 member count r ies . And SDR h b i l l i o n \^ ras a l loca ted 
I l l 
in each of the years 1979j 1980 and I98l , brins^ng the 
t o t a l number of SDRs in existence to SDR 21 b i l l i o n . The 
Rmd pays i n t e r e s t on holdings of SDRs and levies charges 
a t the same r a t e on a l loca t ion . 
76. DAGLI (Vadi la l ) . What to do with •unwanted d o l l a r s ? 
Commerce. 139, 356^; 1979, Oc, 6; 65^. 
US do l l a r depreciated by 19^ ^^rhile the Yen and 
German mark appreciated by hO% and 30% r espec t ive ly between 
September 1977 and December 1978. The Swiss Franc appreciated 
by 3^% diiring t h i s per iod . Exchange maflcets ane today deno-
minated by f a s t changing re la t ionsh ip betx'/een these four major 
ciirrencies of the world, The I n s t a b i l i t y in exchange r a t e s 
would Indicate the f loa t ing exchange r a t e system has not 
narked e f fec t ive ly . I t has-.also led to a view tha t b e t t e r 
managemeit of exchange r a t e s i s required so that the IMF which 
was almost k i l l ed by the delinking of tlie dol lar from gold in 
August 1971 niay beccmie again an important i n t e rna t iona l monetary 
organisat ion. As a r e s u l t the r o l e of SDRs in the monetary 
system may become more Effec t ive , The SDR i s more s table than 
the d o l l a r . The IMF resumed the a l loca t ion of SDRs at a r a t e 
of SDR h b i l l i o n per year for a period of thcee year beginning 
from 1979« Tlie SDR i s the p r i n c i p a l reserve asse t in the 
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i n t e rna t iona l monetary system. Since no a l loca t ion of SDRs 
has taken place since 1972, the share of the SDH in in t e rna -
t iona l l i q u i d i t y has been -progressively dec l in ing . 
11, DATTA (Bhabatosh) , How best to u t i l i s e the mounting 
foreign exchange r e se rves . Capi ta l . 180, ^•520; 1978» J l j 
6; 27-31* 
The recent phase of rap id ly increasing foreign 
reserves i s d i f fe ren t in many ways. Ihe r a t e of increases 
has been very f a s t , the foreign exchange in the hands of the 
Reserve Bank ra is ing from Rs, 611 crores a t the end of 197^-75 
to Rs. 2,863 crores a t the end of 1976-77 and further to 
Rs. 3,566 crores in the middle of December 1977« J^ o these 
f igures have to be added the gold in the hands of the Reserve 
Bank and the SDR holdings v;ith the IMF, Hie t o t a l gold holding 
of Bank stood a t Rs, I87.8O crores since January 1977, when 
the IMF returned Rs. 5•28 crores worth of gold to I n d i a . The 
SDR holdings of India have slowly been f a l l i n g , but the end 
of August 1977, they were qui te high a t 139 mil l ion SDR's, or 
the equivalent of approximately Rs, 1^3 c ro res , 
1^, GRAY (Jean M). vl.o IMF : ka emerging cen t r a l bank ? Eco 
aiiid. 20, 1; 1979, J l ; 63-8, 
The IMF i s emerging as a "Central bank for the nat ional 
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cen t ra l banks". The IMF as a special ized f inanc ia l i n t e r -
mediary whose primary function i s to a s s i s t in the achieve-
ment of a smoothly fimctioning i n t e rna t i ona l payments :"adjust-
ment p rocess . Althrough IMF objec t ives , to promote s t a b i l i t y 
in in t e rna t iona l exchange markets by fos ter ing balanced 
growth and reasonable pr ice s t a b i l i t y in na t iona l markets, 
p a r a l l e l those of many cen t r a l banks, i t s author i ty and the 
scope of i t s operation do n o t . The H'lF meets the uniqueness 
c r i t e r i a for a cen t r a l bank in only one respect:. I t creates 
in te rna t iona l reserve asse t s in the form-of SDR*'s which remains 
as a long run ob jec t ives . 
79. LAL¥MX: CKC). In te rna t iona l monetary system: Present 
pos i t ion and future out look, Econ Affairs . 18, 1-2; 
1973, Ja-Fe; 29-38. 
In te rna t iona l monetary system i s an arrangement 
which helps the smooth flow of goods, services and money 
betv/een countr ies p a r t i c i p a t i n g in i t by maintaining a s table 
r a t e of exchange between the i r respect ive cur renc ies . An i n t e r -
na t iona l monetary system became a necess i ty when from the middle 
of the 19th century, in te rna tbna l trade gained a ncmentum, and 
lucki ly the vrorld came to h i t upon a device for the purpose. 
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which came to be named 'gold standard' in v^ilch any 
imbalance in a count ry ' s Import posi t ion s t a r t ed a "flow 
of specie that sooner or l a t e r stopped the flow". In f a c t , 
for a clear understanding of the post-war i n t e rna t iona l 
monetary system, the growing world supply of d o l l a r became 
more inportant than the whole of the year- to-year functicning 
of the Il-IF lumped together . The BIF created a "paper gold" 
in i t s reserve cal led SDR in January I97O. Ilio IW \Tkll 
continue to function with i t s SER's iiO long as there i s no 
major threa t against i t , 
80, OGRA (Ashok). World monetary drama. Century. 1^, 3J+*, 
1976, J i , i 5 ; 18-20. 
The Kingston Conference that was attended by 20 
finance minis ters representing developed and developins 
countr ies marked a v/atershed in the short h i s to ry of II-F. She 
SDRs, so cal led paper gold, wi l l be p r i n c i p a l reserve asse t 
in the Il^iF. Gold was used as a base of na t iona l monetary 
system and the free conve r t i b i l i t y of bank notes in to gold 
enabled cen t r a l banks to effect i n t e rna t iona l payments through 
informal co-operation without governmental in tervent ion and 
thus assured the f ree flow of in te rna t iona l t rade . Within 
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ce r t a in l imi t s and on ce r ta in condi t ions , a member s t a t e 
become e n t i t l e d , against pa;yment in i t s oi/jn currency, to 
draw on the fund in order to obtain such foreign currency 
as i t present ly needed for malting paymaits in tha t currency. 
The mechanism adopted for t h i s purpose was the assignment 
to the currency of each member of a par value expressed in 
terms of gold as a common denomination or in terms of US 
d o l l a r . I t was obligatory on the p a r t of the fund members 
to maintain orderly exchange arrangements on tlie basis of 
par values . The p r i n c i p a l demand of the developing countries 
for a l i nk between the SERs and development aid and secure 
fresh a l loca t ion of SDR's to meet l i qu id i t y needs were not 
met. An attempt was made at res t r t ic t ing the i n t e rna t i ona l 
monetary systrai, but several iinportant matters remained 
undecided, 
81. PAia (IG) , Current c r i s i s in in t e rna t iona l economic 
co-operat ion. Indian & For Rev. 19, 19; 1982, J l , l5-31j 
8-10. 
We have to talce an ac t ive p a r t in Ilorth-IIorth 
controversies a t l e a s t in i n t e rna t iona l forums and encourage 
i n s t i t u t i o n s l ike the Il-IF to talte the i r ro l e of global 
surve i l lance-surve i l lance of the r i ch as v/ell as of the poor 
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and i r r e spec t ive of whether they are borrowers or c red i to r s -
a l i t t l e more ser iously than they have done for some t ime. 
Certainly, there would be much greater success towards mental 
and mater ia l equilibrium in the world i f the in t e rna t iona l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s turn off the heat a b i t from the developing 
countr ies that need to borrow from them and tiirn i t on instead 
on those r i c h nat ions v;ho are s i t t i n g p r e t t y on enormous 
powder kegs that threaten to blow up a t any time. The IIT has 
stopped the creat ion of SDKs from th is year , and there i s 
reason to think tha t the r i che r c o u n t r i e s , a f te r ensuring 
improvement in the c l ia rac tor i s t i cs of the 3DI1 at tlic cost of 
low income coun t r i e s , are no longer in t e re s t ed in making 
SDRs the p r inc ipa l i n t e rna t i ona l reserve a s s e t . 
82. RAO (VKRV). IMF and development a s s i s t ance . Commerce. 
139, 3566; 1979, Oc, 20; 7 ^ . 
The use of SERs as a too l for developmental a s s i s -
tance, SDRs were created by the H'lF as a type of i n t e rna t iona l 
l i q u i d i t y tha t would not involve a t ransfer of r e a l resources 
but v/ould be based on na t iona l guarantees of acceptance by 
pa r t i c ipan t s for the adjustm.ent of payments imbalances. The 
IMF has formulated proposals for the crea t ion of ncv; type of 
SDRs in eschange for the dol lar held by member countr ies in 
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t he i r reserves in viiat was ca l l ed tlie subs t i tu t ion account. 
These new SDRs v/ere intended mainly to b a i l out the developed 
and tlie o i l -expor t ing countr ies who were worried by the i r 
mounting do l l a r balances and the i n s t a b i l i t y attending the i r 
valuation and tha t i t may a l so come in way of new issues of 
SDRs on the old bas is which involved no t ransfer of r e a l 
resources and had given some benefi t to the developing count-
r i e s . The system of a l loca t ion should not be based on Il^ ZF 
quotas bjit should give a larger proportion to the developing 
count r ies . 
83, SDRs AS main reserve a s s e t . Flnan Escp. 13, 10; 1973, 
Mr, 28; 1(if-8). 
The IMF has agreed on "s table but adjustable 
exchange r a t e s and on malting SDRs the p r inc ipa l reserve a s s e t . 
The four p r inc ip l e s for evolving tlie future in t e rna t iona l 
monetary system v^lch would be responsive to the needs of both 
developed and developing countr ies and a reformed system 
should a lso provide for adequate t ransfer of r e a l resources 
from developed to developing coun t r i e s . 
8^, TliOH^HILL (Barbara). Amity through tade accords. Eastern 
EOion. 50, 3 ; 1968, J a , 195 105. 
The thlcd major economic move in 1967 was the 
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iinanimous vote by 107 nat ions for a plan to increase the 
world 's nonetary rese rves . The IMF, approved the creat ion of 
new reserves ca l led spec ia l Drawing Rights (SDRs) to help 
gold and do l la r s finance in te rna t iona l t rade . The plan i s 
the f i r s t ma^or change in world finance since the monetary 
fund i t s e l f was es tabl ished 23 years ago. The nev; world 
money, which w i l l amount to an Il-IF book-keeping measure i s 
intended to provide individual coun t r i e s , with enough reserves 
to r i d e out temporary d e f i c i t , while s t i l l pursuing l i b e r a l 
trade po l i c i e s with other na t ions . Without r e s e r v e s , countr ies 
would be forced, during d e f i c i t per iod, to reduce the i r 
purchases from other coun t r i e s . The cutbacks might be 
excessive, in the l i g h t of long-term trade prospec ts . The 
fund was created the g rea te s t forward step in world f inanc ia l 
co-operation. Free trade wi l l enhance the economic growth of 
the individual countr ies and in turn tha t the v/orld and a l l 
i t s people. 
85. THJJILLO (Candelario) . Special drawing r i g h t s : rue 
computer approach to the new reserve a s s e t . Fin jS Dev. 
7, h'y 1970, Dec; 5I+-6O. 
Special drawing r i g h t s (SDRs), the new reserve 
asse t being held by 10^ pajrt icipating fund members, v/ore e s t ab -
l ished by e lec t ron ica l ly computing and t ransfer r ing o::^ -ch 
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country 's a l loca t ion on to a computer magnetic tape, i0.1o-
cat ions of SDR's made to p a r t i c i p a t i n g monbers have the 
effect of increasing the reserves of those members. The 
t ransact ions between the IMF in which a member requi res i t s 
own currency from the fund in exchange for gold or ciirrencies 
acceptable to the IMF. 
86, WHiLICH (Henry C). ' : . : Vtfcr Id monetary system af te r 
postponmoit of the subs t i tu t ion account. In ter Econ. 
15, ^ ; 1980, J l - i ig ; 163-7. 
Recently the interim committee of the IMF met in 
Hamburgh without making s ign i f ican t progress on the proposal 
for a subs t i tu t ion account. One of the main i n i t i a t i v e s 
towards r e s t ruc t i ng the in te rna t iona l monetary system thus 
was postponed i f not inde f in i t e ly syspended, Viiat problom 
was the subs t i tu t ion account designed to solve ? Can i t be 
solved without the subs t i tu t ion account ? A decis ion to 
ac-tivate the subs t i tu t ion account would move the process in the 
d i rec t ion of an SDR-based systeci, although the u l t imate out -
come might s t i l l be a d i f fe ren t one. Foreign exchan^^e i n t e r -
vention in SDR v/ould cons t i t u t e a s ign i f ican t Improvement in 
the in t e rna t iona l monetary system. I t would l imi t the imdesi-
rab le effects a r i s ing from use of na t iona l currencies . 
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FOI^ ID'S AGREH-m I^T 
?>^, GOLD (Joseph) . Some f i r s t e f f e c t s of t he Second An end-
men t . Fin & Dev. 1 5 , 3 ; 1978, Se; 2^i-9. 
"Biere have been a number of immediate changes in 
ttie a c t i v i t i e s of the IW as the r e s u l t of the en t ry i n t o 
fo r ce of the Second itoendment of i t s j i r t i d e s of Agreement. 
They inc lude changes in the r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s of members, 
the func t ions and t r a n s a c t i o n s of the IMF. There may be fewer 
ambigu i t i e s in the p r o v i s i o n s d e a l i n g v/ith gold in the second 
Anendment, but the f u t u r e of gold i s u n c l e a r , no tv / i ths tand ing 
the agreed o b j e c t i v e of t h e g r a d u a l r e d u c t i o n in i t s r o l e in 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l monetary system. Freedom of members to choose 
t h e i r exchange arrangements does no t means freedom from a l l 
r e g u l a t i o n s . The ItlF and o ther members to ensure the e x i s t e n c e 
of o rde r ly exchange arrangements and to promote a s t a b l e 
system of exchange r a t e i . The mono l i th i c s t r u c t u r e has been 
eroded in favor of a s e r i e s of p o l i c i e s , wi th sep?!" te changes , 
and even. sep_^ate f inanc ing for some p o l i c i e s , 
88, GUPTA (OP). -• Second Anendment of t h e A r t i c l e s of 
Agreemoit of the Il-IF : A rev iew. Ind ian J of Gomra. 3 3 , 
123; 1980, J e ; 25-36 . 
The Second Amendment of the A r t i c l e of Agreement 
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of the IMF which came into foa?ce on i ^ r l l 1 , 1978 represents 
the most massive and con^lex revis ion of a major t r ea ty that 
has ever been undertaken. The second tomdment could conve-
n ien t ly be grouped in to the follov/ing ca tegor ies . Exchange 
arrangements and survei l lance by the fund; Role of gold in 
intelrhational monetary system; CJhanges in the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
and expansion, of the SDR's; SiK^jlification and expansion of 
the fund's f inanc ia l operations and t r ansac t ions . 
89. HEGDE (Bamakrishna) . Ti-^ loan and i t s impl ica t ions . Jan 3ul. 
2 , 9-10; 1982, Mv, 155 7. 
The large scale borrowing from, the IMF hy ce r ta in 
developing countries has simply m.eant a surrender of the i r 
eccnomic sovereignty and has s t ressed tha t t ' l i s i s not a path 
India should follow. To explain what are the implicat ions 
and in x-Aiat way our r i g h t s , cur po l ic ies tha t are going to be 
effected by the po l ic ies of IMF from time to time. T:ie 
changes were incorporated in the second amendment of the 
Ar t ic les of Agreement could only be regarded as t r a d i t i o n a l 
s t ep . I t indicates t r a n s i t i o n a l ste;^ tov/ards a more comj)rehen-
sive agreement with IMF which would, among other th ings , hope-
fu l ly es tab l i sh a l ink between SDRs aiid developmait ass i s tance 
and enable the developing countr ies to play a large ro l e in 
122 
decision aaking. Today, the governraent i s borrov/ing 
'Rs. 5)000 crores . The cumulative effect of t h i s w i l l be 
such a d i s a s t e r that our future government w i l l not be able 
to discharge t h i s deist. The foreign exchange reserves were 
of the order of Rs. 1,^91 crores in 1975-76. \tien the Janta 
Government resigned in 1979-80 the reserves had r i s en to Rs, 
5,219 c ro re s . 
90, HOOD (VIMC) . Surveil lance over exchange r a t e s . Fin & Dev. 
19, 1; 1982, Mr; 9-12. 
Responding to the vie\\r among i t s members that the 
fund should be ac t ive in exercising surve i l l ance , i t p\3rsues 
th i s function a t mul t i la te ra l , and b i l a t e r a l l e v e l . The Fijnd's 
Economic Counsellor reviews the purposes and process of survei-
l l ance , v/ithin the f l ex ib le framework establ ished by the 
Artiicles of Agreement. The IMF seeks to promote s t a b i l i t y 
by fos ter ing orderly underlying economic and f inanc ia l condi-
t ions and a monetary system that does not tend to produce 
e r r a t i c desc r ip t ions . I t avoids manipulating exchange r a t e s 
or the in te rna t iona l monetary system in order to prevent 
effect ive balance of payments adjustment. The Fund sha l l 
oversee the in te rna t iona l monetary system in order to ensure 
i t s effect ive operat ion, and sha l l oversee the compliance of 
each member v/ith its. obl igat ions. 
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91, MAIIROTRA (KN). In t e rna t iona l monetary issues anci the 
developing coun t r i e s . For Tr 3iil. 10, 1; 1979, J l ; 1-5. 
Problems concerning in t e rna t iona l monetary system 
and their implications for the developing countr ies have been 
frequQitly discussed on various na t iona l and in t e rna t iona l forumj 
during the l a s t decade. I t i s now widely recognised that 
because of close inter-dependence of trade and nonetary flox'/s, 
reforms in the system should form an i n t eg ra l p a r t of the 
New In te rna t iona l Economic Order, Second ^endment of the 
a r t i c l e s of agreement of the IW which became effectlVG only 
from i ^ r i l 1 , t978, represents a s igni f icant development. The 
IMF a r t i c l e s has legal i sed the f luctuat ing exchange regime but 
v i sua l i ses that a t a future d a t e , a system based on s tab le 
adjustable paB values should be poss ib le , but would be done 
only if 85 per cent majority of the fund's t o t a l vottog power 
agrees tD i t . I t a l so provides for a system of survei l lance by 
the IMF. The 11 member countr ies v;hose foreign exchange 
holdiags increased by SDR 1 b i l l i o n or more added 27 bi l l iaai 
to the i r aggregate holdings , accounting for <)Ofa of the r i s e in 
the holdings of a l l count r ies . Four o i l exporting coun t r i es , 
I r a n , I r aq , Saudi Arabia and Libya accounted for another SDR 
7 b i l l i on or about ^8%, I t i s d i s t r e s s ing to note that out-
standing debt obl igat ions of 9^ - developing countr ies has 
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gronn from I 71.7 bil l ion to I 216.6 bil l ion daring the 
period of 1970-76, representing an ammal rate of growth of 
20,2,%, Ihe rate of increase of outstanding debt tended to 
accelerate overtime. 
92.. THiKS ON doabling IMP's lending power. Bcon Tiij^ aa. 
9, 255; 1 (2-3). 
A package of measurea %dilch wi l l nearly doable Ihe 
lending power of IMF is to be under discussion among the United 
States and other major indnstrlallaed nations. To work out 
measures to strengthen the financial position of IMF through 
accelerated inc£eas# in (piota subscriptions. A tentative 
agretfuent to increase IMF's basic l«iding resources by about 
50^ as part of the package. Cie ttiitatlve agreement i s to 
call for an Increase of about $ 30 bil l ion in basic qaotas paid 
by member countries of IMF. In increase in IMF* s Oaneral 
ArrangtfBent to Borrow (GAB) from curr«it six and a request to 
Saudi Aralda to provide IMF with a new revolving credit of 
about 5 bi l l loa dollars for lending to countries in financial 
diff icult ies , are started to be remaining parts of the package. 
13xe agreMoeatt under i«hlch other IMF coun-trlas wHl also be 
allowed to borrow from this fund. 
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93« 2 ^ (Bdlvln H). Xnternatlonal nonetary donrelopmeats. 
UiUm BB0B« 66, 185 1976, Ap, 3O5 875-6. 
In recoit years, the ftmdamental chaxiges In 
international monetary arrang^nmt taken place, and It i s 
ij^ortant that these chani^ es be fUUy understood. The 
agreeaent was solidified in Jamlca by the Interia committe of 
the IMF. Ihe agremcat involves gaieral revision of 
international iBonetary arrang^ ttOMitLS established at the 19Mf 
Bretton woods confer^ SLCe, lAille preserving the basic alms of 
promoting international^ monetary cooperation and faci l l t ing the 
ezchani^ e of gooda, servlaea tfid ee^ltal»^ Iiq;>ortant^  operational 
ai^eets of the system^ have b^sn ohang^ ed to promote a snoothly 
fanctioning monetary straotnre, vlthout the shocks and 
dl8e<iulllbla idiloh arose with increasing frequoicy' in the 
1960*4 and early 1970*8. Under the original IMF article'a each 
nation undertook to maintain & "par value** for I ts currency, 
e:^ressed in texma of gold,.and agreed to convert foreign 
off icial holdings of i t s currency iato gold at the request of 
the holder. Ihls new provision recognizes that the relationship 
between curroicles oist reflect the evolution of domestic 
economics. But par value provisions cannot be achieved through 
action to f ix or manage exchange rates In conflict with 
underlying condltl<xis. If each country maintains sustainable 
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non-lnflatJonary rat«8 of economic growth, th<Bi fllschiAge 
relations will also be relatively stable. 
9M-. 1DT]S(I (John H). Surveillance over exchange rate policies. 
Fto » DgY. 1^, 3 | 1977, Se> 17-9. 
Ihe IMF recently announced the principles and 
procedures for tbe guidance of monber countries with respect 
to exchange rate pol icies , and for tiie exercise of fund 
surveillance over those policies , after the proposed second 
aiiendiunt of the Article of Agreenent becomes effective. 
Surveillance Is an iiiD|>ortant and. coi^Xer function, which 
reflects member countriea recognition of their interdependence. 
Ihe purpose of IMF SurveiUanca i s to reduce the economic 
costs and the internatlonal^polltleal frictions which result 
from a country having the wrong exchange rate over a 
significant period. 
FQND'S OOITDIIIONiLlTY 
95. BAOCHI (Amlya Kumar). OondA-tionality and I t s Implications. 
a»at«wi Baon. 77^ 23J I 9 8 l , De, h; 1068 . 
The IMF often escacted condltiona lAilch aggravated 
the Instability of the borrowing country and seriously hamiiered 
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I t s efforts at Industrlallsstion. In Argentina, Chile and 
ntny other countries, in tbe. 1950* s and 1960's. The IMF now 
reeoBBends not Just short run policies but It Insists on a 
package of policies that should bring about 'Structural 
readjU8tm«it* In the direction i t wants. Thus the lc»ig-run 
developaent objectives of tkLB country might be coii|>letely 
overturned at the behest of tiie IMF. Since the Indian 
Qovemment has now negotiated the largest single loan ever 
granted 1^ IMF, i t i s inviting application of the maxlnui 
conditionalIty laid down by the IMF» The IMF In concert with 
the othtf controllers of international capitalism have not 
tueeetded vei^ well in ohecklfig inflation or promoting any 
other kind of stability. 
96, Bji(IiiyLSlBIUMAHIAK (V). .> Americans abstalh, but the 
fund marches on. Itia^ fflPB figgfl.77, 21; 1981, Nv, 20;953-6. 
The American opposition to the IMF loan to India 
always had an air of th^trioal i ty about i t . But the fund's 
management had satisfied i t s e l f by that time that the Indian 
loan request f e l l within the scope of the policy the IMF had 
adopted for extending i t s conditional financial support to 
adjustment programmes Instituted by member-countries in order 
to overcome medium t^erm paym^ts imbalances^ The IMF on the 
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sasplolon that i t s assistance to Third World countries thro\igh 
i t s enlarged access policy isay spil l over from balance-of-
payment support to disgalsed development financing. Ttie needs 
of the IMF, the Americans are hlocking further creation of 3I>R*s 
and insisting on the fond coiq;>leting i t s on-going studies in 
this area before the proposal taken up. They have also 
erpressed their uneasiness over the success %diich the fund has 
heen achieving in lining up resources for i t s enlarged access 
policy by tapping Saudi Arabia and other Gulf sources. The 
IMF shifting to a track of high conditlonality in extending 
balsnee of payments support to developing countries. The IMF 
are scheduled to consider tode^ tiie largest loan the agency 
has ever been a&ed to mi&e-a credit of 5 bil l ion SDRs (about 
$5,68 billion) to India. 
97. BALLAI. (N Morarl). \C?omm«iat on central budget : 1982-83. 
Eco Rev. 27,9; 1982, ipj ^ 7 . 
Analyses tdie budget provisions of 1982-83, con^aring 
i t with last year's budget. The views expressed are those of 
the author only. Ve can very well understand the finance 
minister's anxiety to inerease production to cut short the 
initorts especially in the l ight of IMF loan. We are borrowing 
from IMF Just to cover up the balance of payment deficits . Me 
129 
simply cannot afford to continue with the pereonical external 
payment problem. Ve are singly going to sink, i f the balance 
of payment position does not trnpTove, even with the assistance 
of title IMF funds. All financial asserts hoped that the 
deficit may be much less at least this time, in view of the 
additional inflow of foreign capital throu^ IMF borrowing, 
which adds to the eirctilatlon of money in the economy. If 
deficit financing i s also huge with the IMF loan i t may 
ultimately generate tremendous pressures, th9 e^tperts opined. 
So, the IMF as conditions for i t s loan are essential. 
98* BIHJ C8HiJay«). IMF I o n . Jgmt A Pol Hdv. 17, 23| 1982, 
Je, 5j 962-3. 
IMF eonditionality has meant tnterferenoe in the 
internallaeoiiOBie and social policies of debtor nations and 
that debtor nations have been forced to swallow the bitter p i l l 
of 'structural adjustment' lAiiofa in many cases has only worsened 
the balance of payments situation and has allowed ^ e IMF and 
i t s principal member. Indian industrialists seem to be now 
clear that the new ii^iort policy i s not In their Interests and 
that i t was imposed by the IMF. Jamiea stopped getting the loan 
from the IMF. Jamiea went throu^ serious pol i t ical and eo<»L(»ic 
cr is i s as a result of implementing fund progronmes and the IMF 
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ttight«ied the torev on Manley, who vas teeesing less 
aeecBiiodatlTe toimrds tbe IMF. Bat J«nica i s once »faiB 
seeorlng funds frcni the IMF, 
99* Bffi0 (Sirajaya). : ^ IMP loan t k loyalist Tiev. igtsSL 
* P'^ T Mriv- 17, T3; 1982, Mr, 27J H89-91. 
The IMF 'doiBHlltionality* Is not objectionable 
slnoe no mcnber country has eoqpreased against it« The 
Government of India has probably gone in for the ^ bil l ion 
SIR loan due to the '^pressure on the balance of payments", 
^d ia voald adopt only sneh of the measures and polieiss and 
programmes as vere crisistont with its: own policies* The 
5 billion SDR loan can be repaid, the Indian economy revived 
and a l l problems sorted oat providedi In the next few years, 
In the period when the loan i s being absorbed, there i s no 
inflationary pressure built up In the economy* 
100* BHAPtJRI (Imit). f e c i a l ealuse In India's loan* 
77, 23; 1981, De, h; 1072-3. 
In the Interest of International commercial banking, 
the IMF todiqr i s being asked to play -m. role where banks can 
avoid such **lending-traps>* In developing countries. The basic 
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logle of the IMF "speelal clause** la India*s case i s to 
pre-oRpt India's right to approach Internatiooal banks for 
eonierclal horroirlngy so ^b&t India does not hecone viotber 
"lending-traps** for then. Otir suggestion i s that this 
pttaiAfiK Is now helng attoq^ted to he resolved throu^ an 
International policies role by IW (and the Iferld BankI In 
the interest, and on behalf of the intematlonal commercial 
btfaldni^  system* IMF eondltlonality liq^osed by India*s getting 
Into a debt trap then allov the IMIT to force India to accept 
•altlaatlonal corporations fereign private Investment, which 
provide a suitable vehicle for International coiuBsrcial 
banking* 
101. BIEd (Siveifti). IMF loan & recession t An analysis of 
relationship. Bean Times. 9, 2^3; 1982, Nv, 26; 5 (3-6). 
In a developing, eeeaony like India, boats of rece-
ssion and JjakHAlon are not the parts of reccurroat eyelieal 
varimtlen* in the level of aggregate economic activity-
charaeteristle; of an advanced cflq;)italist system* India's 
present external Indebtedness i s put around Ra. 15»0CX) or ores* 
In 1981-82, total debt was estimated «t Bs. 837 crore which 
constitated about 25% of the country*s? foreign exchange 
reserves. Ibe recent availing of massive 5*6 bil l ion dollar 
loan from the IMF marked a radical departure from ^le policy 
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of aifoltlag eondltloaal aid. Ilillo the loon was blgatt In 
tha history of tba IMF, tfoa loan vas the largest and iml^e 
for India too, as no aid received earlier carried with It 
sn<di a^ v^lde range of conditional clauses. The loan which la 
dyMI.apm«iitaX **1A character as I t i s lnt«iied to f i l l the 
ffteggerlng halance of pa^nAts deficit of Rs. ^800 orore in 
198#-8t and stabilise In fature the asternal payments posi-
tion. The IMF ccnditionality which has been put In practice 
and Idle present recessionary trends in parts of the country's 
iiuTullfttal sectors. 
t02» BIBD COrahaa). Oondltlonality and the needs of develo-
ping coantrieSai Inter Betgi> 17} 1; 1982| Ja-Fe; 32-6. 
The principal cause of the balance of payments 
deficits of the non-oil developing coantries has altared 
since 1973< exogenous factors now piay a far more important 
role than previously. The a^proiorlateness of the ceoftitions 
conventionally attached to IMF drawings need to be re-examined 
In tSiis l ight. ^ FOr Instance a view amengst developing 
coantries that IMF eonditionallty i s Inappropriate to their 
problems may deter them from turning to the fund; again, an 
increase in their need for finance as reflected by a deterio-
ration In their balance of paijneats may force tims to borrow 
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Bore from tlM fond in the npp«r credit tranches or through 
the extended fae l l l ty where stricter and mere rigorous 
oondltlonallty implies* This v l U be more so the ease If the 
slxe of fond (jaotas, idileh in tarn Is the main factor 
detemlned the s lse of the fund's lending capacity, Is not 
mi^tained in real terms. 
103. OOHDinOHAXITY IffD the role of the IMF. Been & Pol Mdy. 
15, ^5-6; 1980, NY, 8-15? 1983-7. 
QlYen t2ie adverse outlook in the balance of 
payments In almost a l l non-oil pow countries, and the l ike-
hood that many of them v l U have no other recourse for 
additional financing but the IMT, I t Is important to examine 
the nature of ^ e problms tbat are worrying many developing 
countries regarding IMF pol ic ies . 
10^. BAIT (Baddar). %QS>ftl.snoe of payments, IMF loan aaoA 
national policy, igj^it^ 37} 3; 1982, Fe, 21; 5-6« 
Baring tSie last few years, the balance of payments 
situation has been deteriorating. This Is largely the result 
of the growing unfavourablcness in the balance of trade. The 
balaoiGe of trade which was adverse to the tone of Bs. 2,V^9 
crwes in 1979-80 more than doubled Itself in the next year 
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and was of the order of Rs, 59^26 erores in 1980-81. Bven 
during 1981-82, i t i s expected to be of the order of more 
than Rs« 5,000 or ores, TbUt txmSLB gap Is partially met by 
a favourable baSanee of lniKi»lble8. Ihis i s healthy feature, 
bat theGovemineat instead of redueing ttie trade gap has 
adopted the easier method of going in for a huge loan fron 
the IMF of the order of | 5 bil l ion. Ihe country hxv reacted 
sharply to the oonditionalit las attached to the IMF loan. Ihe 
country i s reversing many of the basic policies with respect 
to private enterprise, AMdgn collaborations and impwt subs-
cription. Our ee^iomy suffered a sharp set back because of 
both domestic and external factors, real national income f e l l 
by 5^ in 1979-80 and inflation, which re-emerged early in the 
year, nas over 20%, Dosestie savings f e l l to about 2^% of 
GDP. The external situiUon in facing tiie economy also deterio-
rated sharply. The price of imported o i l doubled from the end 
of 1978 to January I98O and this was reflected in a shift into 
an overall deficit in the balance of payments in the seecnd 
half of 1979-80, 
105. CUTTA (tear Kath). Foreign exchange constraints and a 
self reliant economy. Capital. A; I981; 13-5* 
Ihe coincidence of the o i l cr i s i s with t^e world 
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recession since 197^ made i t Incumbent for non-oil least 
developed countries (LDCs) heavily depend^it on international 
credit matketft. The IMF has underwritten most of this massive 
debt build up. The developing countries import normally more 
goods and services than they do export and the current 
account of deficits tftiiftare so incurred in ttie process are 
normally covered up in the form of aids, loans and direct 
Inresteent. The INF to Intervoie more actively in LDCs 
policy melclng. k s t i l l different group recommends a slow dovn 
of economic grorth as a remedy for LDCs payment problems. The 
IMF which can ass«rt any conditionality clause to safe-guard 
tile financial Interests bdhlnd laon making and repayment 
thereof. The successful negotiation of an IMF loan tiierefore 
acts as a strong balancing factor on the assessment side. In 
recent years, a growing deficit In India's balance of trade to 
the tune of Rs. 5»000 crore seems to be almost persisting. 
India's ezp<»rt In 198M-85 Should be around Rs* 13,000 crore as 
against Rs. 6,M-23 crore in\1979'^0. 
• \ 
106. DUTTA (HiAbatosh). ".43?VKlg6et and tftie IMF conditions. 
Smja^ 188, H697r19df, Mr, \9% 22-3* 
Ihe eanditioas at^ehed te the recent IMF drawing 
would be subtantially refleotvd In the eeatral budget for 
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1i982-83. The lBg[>ortant revADue-ralsing schoaes have been 
annoonced only a few weeks hefore the presentation of the 
budget. The fund oflnditlons and of the fund line of thinking 
on the budget i s the heavy reliance on Import duties. Out 
of Rs* 533^ ^ crore of new taxation proposed, as much as Rs, 392 
erorey or about 2/Z will come from customs. The Government 
to liberalize and not to liqpose any restrictions for balance 
of paymoits ptirposes. The fund and the continuance consulta-
tions in depth v l l l probably ensure that the governm^it's 
contribution to the inflationary pressures wil l be kept in 
some check. The fund condition related to payment agr«en«its 
only with membtf countries. India does not have a multiple-
exchange system and therefore, the condition prohibiting i t 
i s not relevant to a l l . The fund did not Insist on the 
devaluation of the rupee but the need for * realistic* eocohange 
rates was enphaslaidU 
1i07« GINGaLY (JK)« Probe into monetary system. gX. 60, 3; 
1983, Ja, 3j 90«-7). 
The RHE to undertakie an in-deptti probe into the 
monetary system. I t i s , has not caused any big ripple on 
the country's monetary stream. I t i s also necessary to find 
out how the RBI can f u l f i l l \3EL9 credit oeilling laid down by 
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the IMF with a vlev to fa l f l l l lng the condltlonallty 
claases. The net credit expansion to the Government t i l l 
December 1982 should have heen of the order of Rs. ^,160 
crore. Bat by November 19» It exceeded the limit and 
reached Be. V,370 crore. Ihe IMF condltlonallty clause, an 
oyerall credit expansion of Rs. 11,930 crore should have been 
achieved by December 311 1982. Against l^ ls , the actual 
expansion has been Rs. 7)^11 crore, which i s much lover tiian 
the total cel l l ing, mainly because of the lower commercial 
credit. Bat theee i s every possibility that the IMF may 
object to the greater cre4^t expansion to the Govemmsnt and 
also the large Union budget def ic i t , which i s stated to 
exceed Rs* 2,000 crore, cMqpared with the estimated deficit 
of Rs, 1,365 crore, 
108. OQITIAN (Manual). Fund condltlonallty and the Inter-
national adjustment process. Fin & Dev> I8, 2$ I98I, 
Je; 1»t-7. 
As thB 1980s unfolded, the international economy 
was entering a difficult stage t inflation in most countries 
was high and showed no signs of abating; growth rates were 
slowing down; and external Imbalances had Increased and shifted 
among group of countries. The recent steps taken at the fond 
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to support m«nibflr'8 adjastaent efforts to iji^rove their 
eeonomlc perforaance. 
109. GUITIAN (Manual). Rind condltlonallty and the Inter-
national adjustment process t The early period, 1950-70, 
rin&^^. 17, V, 1980, De; 23-7. 
During t2ie 1950's and the 1960s, the IMF's 
resources were increasingly called upon i t s member countries. 
The condltlonality attached to the use of these resources 
and the practices that nere developed by the IMF for the 
Implementation of condltlonality during this period of 
relatlYely stable prices and growtii rates. The issue at 
stake i s not lAiether adjustment will be carried out but 
lAiether i t v i l l be carried out efficiently. Ck>ndltlonality 
is a means to ensure the efficiency of International adjust-
ment process. 1]laiiformity of treatmoit, irtien properly reh ires 
that for any given degree of need the effort of economic 
adjustment sought in programs be broadly equivalent among 
members. In time, the practices of condltlonality csdie to 
encompass a l l general aspect of econoslc pol ic ies . So that 
imbalances could be redressed vitiiout resort to restriction 
on trade and payments. 
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110. GdlTIAVr (Moamel). IMF and Its Changing condltlonallty. 
Mftteafrtwa. 19, 52; 1981, Ag, 29; 7-8. 
Ihe 6oT«rnmflQt of India's deelsl(»i to take a 
massive IMF loan has tourebsd off a njitlonvlde eentroT«FS7 
ovar the condltlonallty attached to the loan. Ihe IMF, traces 
13ie evolatlon of tiie condltlonallty In the last decade, which 
has relevance to ^ e currently negotiated loan. luring their 
tiio-year duration they were used l^ $^ meabers and provided 
thea with approximately 7 billion SDBs. The o i l f a c i l i t i e s . 
In effect. Introduced a modification-in favour of financing, 
in the typical blend between adjustment and finalsIng In tiie 
fund's standby arrangements. The IMF has made loans for some 
SDB 3 bil l ion to low income developing countries. 
111. IMF's EiGBl elimnt. ^on A Pol Wklv. 16, »+2-»f3; 1981, 
Oc, 17-^j 16»f. 
The large scale borrowing frcM the IMF by some 
undeveloped coimtries has simply meant "a surrender of their 
eeonomle soverignty" and stress tiiat "this i s not a path 
l ike India to follow" i t had not been an Idle warning. Ihe 
leakage of the exact terms and condition on which India i s 
negotiating for a loan of 5 bil l ion. SDRs from the IMF. That 
borrowing from the IMF would give the IMF power to impose i t s 
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own style of "econdmie discipline" on the governaents 
economic policies and the management of the economy. 
India's economic soverlgnty and decision making powers In 
the coming tiiree years during which period the IMF loan 
wonld be drawi In three annual Instalments and subsequently 
for^ a^s long as the loan together wltii the Interest on It Is 
t^ttHy rapid. 
112* IMF LOAN to India t Bi^k'horizon or silver lining. 
> 28, 10; 1981, Dej 8-12. 
Die IMP recently approved the loan of ^ bill ion 
SDRs to India* Approximately 10^ per annum. 6.25^ per annum 
on half of the loan amoixnt, tiie Interest rate will be charged 
by tile IMF. India has sought this loan to deal with the 
acute balance of payments cr is i s through \diich the country 
i s passing at present. For many of the non-oil developing 
countries, the past two years have been a period of increasing 
economic diff icult ies . The record of the non-oil developing 
countries with respect to inflation to considerably worse than 
their growth performance." Because of the prevalence of 
accommodating financial policies as well as the higher cost 
of imported goods consumer prices in this group of countries, 
have risen steeply". India would be able to achieve a break 
1 4 1 
through in o i l production In the next three years and would 
not be obliged to draw last Instalment of the IMF loan. The 
balance of payments problem and gives the IMP the power to 
impose i t s o%ai style of "Economic Discipline." The huge 
IMP loan would finance the deficit in the budget, would 
enhance the level of the reserves. The decision of the IMF, 
including the pattern of "cohdtionality" in relation to large 
drawings on i t by different countries. The IMF loan i s going 
to prove a silver lining. However, the acquisation of IMF 
loan, through seemingly perched on a dark horizon, has bright 
silvery spots. 
113, IMF : Reorienting the policies . Capital. 180, 4-519; 1978 
Je, 29; 889-90. 
Sie Governm«it of a country whose finances are in 
poor shape appeals to the fund help, and the fund demands 
drastic correctives as a condition of granting i t . The IMP is 
not willingly involved in polidkics, but i t cannot avoid accusa-
tions tbat for the sake of stability in the financial system 
as a whole, i t i s willing to support repressure regimes. Nor 
can i t avoid criticisms, mostly frcm developing countries and 
that i t s method of f imuQclal rectitude cure too sophisticated 
to be applied indiscriminately, and tiiiat method which could be 
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beneficial If they were applied over a period of years 
may cause excessive stress If tiiey are forced lato a period 
of a year or two. Egypt's negotiation of a three-year 
standby credit from the IMF i s virtually a condition of 
continuing assistance from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and 
the UAB as well as a suggested explanation of intensified 
pol i t ical repression. 
11^-. JOHNSON (Omotunde) and SALOP (Joanne). Stabilization 
programs and income distribution. Fin & Dev. I7, h; 
1980, Dej 28-31. 
The IMF makes i t s resources available to the 
countries, under certain c<mditions, in support of stabiliza-
tion programs designed to counter payments imbalances inevit-
ably affect the distribution of income within the population 
of the country concerned. The programs implemented with IMF 
supporltin Bolivia, Qiana, Indonesia, and the Philippines and 
review the short-term impact of the adjustment measures on the 
earnings of different income groups. Domestic pol i t ical 
considerations largely determine who bears the burden of 
reducing and restructuring aggregate demand to achieve sustained 
external balance. 
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115« KA3RA (Kamal Nayar). IMF loan and self-reliance. 
Mainstream. 20, 15; I98I, De, 12? 12-^. 
!£he Government of India has obtained a conditional 
commit&ent from the IMF for a massive balance of payments 
support loan. As in the practice, the IMF has applied i t s 
maximum oonditionality clauses. The condltionality clauses 
are nothing but a means for making the borrowing country 
change socio-economic domestic policies and International 
economic and financial relationship. The IMF's policy pres-
criptions are also strongly tinged with supply side economics 
and the market orientation. The policy changed already 
initiated in India which were catalogued eff ie ial ly witii the 
loan application indicate the strc»ig maiket and private 
mterprise. Over the Sixth Five Year Plan period, the net 
capital inflow from abroad i s projected at Rs. 9»063 crores at 
1979-dO prices. In the fitaittwo years, net ex'ternal resources 
to the tune of Rs. 1,792 crores and Rs. 1,379 crores have 
already been availed of. Thai<«caes the Rs. 5^270 crores of 
balance of payments support extended exchange fac i l i ty from 
t^e IMF. The IMF amounts to violating the Sixth Plan framework. 
116« KOLDIP NAYAR. Eleven tfteps to IMF temple. Sunday. 9, 13; 
1981, Se, 13; 10-1. 
The IMF has approved a loan of $ 5 bill ion to India. 
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Bat the fund pat fcrvard certain conditions vrhlch are 
celling on deficit financing, tighter control of money 
supply; removal of liberalisation of price controls; r«aoval 
of administrated prices in the public sector; revision of 
power tariffs ; measures towards conserving energy; r«aoval 
of the subsidiaries to the extent possible^ more incentives 
for higher investment in the public sector; tax reforms and 
better tax administration^ improvement in the performance 
of infra structural fac i l i t i e s ; and measures to stejpiip imports. 
117, lOSBTA (BalraJ). Qianging patterns of foreign aid. 
SaiLiJaL A; 1981; ^9-52. 
India has moved a long t«ay from the f irs t concept 
of aid as a supploaait to dcaaestic resources for a development 
to i t s use as a maintenance resource and finally to reliance 
on foreign aid as a short-term balance of paym«its support. 
!Die question really i s how far mich a borrowing spree and 
injection of direct foreign investment i^ich will be arranged 
side by side will build up the capacity of the economy to 
satisfy the domestic requirements of development, raise the 
living standards of people and promote exports for servicing 
foreign investment and credits on the scale being envisaged. 
India has been pushed into seeking balance-of-paymoits support 
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from tiie IMF \mder i t s Bictended Fond Faculty. The eondl-
t lonallt les attached to such a loan are really not negotiable, 
!Ehis kind of loan could be had on caneessional terms. The 
IMP, however i s not ccaicerned with the developmental ass is -
tance at a l l . I t s role i s str ict ly for ^ i c h deals in short-
term balance-of-payments problems tAiich arise in world trade 
by giving short-term credit to those countries which run into 
trade and payments def ic i ts . 
118. MISHRA (REC). IMF conditions t Playing with f ire . Ifjp^. 
2k, 2; 1981, Ag, 22; 7. 
Indian Finance Minister, Mr. R. Venkataraman should, 
therefore take parliament fully into confidence not only about 
the conditions specially attached to the 5*6 billioft loan \diich 
the government i s currently negotiating with tiie IMF, but also 
about the general IMF condltionalitles. k large number of 
African countries since the 70s, lAiea tiie world Bank-IMF 
policies began to operate in titiat contin«at, i s a clear wsornlng 
that any complacency towards IMF condltionalitles i s like 
playing with f ire. The terms and conditions which the IMF pats 
forward during the negotiations for dispensing i t s largesses. 
Bat these are the consequences v^lch have followed i t s conditions 
The hi^er Inflation rocked the Brazilian economy once advertised 
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as model of growth. IMF's Insistence on export promotion. 
In most of the developing countries which have leaned to 
heavily on IMP, c iv i l l i be r t i e s have heen crashed, growth 
has become stunted. Social welfare programmes have been 
slashed, a l l measures to strengthen the ind^endent founda-
tion of economy have been undermined. 
119. NOWZAP (Baliram). Managing external debt In developing 
countries. Fin & Dev. 17, 3» 1980, Se; 2V-7, 
!£he flow of financial resources to the developing 
countries have Increased sharply in recent years. Some 
general Issues raised by the resort to external finance, but 
IMF's role in Instances, where countries encounter debt 
servicing d i f f i cu l t i e s . The IMF Is Involved with the external 
debt probl^is of I t s members. The fund resources are made 
available In support of a s tabi l izat ion programme, the stand-by 
arrangement often Includes provisions regarding new borrowing 
during the period covered In the arrangement. The IMF plays 
an Important ro le In case ii&ere I t s members face debt resche-
duling si tuat ions. The IMF supported s tabi l iza t ion programs 
as part of a general review of the condltlonallty attached to 
the use of fund resources undertaken ear l i e r . 
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120. N RAM. Will India accept IMF 'conditionality' ? Hindu. 
10M-, 2; 1981, Ja, 2; 6 (3 -6) . 
The new year ushered in between the Government of 
India and the IMF for a large ext«ided arrangement entailing 
a s ignif icant degree of conditionality In economic direct ion. 
The conditionality bringing fund monitoring and surveillance 
in i t s wake, wi l l be related special ly to monetary and f i s c a l 
p o l i c i e s , foreign-borrowing, and exchange rate managoient. 
Tram the standpoint of c r i t i c s in \he developing world, the 
conditionality principle enables tiie fund to twist arms. The 
IMF approved an arrangement for Pakistan making available 
resources to the tune of 1.268 b i l l i o n SDR over the next three 
years. An amount equivalent to ¥f5^ of tiiat country's old 
quota of SDR 285 mill ion, SDR 8OO mil l ion , also for the three 
yeaars, for Bangladesh ^ o s e new fund quota i s SDR 228 mil l ion. 
India's new quota in tiie IMF i s SDR 1.7 b i l l i on . India's 
economy i s seea as bung in a period of quite serious balance 
of paymoits d i f f i cu l ty l^at may approach a c r i s i s at some not 
very distant point l inless the trends are reserved. 
121. NYERERE (Julius) . Nyerere and Manley on the IMF. 
Econ. 77, 235 1981, De, h-, 107if-5. 
The IMF always lays down conditions for using any 
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of I ts f a c i l i t i e s . We tiierefore e j e c t e d that there would 
be certain conditions Imposed should ve desire to use the 
IMF extended fond f a c i l i t y . Tanzania i s not prepared to 
devalue i t s currency Just because this i s a traditional free 
market solution to everything and regardless of the merits 
of our posit ion. Our price control machinery may not be the 
most ef fect ive in the world, but we w i l l not abandon price 
ecxitrol. We w i l l only str ive to make i t more e f f i c i en t . The 
Importance of the Third World demand for changed In the manage* 
ment structure of tiie IMF. IMF prescriptions are designed by 
and for developed cap i ta l i s t economies and are inappropriate 
for developing economies of any kind. The foreign-exchange 
situation ^ I c h the IMF involvement i t s e l f i s aimed at 
Improving. 
122; RAI (Kartik). IMF loan : False claim of the apologists . 
People's Damo. 5 , 3*+; 1981, Ag, 23? ^. 
The apologists for 5 b i l l i on dollar IMF loan to 
India have not voiced any public opposition to the view that 
IMF "eonditionality" i s pernicious. This massive loan, the 
biggest ever in IMF's his tory, witiiout attracting the harsh 
texms on which the IMF usually givest loans. The IMF package 
brought not only sharp reductions in the l iving standards of 
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the working people through unemployment, %rage-cuts and 
the withdrawal of rel ief , but also no recovery In the 
economy, nor even any Improvement in the balance of payments 
not withstanding a traaendous Increase In private profita-
bi l i ty . The IMF makes any attempt to tighten the conditions, 
India always have the option to get out the IMF's clutches 
and go to commercial ^anks. 
123* RAI (Kartlk). Imperialism's usurious exploitation of 
the Ihird World. People's Demo. 6, 8; I982, Fe, 21; h, 
''Capital 1 an which began i t s development with 
petty usury capital, ends i t s development with gigantic usury 
capital". Taking advantage precisely of the burdens Imposed 
on the Third liforld countries by the capitalist cr is is . The 
IMF's "conditionality" putting a ceiling on commercial borrowing 
by clitt it , as was imposed for instance on India, may appear to 
contradict this point, namely, that imperialist agencies like 
the IMF and the World Bank are being used to faci l i tate the 
entry of multinational banks. The IMF moved in with a tight 
grip over the economy, they are particularly chary of lending 
to unknown. To get the Third World deeper into debt, to "open 
i t up" for multinational banks, to extract a heavy "tribute" 
through Interest charges, such i s the strategy of li^erlallsm. 
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12^. RAI CKartlk). Stiffening terms of Imperialist ^&ld"i 
US will dictate. Peopla*s Demo. 5, ^ ; 198l, Oc, -^5 K 
Ihe India's massive 5»5 bil l ion dollar borrowing 
from ttie IMF has been negotiated without any detrimental 
eonditionality caluses becomes evident. !Ehe United Sta t^esy 
which really cal ls the tone, i s insisting that India should 
produce a "financial plan" including 'specific actions* to 
"Is^rove the eccmomy" before approval for the loan i s granted. 
In short, India must pursue a set of policies dictated by the 
United States and Venkataraman's forthcoming Isudgetary proposals 
must be approved by tiie Reagen Administration before any I^P 
loan i s sanctioned. 
125. RAI (Kartik). ^ t ' > f iscal cr i s i s . People's Demo. 
7, I5 1983, Ja, 2; h. 
The immediate factor underlying the current rece-
ssion has be«i the policy package adopted by the Indian 
Government under the dictates of the IMF. Import l iberalisa-
tion, credit sq[aeeze and the snatching a%ray of purdhasing 
power from the people through massive hikes in administered 
price and indirect taxes, a l l these measures dictated by the 
IMF have contribute to the current industrial recession. 
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126* RAI (Kartik), r Oeepealng cris is : Widening trade 
deficit . People's Demo. 6, l5; 1982, Ap, 11; h, 
!Die IMF on i t s 5 bill ion SDR loan had included 
among other things a jacking up of prices a l l round in the 
economy and the Imposition of a credit squeeze. Critics 
had pointed out at the time t^at tiiese steps would amount to 
nothing short of promoting a deliberate "engineered" Inflation 
as well as a deliberate "etiglneered"recesslon. Ihe IMP condi-
tionalit les bears out anqply tiie truth of the cr i t ics ' 
contrition. The whole package of measures adopted under IMP 
guidance that underlies the emerging recession and the spreading 
sickness. The IMF would not stand for that, resort to a 
further round of price-hikes over and above what was «ivlsaged 
in the budget. This in turn, would worsen both inflation as 
well as recession. India's foreign exchange reserves by about 
Rs. 1,300 crore during tiie period Apr 11-January, had neverthe-
less takan comfort from tiie fact that export growth nas running 
at about ^h%, ccxapared to a rate of Import growth of about 6%, 
The trade deficit would be about Rs. 55©0-5600 crore compared 
to Rs. 5756 crore for the previous year. The projected 
deficit was of course huge, but at least i t appeared to mark 
an improv«mait 07er the previous year. 
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127. RAI CKartlk). . ?New llc«islng policy. People's Damo. 
6, 19; 1982, My, 9; ^. 
The Govemnent's public postoring not wlthstanl Ixig, 
therefore the new llcesstag policy i s meant to do away with 
a l l controls. Upon capacity expeuislon by the monopolists 
and the maltinatlonals. This i s precisely \iti&t the IMF has 
been wanting. T«itative moves in this direction initiated 
notably wltti the 198O Industrial policy statemait were precisely 
lAiat was hailed in tiie secret IMF memorandum as a major and 
welccme shift in policy. And now the government has gone a 
long way further along this path, no doubt to please the IMF. 
!Ehe govt, i s reportedly planning to dismantle price and 
distribution controls, a measure the IMF wants, which would 
necessarily result in boosting private profit-margins. And 
i t has, of course been attacking the working class . 
128. RAX (Kartik). o^s t t i e of l i e s around the IMF loan. 
People's Demo. 5, Mf; I98I, Nv, I5 h. 
The IMP would not only determine the general sdiaye 
of economic policy, but would enforce, through the so called 
^performance clauses'* specific aritiiematlc ceilings on how 
much the government can borrow from the banks, and so on. Ihe 
IMF gives a loan, i t arrogates to i t se l f the right to determine 
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the ecoaomlc policy of the borxovlng coon try. The IMF has 
put a celling on the amount that India can borrow aborad 
commercially, ^^h billion SISRa in the f irs t year; this figure 
may change in the subsequent year but i t s implications are 
serious. Vhile commercial loans carry much hi^er Interest 
rates, pie IMF ability to in^ose *CQndltionality' on the 
borrowers. The IMF i s ensuring for i t se l f a monopoly position 
as a lender, ensuring that India has no vftiere else to turn 
and remain a "tie* client'*. 13ie IMF programme danands, in 
otherwGTds, i s a massive Increase in the rate of surplus value. 
The IMF's prescription of Import "liberalisation'* for India i s 
meant to help not the Indian economy but tiie imperialist 
countries. And the IMF would seek to rectify the resulting 
widening of our paymoits gap through an increasing squeeze on 
the people. 
129* HAY (Sankar). Self-reliance and foreign assistance : 
Basicity of Interlink. Capital. Aj 198I; 39-Mf. 
No nation In the Third world can achieve self-
sufficiency without foreign assistance, tiiat there are serious 
risks Involved In i t unless the issue i s viewed in the proper 
perspective. This i s particularly in tiie light of the fact 
that such aids as a rule are accompanied by intrualffi of trans-
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nationals In the Industrial sphere of imderdeveloped 
countries. Ihls phenomeaon, instead of fostenlng self-
sufficiency only Increases the dependence of Third World 
nations cm the developed nations. Ihls i s more pertinoit 
in the Indian case as the new trend of foreign aid throu^ 
tile IMF has an explicit or implicit conditlonality of open 
door to private foreign investment. 
130. RECiaiNG PROBLBM. Boon Tinges. 7, 59; 1980, My, 2»t;5(1-2). 
Sie current account surplus of the o i l exporting 
countries dropped from the peak of $ 60 billion touched in 
197^ to I 6 bil l ion in 1978, but rose to | 60 billion again 
in 1979} among other reasons, because of a decline in the 
growth rate of their Imports from 15/^  in 1978 to k% in 1979. 
The ocmbined current account deficit of the developing 
corn tries Increased from $ 6 bil l ion in 1973 to $ 2^ bil l ion 
in 197**- and $ 38 bil l ion In 1975. Wille i t i s estimated that 
the developing countries current account def ic i t wil l r ise by 
about $ 20 to $ 25 bil l ion to touch $ 70 to $ 75 bill ion in 
1980. The market have vaguely expressed yearning to work In 
the shadow of the IMF (rather than the World Bank) largely 
because they consider the fund's conditlonality restrictions a 
safeguard. 
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131. REICHMANN (TM) • ::3 Ftmd's ccxnditional assistance and 
the problems of adjustment, 1973-75. Fin & Dev. 15, ^; 
1978, De; 38-M-1. 
A review of 21 stand-by arrangements, vdiich the 
IMF granted In support of s tabi l izat ion in 18 moaber countries 
between 1973 and 1975* The main aspects of the design and 
in^loaentation of the programs and evaluates their effective-
ness against the background of the economic disturbances of 
the time. 
132* THIMMAIAH (G) • External assistance as a means of covering 
resource gap. Capital. A; I98I; 17-21. 
From the point of-view of economic as well as 
po l i t i c a l independence external assistance should be reduced 
to the minlsrusA) i t i s not wise for India to shut off foreign 
aid. If the coimtry wants to go for large scale investm^at, 
par t icular ly in areas l ike o i l exploration and telecc»nmunication, 
domestic savings will not be adequate. The IMF loan has to be 
viewed in this context. Because of the b i t t e r experience of 
the conditionality in^osed on India for getting loans from 
jdie IMF from the Fourth Plan. India had to depend upon foreign 
assistance to service the by then accumulated foreign debt 
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and to finance malnteaance imports to sustain development 
ac t iv i t i e s , ^ t h sagging exports, India was l e f t with no 
al ternative bat to go in for the IMP lojm. 
133. TIN AY GOPTA. UGANDA J Road to recovery, ^a.-'n^^r'*^-
21 , 16; 1982, De, 18; 19-22. 
The IMP and the Uganda Crovemmmt has drawn up a 
recovery programme which clearly st ipulates that the private 
sector, including co-operatives, wil l con^lete with the para-
s ta ta l s in an open and free market. Obote de§enils h i s moving 
away from the ear l ier Left is t path and h i s accepting IMF and 
World Bank help by writing that "the timing and volume of any 
assistance are crucial . Coupled with our resolve to take 
bold measures, assis tance, ^ i c h i s too l a te and too l i t t l e , 
could r e su l t in dislnooitives for the Ugandan producer to 
redouble their efforts to meet the challoige of recovery", 
Obote finds himself in a predicament in order to survive, lie 
needs 800 million dollar of foreign exchange, delay of payment 
on previous loan and raising of quota. This i s linked to his 
accepting IMF condition aixi IMP loan. Conditions included 
higher farm pr ices , lesser expenditure cxi administration, 
devaluation of the Shil l ing, rat ional isat ion of tax structure, 
Introduction of flexible in teres t r a t e , transfer of paras ta ta l 
organisation to Joint or private control. 
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FUND'S MaffiERSHIP 
13^. SCHRODER (Klaus). IMP and the countries of the council 
for mutual economic assistance. Inter Eeon. 17) 2; I982, 
Mr-J^; 87-90. 
In November I981 Hungary and, one week la ter Poland 
applied for membership of the IMF and the IBRD (VJbrld Bank). 
These applications have highlighted a subject vihich had been 
neglected for quite some time. This analysis deals with the 
problems and conse(^ences which arise from the membership of 
countries of the council for mutual economic assistance 
(Ckxnecon) - tiae eccxiomies of iiihich largely conform to 
principles of central eccnomic planning - in IMF, an in s t i t u -
tion organised according to market pr inciples . 
135, VBKATACHABY (R). China In IMF; A new ro le to play in 
S.E. Asia. Econ Times. 7 , 59; 1980, My, 2k', 5 (7-8). 
Gtilna decision to become a meber of the IMF repre-
sents a significant break from the ideological past , since 
China had been projecting the International monetary organisa-
tion as a club of the cap i t a l i s t nlitions, exploiting the econo-
mically developing countries. To become a member of the IMP 
and the IBRD. I t is claiming the status of a developing 
country and shedding tiie ortiiodox Maoist image, China now seeks 
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to make a bet ter use of available International finance 
to give a forceful thrust to i t s economic growth. The 
IKP membership of china will have a definite intact on 
other South-east Asian countries in general and on India 
in par t icular . Die subscription of Chiang's regime to the 
IMF vas $ 500 million, out of to t a l subscription of $ 8 
bi l l ion giving i t a share of 6,35S^. Indiafe subscription 
was $ UOO million. IMF subscription quotas are based on 
national income, gold holdings and global standing in e:xport 
and imports, a l l of \jhich continue to be in favour of Indus-
t r i a l nations. I t wil l be worth watching the a t t i tude of 
China towards the r ich nations ' plan to Ins t i tu te a subst i ta-
tion fund by selling IMF gold in order to mop up the excess 
dollar l iquidi ty in international market. 
GOLD SALE, PROFIT, DE7M.0PING OOUNTRIES 
136. IMP GOLD sa les . Scon Times. 7, 55; 1980, My, 20; 5(1-2). 
The IMF completed the sale of 50 million ounces of 
gold, or a third of tiie t o t a l quantum of gold held by i t , this 
month. !Die off icial price of gold of dollar 35 an ounce had 
to be abandoned by IMF to a l l members countries. According 
to the IMF, cut of the prof i ts from the auction sales of 25 
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million ounces of gold, dollar /129 bi l l ion wil l have been 
transferred direct ly to lOM- developing countries in proportion 
to their quotas as on 31 , 1975* Iraq, Kuwait, Qua t a r , Saudi 
Arabia, the UAS and Venezuela, have irrevocably transferred 
their fu l l share (and Jugoslavia a par t of i t s share) in the 
gold profit to the t rus t fund. The balance of the p ro f i t s , 
together with these t ransfers , are available for loans by the 
t rus t fund created for the purpose. !Ihe t rus t fund has loaned 
the equivalent of SDR 1,9 bi l l ion to 50 developing nations, 
out of 61 members l i s ted as el igible for these loans. India 
i s an el igible member, but has not borrowed so far . I t has 
given notice that i t proposes to borrow against i t s quota. In 
estimated amount of Rs. 55*0 crore has been mentioned as the 
borrowing proposed from the t rus t ftind. 
137, MARTIN (Michael Galen), Gold market developments : 1975-
77. Ha«fcem Econ. 71, 3; 1978, J l , 21; 125-30. 
In August 1975, the IMF agreed that 25 million 
ounces of gold should be sold by the fund for the benefit of 
developing countries, and another 25 million ounces should be 
distributed to fund member countries. The highly vola t i le 
movement of gold jarices over the l a s t few years was due In part 
to abrupt variations In the speculative demand for gold and 
the fluctuation in supplies from commimt countries. Moreover, 
180 
since tiie gold market i s very sensit ive to actual and 
expected changes in currency valaes and in teres t r a t ^ , 
the generally "onstable econcwiic condition of recent years; 
have also contributed to the market* s movem^ts. The gold 
market then has been marked by wide price swings over the 
l a s t five years. 
GOLD SALE, PROFIT, INDIA 
t38. IMP LOAN to developing nations. Beon Tmd. 7, 17; 1978, 
Se, 1; 13. 
The IMF wil l d is t r ibute through the Trust Fund, 
prof i t s from the sale of gold amounting to $ 362.6 million 
to IQlf developing countries. Out of this India will receive 
the highest share of $ ^2 millions. 
139. IMF s Prospects for gold sales. Capital, 178, Wt^f; 
1976, De, 23; 87»f-5. 
The recent recovery in the price of gold In the 
international market has enabled the IMF to reep a r ich 
harvest in i t s l a t e s t auction earl ier th is month in the shape 
of a substantially higher price and also a higher prof i t margin 
than a t any of i t s ea r l i e r four auctions. I t received a price 
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of $ 137 an ounce In the l a t e s t auction, ccmipared with 
I 126 and $ 109.U0, the high and low points , respectively, 
In the previous auctions. The event must have been noticed 
witii considerable satisfaction a t leas t in the 61 developing 
nations designated by the IMF as qualified to receive loans 
frc»B the Trust FUnd, into vhich the prof i ts of the gold sales 
are to go. As the 61 countries designated as beneficiaries 
of the Trust f\md are to receive assistance In proportion to 
their quotas, India as one of 61 and as the country having 
the largest proportionate share in to ta l of quotas of the 
receiving countries, i s e l igible to get, on th i s basis , 25% 
of tiie to ta l Trust Rmd assistance. All the other countries 
in the group of 61 would benefit a l so , each according to the 
strength of i t s quota. Egypt has 5^, Pakistan 6.3^, Sri Lanka 
2«6J? of ttie t o t a l quotas of the group. The asslatance from 
the Trust Pond would be available for ei ther or both of the 
period July 1976 to June 1978 and July 1978 to June 198O. 
INDIA, SIXTH FIVE YEAR PLAN 
^hO, APISBSHIAH (Malcolm S). I s foreign aid a barrier to 
self-reliance ? Capital. A; I98I; 59-6^. 
Self-reliance i s defined in terms of resi l ience to 
162 
cope with disturbance in the international economy and 
the linproveoient in our capacity to weather international 
shocks. The way foreign aid has been used in the develop-
mental endeavour through different Five-Year Plans. TSae 
use of foreign aid in meeting the budgetary gap, obviously 
snj5)ping fingers a t the $ 5»7 b i l l ion IMF loan. The IMF 
loan of Rs. 5>100 crore, ^ i c h i s fully receivable during 
the Sixth Plan period. The l a t e s t estimate subnitted to 
Parliament of the total foreign aid to India i s Rs. 2^,759.2 
crore comprising Rs, 18,872.5 crore in leans, Rs. 3112.8 
crore in grants and Rs. 2773.9 crore as PL hQO aid. The 
IMP loan has brought into sharp focus, i s the need to cover 
the growing trade def ic i t and balance-of-payments gap. The 
IMF loan are contrary to the Plan pr inciples of self-
rel iance; that the concept of self-reliance conceived by the 
Plan i s being eroded by consciously following a policy of 
exp<»rt-oriented growth which mates the Indian economy "a 
hostage" to tiie vagaries of market economies. 
I M . AJYAR (Swaminathan S). Pranab Makherjee muddles through. 
Eaatern Econ. 78, 1 i ; I982, Mr, 19; 6k3-9, 
I t i s a stab in the back of India 's self-reliance 
in favour of IMF pol ic ies . There is a convergence between the 
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ideas of the IMP and Sixth Plan; and i t would be a fatuous 
to soggest that the Sixth Plan policies have been laid dovm 
by the IMF to suggest that IMF policies have been laid down 
by the Sixth Plan. The Government i s quite detennined to 
get future instalments of the IMF loan. The IMF has in 
effect, given our econcany a gentle nudge in the right 
direction. 
Ttlf2. AJ2AR (Swaminathan S). Who's afl^aid of the loan ? 
Eastern Econ. 77, 23; 1981, De, h', 1070-2. 
The USA pointed cut that the loan to India was 
easily the biggest ever given by the IMP, and objected to 
such a massive loan being given to a country which already 
had five bi l l ion dollars in i t s foreign exchange reserves. 
But cxie aspect on which the IMF has been most specific i s to 
prohibit ccomercial borrowing of more than ^A b i l l ion dol lars . 
The IMP has given India the biggest-ever loan permitting 
adjistment over a three-year period, with repayments of the 
loan being staggered over seven to ten years. I t set up 
special t rus t fund from the profit of i t s gold sales,and 
disbursed this money in the form of unabashed aid. The Sixth 
Plan stresses the need for curbing def ic i t financing, restrain-
ing monetary grcwth, encouraging exports, raising substantiasl 
resources by ioiproving the efficiency of the public sector 
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and tiie price of i t s products^ reducing subsidies and 
encouraging exports. All these policies are part and 
parcel of the standard IMF format. But l e t there be no 
mistake, this policy frame was^  formulated long before 
India applied for the IHF loan, and was not a resu l t of 
IMF pressure. The IMF instalment tiiis year i s smallest, 
and gets bigger and bigger in the two years ahead. By the 
time the biggest instalment of 2,300 million SDR i s due in 
1983-8M-, India may have considerable diff icul ty in proving 
that i t real ly needs so much money, as i t s payments gap a t 
the time should be small or non-existent. 
t ^3 , BHANDABI (ATvlnd), Taxation of Rs. 250 crores ? Comm r^cft. 
lMt, 3690; 1982, Fe, 27', 352. 
The thrust of certain IMF conditions i s towards 
a great role for the private sector, the Sixth Plan i t se l f 
places a heavy burden on the shoulders^ of the corporate 
sector in regard to resource generation. The IMF loan condi-
t ional i ty about keeping government borrowing from the banking 
sector within l imit should hardly act as a damper to de f ic i t -
financing because the approach to fixation of tiiis l imit i s 
rather l i be ra l . As far as the f i r s t instalment of the loan 
i s concerned, the prescription of limit on credit to the 
gov^nment. 
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tMf, BRAHMANANDA (PR). Economic Implications of the loan ? 
BaslfePg aeoft, lly 235 1981, De, U-; 1065-7. 
I t Is not widely real ised that frcm 198O-81 
onvards a fa i r ly serious balance of payments c r i s i s on the 
current account has been baildlng up. Finance Minister has 
referred to Rs* 1,^ 00 crores decline in foreign exchange 
reserve in the f i r s t 7"i" month of the current year (198I-82) 
that i s , the second yeeor of the Sixth Plan. A 25 per cent 
decline within less than three quarters of a year. The 
currently exchange reserves has been extent and are estimated 
from Rs. 1,200 crores (I98O-8I) to Rs. 3,U00 crores, excluding 
Rs. 870 crores received from the IMF trust fund. The GNP at 
market prices in 198O-8I would be around Rs. 135,000 crores 
and in 1981-82 i t may be around Rs. 157,000 crores. The trade 
gap for 1980-81 would be about ^.1 per cent and in 1981-82 i t 
may be \ to M-.2 per cent. The IMF loan wi l l meet about 20-25 
per cent of the gap. Since the rat io between real working 
capital and output i s 1 to 3 . The IMF loan wi l l help the 
country get Rs. 5,000 crores of commercial borrowings. The 
monetary, credit and Fiscal po l i c i e s suggested by IMF are very 
moderate. They are also part of Sixth Plan's thinking. 
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1M-5. DATT (Buddar). IMF loan and i t s impact aa national 
pol ic ies . Janta. 37, 29; 1982, Se, 12; 3-6. 
The IMP conditions are not very harsh. Many of 
these had already been Incorporated in the Sixth Plan 
Strategy. The country i s reversing many of the basic po l i -
cies witii respect to private enterpr ise , foreign collabora-
t ions, iaqport substitution e tc . The deteriorating balance of 
payments situation has been cited as the principal reason 
for compelling the Govemmait to go in for th is huge loan. 
The economy stiffered a sharp set back because of both 
domestic and external factors . Real national income f e l l by 
55^  In 1979-80 and Inflat ion, which re-emerged early in this 
year, was over 20%, The IMF loan would have been rendered 
unecessary. Instead of emphasising the path of effective 
management and control, the government has chosen the path of 
least resistance, v^ich through i t may solve the problon of 
balance of payments for the shortperi6d, may land us in a much 
graver debt burden in years to come. This loan i s a permanent 
curve in an i l lus ion; i t i s more of a temporary re l ie f . The 
IMF policies lay the debt trap for India. This debt trap 
could be avoided by suitably adjusting domestic policies in 
such a manner that the ra te of depletion of foreign reserves 
could be slowed down. 
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^k6» GVLS (Catherine). Financing India's structural 
adjustment i Role of the IMP. Eastern Econ. 79, 2; 
1982; J l , 11; 52-61. 
The IMF approved the second year's lending programme 
to India, 1,800 mill ion SI>Rs-as part of the f ive b i l l i on dollar 
l ian sanctioned over a three-yeur period. This i s an appro-
priate time to take another look at the loan and i t s implica-
tions for India. This i s a supply-side loan aimed at boosting 
production, unlike upper-tranche IMF loans which seek deflation 
and a cut in gogernmoit spending. The i n i t i a l impact of the 
loan has been oicouraging, throu^ i t i s too early to come to 
a f inal Judgement. The lack of condit ional i ty , or even a 
means of monitoring India's supply-side programme i s highlighted, 
The only l imits placed by the IMP are on money supply and 
commercial borrowing, vrtiich may be adequate cr i ter ia for demand 
mainaganent but not for a programme designed to boost investment, 
production and eixports. The IMF i s basically trusting India 
to implement i t s own Sixth Plan. 
1^7. HAZARDS IN IMF loans. Mainstream. I9 , 50; I98I ,Ag,l5;6-8. 
The IMF and India regarding the terms and conditions 
of a ^-.2 b i l l ion dollar loan. The IMF i s going tough with 
India and wants to export as high a price as i t can. Obviously 
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t h i s p r i ce w i l l be in terms of changes in p o l i c i e s of the 
government. India i s compelled to borrow from the IW 
under the "extended f a c i l i t y arrangement" for the f i r s t 
time becaiise i t has to finance the Sixth Plan and meet the 
balance of payments d e f i c i t s . The t o t a l resources of the 
IMP as contributed by manbers are 60 b i l l i o n SDRs (one SDR = 
roughly $ 1.27), in which I n d i a ' s share i s 171 •50 mil l ion 
SDRs. On the bas is of t h i s quota Ind ia can borrow roughly 
$ 8 b i l l i o n which w i l l come to U.5 times i t quota over a 
period of three yea r s . Out of t h i s India can borrow 100^ 
of i t s quota under compensatory f inancing, 50^ under buffer 
stock f a c i l i t y and 25^ under "the reserve t ranche". 
1lf8. MOHMTY (Swaraj), e IMP loan to India ; A challenge 
to meet. Oris Indus. 2 , 3 , 1982, J a , l^ f; 29-31. 
The Rs. ^jOOO-'crores IMF loan to India i s inc identa l ly 
the l a rges t ever extended by the IMP to any member na t ion . I t s 
s i z e , condit ions and purposes has generated tremendous and 
varied response fran a l l over. About U8jl of the loan i s to be 
provided from the ordinary resources of the INF and the remain-
ing 52^ i s to come from borrowed resources . The average I n t e r e s t 
r a t e w i l l be around 10^. Die very need of the IMF loan. With 
I n d i a ' s c r e d i t worthiness, i t could have borrowed from the 
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commercial market without any condi t ions , as countr ies 
l i k e Braz i l and Mexico have done. The condit ions of the 
IMF l^e s imilar to the pol icy framework of the Sixth Ely e Year 
Plan. The Sixth Plan enumerates the s teps to be taken for 
curbing d e f i c i t f inancing, r e s t r a in ing monetary growth, 
«icouraging expor t s , r a i s i ng subs tan t i a l resources by Impro-
ving the efficiency of the publ ic sector and the p r i ce of 
the products . The s i m i l a r i t y of the Sixth Plan and the IMF 
loan should not be exaggerated. The plan was formulated much 
before India applied for a loan. The f i r s t instalment of 
Rs. 900 crores and enforce a medium of monetary d i s c ip l i ne to 
contain the high r a t e of In f l a t ion . The govt, should take 
some time-bound step to Increase the r a t e of economic growth. 
1^9, PATNAIK (Prabhat) . Policy of ' i n f l a t i o n a r y contract ion*. 
Beon & Pol Wklv, 17, 12> 1982, Mr, 20; ^3'^» 
There i s enough In te rna l evidence in the 1982-83 
budget to ind ica te that apairt from the p r i ce increases already 
decreed, fur ther Increases a r e conten^lated and in fac t , the 
budget f igures are worked out on t h a t b a s i s . However, desp i te 
a l l these p r ice Increases , the Plan outlay in 1982-83 w i l l be 
far from in^ress lve . Not only i s the overa l l Plan outlay 
Impressive, but the outlay on non-energy sector i s p a r t i c u l a r l y 
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so obviously not much of the Sixth Plan remains Intact. 
The series of price hikes that have taken place affecting 
the working people and the middle Income groups would have 
alimost certainly produced a re lat ive contraction of aggre-
gate demand, \yhen in addition are considered the t ight 
credit squeeze as well as the fac t tiiat additional government 
investment has been going largely to a few sectors l ike 
energy with multiplier ef fects vest ly different from those of 
the Income taxed away, even an absolute contraction of demand 
In several sectors of the ec(Hiomy should come as no surprise. 
Indeed, recent economic measures, which in keeping with the 
IMF<s predllectlexis have aimed a t t ight credit and a ccmtrol 
of the budget d e f i c i t through price and Indirect tax hikes, 
amount to a policy of "Inflationary con tract Ion'.* 
150, RAI (Kartlk). :^ IMF and the Sixth Plan. People's Demo. 
« , 3 j 1982, Ja, 17; h. 
India Is performing in f u l f i l l i n g the binding 
cr i ter ia stipulated by the IMF and to "advlee" on the amount 
to be earmartced for the next year's annual plan. The "policy 
i n i t i a t i v e to be tsken in the planning process in view of the 
IMF loan". I t s real aim was a preliminary working out of the 
shape of the 1982-83 annual plan to the IMF's sat is fact ion. 
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The growth of money supply, according to v*ilch th i s r a t e 
of growth for 1981-82 was to be ^5*7% agains t the corresponding 
r a t e of 18.5^ for I98O-81. To sa t i s fy the IMF, the government 
i s considering a reduction in Plan Outlay for 1982-83. The 
Government already promised to the IMF, as a condi t ion for the 
loan. The IW would press the Government to hold wages down 
while p r i ces get adjusted upward. The IMF loan would not 
carry any s igni f icant implication for our professed soc ia l 
objec t ives . 
I 5 l . THBLffT and the IMF loan. Boon & Pol Wklv. 16, 51; I98I , 
De, 19; 2075-7. 
The IMF and the condit ions attached t o tiie grant of 
the loan , \diich were in terpre ted as * black-mail ' of the govern-
ment of India and ' p re s su re ' on i t to which i t had succttnbed. 
The IMF condition and p resc r ip t ion because they conformed fu l ly 
to the ^overnmeat's own p o l i c i e s . The implementation of these 
p o l i c i e s would now be reinforced by the balance of paym^its 
s t ^por t which the IMF loan would provided. The government has 
claimed tha t the IMF loan has been secured to under pin the 
Sixth Plan. India thus had a r i g h t to SIBs, a u n i t created 
for Increasing l i q u i d i t y in the world economy under the IMF, 
and any a l loca t ion of SDRs to India must be welcomed. 
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INFLATION, DEVELOPING OOUNTRIES 
152, BALASQBRAJIANIAN (V). IMF chief happy a t consensus 
achieved. HT. 59, 2h9\ I982, Se, 11; 16 (3-»+). 
Ihe IMF ra ted as the most s ign i f i can t achievement 
of "the ponarkable consensus" that i t must s t i ck to a n t i -
in f la t ionary p o l i c i e s . The IMP had done e a r l i e r that f i s c a l 
d i s c i p l i n e was an important as mtaietary r e s t r a i n t s . More 
important s t i l l from tiie point of view of developing countr ies 
ins i s tence on i n d u s t r i a l countr ies improving aid flows as 
well as on the i r throwing opai t he i r markets to developing 
countr ies so tha t the l e t t e r could Implenent their structuFAl 
adjustment programmes with l e s s pain and more eff ic iency. The 
IMF r ead i ly conceded tha t a grea t dea l of the payments problans 
of developing countr ies stem from a h o s t i l e ex terna l enviponmoit, 
153. BALASUBRAMANIAN (V). IMF sees hard time ahead for th i rd 
world. HT. 59, 231; I982, Ag, 23; U 7 - 8 ) . 
The i n d u s t r i a l countr ies ha'ge a b e t t e r gr ip on basic 
Inf la t ionary pressures in the i r economies now as compared with 
a year ago, b i t i t would s t i l l no t be saefe to r e l ax p o l i c i e s 
of r e s t r a i n t , warned a high o f f i c i a l of the IMF, \Aiile br ief ing 
the media here on i t s annual r e p o r t for 1982. The trends in 
173 
current account balances , again, seem to be of no p a r t i c u l a r 
help to the developing coun t r i e s . The current account surplus 
of the o i l -expor t ing countr ies declined s teeply from $ 116 
b i l l i o n in I98O to $ 69 b i l l i o n in I98I and th i s was wholly 
to the advantage of the balance of payments of the i n d u s t r i a l 
countr ies \rtiich were able to reduce the i r c o l l e c t i v e current 
account d e f i c i t s from $ MO b i l l i o n to about $ 25 b i l l i o n , a f te r 
allowing for o f f i c i a l t ransfe rs of $ 21 b i l l i o n . The current 
account d e f i c i t s of the non-o i l developing coun t r i e s , which 
had increased s teeply during 1978-80, rose further in 1981 to 
about $ 100 b i l l i o n compared with $ 39 b i l l i o n in 1978 and i t 
i s not expected to decl ine very much in 1982. The demand of 
developing countr ies t h a t , in the a l loca t ion of quotas, a 
proper balance should be maintained among the d i f f e ren t groups 
of coun t r i e s , 
15^-. INFLATION RATES drop in i n d u s t r i a l na t i ons . Boon Times 
9, 253; 1982, De, 6; 7 (1 -^ ) . 
According to IMF r e p o r t , i n f l a t ion r a t e s continued 
to ease in most of the i n d u s t r i a l nat ions in the th i rd quarter 
of th i s year. For t h i s group of c o u n t r i e s , consumer p r i ces 
showed an average Increase of 7«1^ over the same period a year 
e a r l i e r . This compared with a 7*9^ year to year increase in 
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consumer p r ices during the second quarter of 1982 and a 
10.1J2 Increase during the 12 month period ending September 
30, 1981. The r a t e of p r i ce r i s e has continued to accelera te 
in the non-oi l developing countr ies as a group, where p r ices 
in the second quarter of 1982 averaged 32.65? higher than a 
year e a r l i e r . The oi l -export ing developing countr ies had 
year to year in f l a t ion r a t e s averaging 8,9^ in the second 
quarter of t h i s year , dovw from 11.1% in the f i r s t three 
months of 1982. 
155. LIN (CY) and SIDDigCJE (Abul KM). Recent pa t t e rn s of 
in f l a t ion in the non-oi l developing coun t r i e s . Fin & Dev. 
15, ^; 1978, De; 28-31. 
During recfflit years , the average r a t e of economic 
growth in the non-oi l developing countrlftsha» been r e l a t i v e l y 
well sus ta ined, desp i te the in t e rna t iona l recess ion . The 
annual increase in r e a l out put dipped only to about h% in 1975; 
and i t approached ^% both in I976 and in 1977. A similar pace 
i s expected to be maintained, on average, in 1978. The domes-
t i c p r i ce record of the non-oi l developing coun t r i es , however, 
has been notably l e s s s a t i s f ac to ry in recent years than their 
growth record . There was a widespread acce lera t ion of p r ice 
increase in th i s group of countr ies in 1977, a t a time vftien 
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i n f l a t ion was generally subsiding elsewhere. The overa l l 
i n f l a t ion r a t e for the non-o i l developing countr ies was 
22J^  in 1977, compared with 165^  in 1976 and 17/^ in 1975. 
Price developmaits varied widely among the developing 
co\mtries because of differences in export earnings , in terms 
of t r ade , and in f i s c a l , monetajpy and wage p o l i c i e s . With 
the belp of the IMF, the growth r a t e s and p r i ce increases in 
the non-oi l developing coun t r i e s . 
156. MANSFIELD (CJharles). Tax-base erosion and in f l a t ion ; 
The case of Ghana. Fin & Dev. 17 | 3 ; 1980, Se; 3 1 - ^ . 
Many developing countr ies have attempted to contain 
ra i s ing p r i c e s and excess d«nand by con t ro l l ing imports and 
pr ices of ce r ta in key products , vftiile maintaining an over* 
valued exchange r a t e . This a r t i c l e d iscusses how much such 
con t ro l l s can lead to an erosion of the tax base in an i n f l a -
tionary environment in the developing coun t r i e s , using Ghana 
as an i l l u s t r a t i o n . 
157. MQRSI (Riad). &xplora t ion of Inf la t ion from the 
Oap i t a l i s t stal^es to the developing coun t r i e s . Dev & 
Socio-Econ Prog. 3 , 6; Ja-Mr; 5-15. 
One of the subject tha t touches the developing 
countries* eccxicmy and the i r e f for t s to develop and l ibe ra t e 
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i t from the g r ip of the world c a p i t a l i s t economy i s the 
exportat ion of Inf la t ion to them. Natura l ly enough the 
exporters are advanced c a p i t a l i s t s t a t e s . 
158. SEASON (Carlos E). Lat in America and theCaribbean : A 
medium-term out look. Fin & Dev, 18 , 3 ; 1981, Se; 3 ^ 7 . 
Countries in th i s region have been able to maintain 
good growth r a t e s over recent years ; however the outlook for 
in f l a t ion has wors^ied and the area% dependence on foreign 
borrowings has grown markedly. The a b i l i t y of tiiese countr ies 
to a d ^ s t In the future w i l l depend c r i t i c a l l y on good 
economic msnag^nent. 
159. SHARMA (KS) and SHABMA (SB). In f l a t ion In the developing 
and developed count r ies . Eco Stud. 20, 3 - ^ ; 1979, 
Se-Oc; 159-66. 
Inflation i s s t i l l a serious problem in many count r ies . 
The overa l l r a t e of pr ice increase in the i n d u s t r i a l countr ies 
amounted to 7JS In 1977, only about half as high as in second 
half of 197 -^ but well above hiatorical s tandards . Rates of 
Inf la t ion in the non-indu*trial countr ies are s t i l l as high as 
In 197^, and far above the r a t e s experienced before the world 
wide Inf la t ionary upsurge of a few years ago. The IMF member 
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countr ies with the th ree l a r g e s t economies - a l l moved 
promptly to reduce t h e i r domestic r » t e s of i n f l a t i on a f t e r 
achieving excessive l eve l during the in t e rna t iona l upsurge 
of p r ice and c o s t s . This wag a welcome fac to r , l a rge ly 
prompting the r e s to ra t ion of f inanc ia l s t a b i l i t y in the 
world economy. 
160. WETTEVEEN (H Johannes). IMF chief looks a t world 
i n f l a t i o n . Eastern Be on. 61+, 3 ; 1975, J a , 17; 105-110, 
The nature and causes of the acce lera t ing inflatic»i 
from which the world has recent ly been suf fer ing , and in p a r t i -
cular about any i n t e r - r e l a t i onsh ip tha t may e x i s t between 
in f l a t ion and recent developments in the exchange r a t e system. 
Developing countr ies have a lvays , cai the average, had higher 
r a t e s of in f l a t ion than i n d u s t r i a l coun t r i es , but the same 
trend i s v i s i b l e among l^em s t he i r ccxisumer p r i ce i nd i ce s , 
which had r i s e n a t an average r a t e of 13 per cent during the 
1965-72 per iod, accelerated to 2h- per cent in I973 and 35 per 
cent in the ear ly months of th i s year. The ro l e of in f l a t ion 
in the abandonment of the par value system. The higher the 
degree of i n f l a t i o n , ths l a rge are l i ke ly to be the divergences 
in in f l a t ion r a t e s . Moreover, there i s no reason why such 
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divergences should occur In the d i r ec t i on required by 
s t ruc tu r a l changes affect ing the balance of payments. Of 
course, exchange r a t e adjustment could take place under 
the par value system. The influence of in f l a t ion on the 
exchange r a t e regime has been more considerable than the 
influences operating in the opposite d i r ec t i on . 
INFLATION, INDIA 
161. DATTA (Bhabatosh). Is danonet isat ion an effect ive 
remedy fcr black money ? Capi ta l . 180, ^^985 1978, J a , 
26; 12^-6. 
Inf la t ionary pressxires in India are s t rong, but 
for tunate ly they have not yet created such a c r i t i c a l s i tua t ion 
as to requ i re d r a s t i c mcaet€U:y refoxm. Bven if d r a s t i c act ion 
i s taken to change the monetary s t r u c t u r e , which i s to be 
c l e a r l y d i s t ingu ish from monetary po l i cy , the importance of 
a l l the measures necessary in the f ie ld of production, d i s t r i -
bution, foreign t rade and Qovemment finances w i l l s t i l l 
remain supreme. 
162. RAI (Kar t ik) . I s infEatLon subsiding 7 Reonle's Demo. 5, 
h7; 1981, Nv, 22; h. 
The r a t e of In f la t ion in the I n d i a ' s economy has 
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come down. "Ihe annual r a t e of Inf la t ion which was 2^% In 
1979-80 had been Tarought down to 16^ in I98O-81. In the 
current year , an an^annual b a s i s , the r a t e of in f l a t ion has 
fur ther declined to l e s s than ?%• Ihe Government has already 
s t a r t ed taking vigorous steps to a r r e s t the p r i c e - f a l l of 
the commodities. This check i s soon going to become inopera-
t i v e , as the government has promised to i t a IMP master tha t 
i t would pursue a " f l ex ib le" p r i ce po l i cy . So to claim tha t 
Inf la t ion has been contained under these circumstances simply 
absurb. 
INFLATION, OIL EXPORTING COQNTRIBS 
163, MORGiN (David). Fiscal pol icy in o i l exporting coun t r i e s , 
1972-78. Fin & Dev. 16, h-, 1979, De? tif-7. 
Since 1972 the major o i l exporting countr ies have 
absorbed an unprecedented volume of r e sources . I n i t i a l l y , 
high governmeat expenditure occurred, acccanpanied by acce l e -
r a t i ng expansion of domestic l i q i i i d i t y and i n f l a t i o n . 
Condition eased af te r 1975, as domestic spending slowed and 
supply bottlenecks; lessened. The r o l e and effect iveness of 
f i s c a l po l i cy , p a r t i c u l a r l y in liie successful e f fo r t s to 
s t a b i l i z e the domestic ec<xiomy. The condit ions for e f fec t ive 
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f i s c a l pol icy In o i l exporting countr ies are not d i r e c t l y 
affected by the revenue effects of the l a t e n t round of o i l 
p r i ce r i s e s . 
INTEREST RATES 
16^. HIGH INTEREST r a t e s . Ecm Times. 9, 251; 1982, De, h] 
5 ( 1 - 2 ) . 
The non-oi l developing countr ies are la rge 
borrowers in the in te rna t iona l market. Much of developing 
countr ies borrowings goes i n to Investment. In low income 
developing countries during the seventies than did e i the r 
p r iva te consumption (3.730 or public consumption ( ^ . 5 ^ . I t 
i s t h i s investment vAiich has been rendered valaerable by the 
regime of high i n t e r e s t r a t e s . I t i s estimated by IMF tha t 
an increase in i n t e r e s t r a t e by 1^ on world c a p i t a l market 
Increases i n t e r e s t paymaits by the non-oi l developing countr ies 
by $ 3 b i l l i o n a year , and only a thlrilof th i s i s off s e t by 
higher I n t e r e s t earnings on the i r o f f i c i a l r e s e r v e s . India 
which have so fa r been r e s t r a ined in tapping c a p i t a l from the 
world markets suffer l e s s , but they have to pay more for non-
market borrowings. The average cost of t he i r borrowings from 
a l l sources has r i s e n s teep ly . The l eve l of i n t e r e s t r a t e s on 
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the world capital markets needs to Ise brought down has 
analysed by the IMF. The interest rates would have declined 
In monetary restraint had led to a change In expectation 
about the rate of Inflation. The regime of high Interest 
rates has brought about recessionary conditions In the indus-
tr ia l i sed countries even as i t has adversely affected growth 
In the developing countries. The IMF's relationship with 
developing countries that have borrowed from i t . 
165. IMF AND IBRD hike interest ra-tes. Econ Trnd. 10, l^-j 
1981; J l , 16; 17. 
Th8 IMF has announced Increases in i t s interest 
rates for thenext three months, countries holding move of 
the IMF's SDK's than were original ly allocated to them wi l l 
receive annual Interest at 1 -^.03/^  instead of 12,28^ on the 
excess. These SDKs, now in circulation are worth about 
$ 2lf,5UO mil l ion. 
166. IMP OJTS Interest ra;te. Econ Trnd. 9, 1^; I98O, J l , 
16; 15. 
ThelMF has reduced interest rate for the SDKs to 
8.25/^ from 10.25/2 with effect from July 1. The rate applies 
to transactions involving SDH's between member countries of 
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the lUO>natlon agency and between such countr ies and the 
IMF I t s e l f . I t has a l so trimmed the In t e r e s t r a t e s from 
9,22/^ to 7.^25/^ payable to credi tor na t ions holding SDRs in 
excess of t h e i r o r i g ina l a l l o c a t i o n s . 
167. IMP RECaCBS I n t e r e s t r a t e s . Flnan Bcp. 9, 3 l3 j 1983, 
J a , 5; Mh). 
!Ihe IMF has announced outs in two of i t s i n t e r e s t 
r a t e s . For the f i r s t three months of 1983, the annual r a t e s 
on i t s "specia l drawing r i g h t s " w i l l be 8.lf7^ instead of 8.95^ 
c r ed i to r countr ies in the fund's "general department" w i l l 
get 7*2% instead of 7.57^. 
LJUN, BAIiANCE OF PA I^BTTS 
168. BALASUBRAMANIAN (V). ^ c t i c a l manoeuvre. Eastern 
EC en. 77, 18; 1981, Oc, 30; 801-^ . 
The GATT, the World Bank and the IMF represent 
free assoc ia t ions of independent countr ies who accept both 
the freedom and the d i s c i p l i n e of a ccxnpetitive economic 
system. From 19^0 to 198O, WP per cap i ta in 60 middle-
income countr ies increased twice as f a s t as in the i n d u s t r i a l 
countr ies When r e a l purchaing power i s taken in to account. 
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The IMF have increased dramat ica l ly , as has the pa r t i c i pa -
t ion of developing country monbers. Third World argumaits 
tha t conceptual and s t r u c t u r a l changes may be needed in the 
economic r e l a t i o n s between the i n d u s t r i a l ^ d the developing 
countr ies so tha t the l a t t e r may receive an adequate t ransfer 
of resources through various mechanisms, such as t r ade , 
investment flows and development a s s i s t a n c e . The IMF's 
various c r e d i t f a c i l i t i e s a re to be tapped for loan to Ind ia , 
The s lae of the loan has not been f i n a l l y decided as ye t , but 
India has a t o t a l enti t lement of 7,900 mi l l ion SDKs. >lhile 
the loan i s expected t o be much less than the en t i t l ement , i t 
w i l l be ' s u b s t a n t i a l enabling' the country to over come i t s 
current balance of pap imt prohlems. Last year , India ra ised 
about one b i l l i o n d o l l a r s from the IMF, 
T169. BALASUBRAMANIAN (V). Bank blames export woes on Ind i a ' s 
p o l i c i e s . HT. 60, 2; I983, J a , 2; 16 (3 -^ ) . 
The World Bank blames the country ' s foreign trade 
woes mainly on domestic pol icy c o n s t r a i n t s . This i s a bad 
new year , if analys is i s accepted by the IMP, IBRD complex, 
those i n s t i t u t i o n s are bound to become more wary and demanding 
in tiieir r e l a t i ons witii ttieGovernment of India . Given the 
increasing pressures on Ind ia ' s balance of payments trends 
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and the external adjustment obl igat ions Is^osed on the 
Indian economy hy the cond i t iona l i ty terms of the US do l l a r s 
5 mil l ion plus IMF loan, the government w i l l have to render 
a he t te r account of I t s e l f in the coming months i f i t i s to 
r e t a i n c r e d i b i l i t y for i t s attempts to improve export pe r fo r -
mance. Claiming tha t a con^arison of Indian t rade e f for t s 
with ttiose of other developing countr ies as well as a d i r e c t 
analjrsis of affected products prdve h i s point . 
170, CHISTI (Sumitra) . External ass i s tance and foreign trade 
in India. Capital . A; I98I; ^5-7» 
India has been able to overcome the saving bar r ie r 
and now has to remove the investment b a r r i e r . The l a t t e r can 
be done only by generating domestic demand through an appro-
p r i a t e s t ra tegy . The foreign exchsuige componeit wi l l be far 
l e ss and the country w i l l be in a pos i t ion to finance her 
required import b i l l . A loan of Rs« 5)000 crore has been taken 
from the IMF to finance her Immediate balance of papients 
requirements. The t o t a l ex te rna l debt burden excluding the 
IMF loan i s around Rs. ^hf 3 ^ crore as in 198I. The massive 
IMP loan a l so c rea tes problems. For ins tance , according to 
one es t ima te , nearly 66^ of the IMF borrowings w i l l have to be 
repaid as i n t e r e s t . Actually, from 1985-86, India w i l l have 
to pay more. Thus the ne t outflow w i l l be heavier . 
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171. DCTTT (RC). IMP loan and our economy. Mainstream. 20, 
\h, 1981, De, 5; 10-^. 
The sanction by the IMF of 5.6 b i l l i o n d o l l a r s , 
or more than Rs. 5200 c ro res , said to be the highest ever 
loan approved by tha t body, has been widely assa i led by 
economists in Ind ia . The IMP and the government w i l l consult 
the fund on the adoption of fur ther measures "consis tent with 
the na t ional p o l i c i e s accepted by our par l iament ." The s t a t e -
m«it released by the IMF makes t h i s c lear when i t s t a tes tha t 
the arrangement i s to strengthen tiie balance of payments 
pos i t ion by "careful d«nand management p o l i c i e s " . These 
p o l i c i e s are unsui table for a developing country l i k e Ind ia , 
The increased expenditure on imports w i l l lead to increased 
imbalance of trade u n t i l , if ever , t h i s i s cured by greater 
export earning as a r e s u l t of such l i b e r a l i s a t i o n . So India 
w i l l only have got over the balance of payment c r i s i s , but a l so 
s t a r t ed earning a surplus large enough to make payment of 
i n t e r e s t and c a p i t a l instalment easy. The demand for a new 
in te rna t iona l econcmic order involving t ransfer of resources 
frcm developed to developing coun t r i es , be t te r terms of t rade 
for primary products . 
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172, GORMAN (D). Aiew r o l e for the IMF ? Econ Die. 16; 1981, 
Ag; 8-12. 
As non-oi l developing countr ies make increasing 
u s e of tile resources avai lable frcm the IMF to help finance 
continuing balance of paym«its d e f i c i t s , the accuracy of the 
IMF finance in r e l a t i o n to expected demands and the appropria-
t a i e s s of the conditions normally attached to such loans have 
been r a i s e d . While access under the IMF'S various f a c i l i t i e s 
has recen t ly been l ibe ra l i zed making resources ava i lab le in 
large amounts and over longer periods than in the p a s t . The 
funds provided by the IMF are s t i l l small in r e l a t i o n both to 
t o t a l net flows of the resources to the non-oi l developing 
countr ies and t h e i r f inancia l requirements, but they have grown 
rap id ly over the pas t two years . I n I98O, gross drawings by 
the non-oil developing countr ies accelerated to $ M-,9 b i l l i o n 
from $ 1.5 b i l l i o n in 1978, vtoile n e t borrowing by these 
countr ies reached $ 2.5 b i l l i o n In 198O agains t net repayments 
of almost $ 1.0 b i l l i on in 1978. The IMP has l i be ra l i s ed acess 
to i t s Various f a c i l i t i e s and increased resources a t i t s disposal 
for lending to developing coun t r i e s . Iftider revised guide l ines , 
annual access to IMF resources has been increased t o 1^0^ of 
respec t ive quotas , extending over a three-year period to -^50^ .^ 
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Cumulative borrowing, ne t of repayments, i s now equivalent 
to a mul t ip le of s ix times respec t ive quotas . 
173. GQLATI ( IS ) . IMF bearer bonds : Do they portend much. 
Econ and Pol Vfely. I 6 , 21; I981, My, 23; 950-2. 
Describing the borrowing sorrangement as agreed by 
IMF, has j u s t tha t the Saudi Arabian a u t h o r i t i e s can ask for 
the i ssue by the fund of i t s bearer notes agains t the sums 
l en t to i t by that country. I t i s the purpose of t h i s paper 
to examine what t h i s commitznent by the fund to issue bearer 
notes portends. The borrowing arranganent to give the necessary 
background to the above mentioned commitment. The var ious 
options are open to analyse to Saudi Arabia in addi t ion to 
the option to ask for bearer no tes . The l ikel ihood i s examined, 
in our Judgement, of r e s o r t to the bearer note opt ion. The 
wider implications of resourse to t h i s type of borrowing by 
the fund. This matter i s important in view of the poss ib le 
expectations tha t the frequent t a lk by the Ptind Management of 
a major recycl ing r o l e by the Fund might have created amongst 
many of i t s member coun t r i e s , espec ia l ly the non-o i l exporting 
developing countr ies which cur ren t ly face an enormous spurt 
in the i r payments d e f i c i t s . 
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17^. IMP SANCTIONS Instalment. Econ. Trnd. 1 1 , 9; 1982, 
My, 1; ^k. 
The IMF has sanctioned another Important instalment 
of $ 336 mi l l ion against the $ 5»6 b i l l i o n multi-year loan 
approved by i t in l a t e I981 to Ind ia . Upt l l now, India has 
dravm about $ 672 mi l l ion agains t the above. The IMF i s 
repor tedly to review in May-June t h i s year, I nd i a ' s balance 
of payments s i tua t ion and econanic pol icy sanct ions , before 
authoris ing disbursements of an add i t iona l $ 2 b i l l i o n of the 
loan funds in the 12 months ending July 1 , I983. 
175. INDIA SEEKS IMF loan. Econ Trnd. 10, lV; 198I , J l , 
16; 17. 
India has sought a loan $ h b i l l i o n from the IMP 
to -tideover i t s balance of payments d i f f i c u l t i e s . The pro jec t 
loan would be largely on commercial terms, repayable in 10 
years with an i n t e r e s t of 7% to 8%, 
176. PAKISTAN AND the IMF. Eastern Eeon. 78, 1; I982, J a , 
1; 23-^ . 
On December 2, I98I , the IMP approved a second year 
programme imder the three years extended arrangement with 
Pakistan for SDR 1,268 mil l ion agreed in November, I98O. This 
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programme alms a t continuing the progress already made 
towards strengthening Pakis tan ' s balance of payments through 
s t r u c t u r a l reforms to improve produc t iv i ty . Along with many 
coun t r i e s , Pakistan experienced economic d i f f i c u l t i e s in the 
mld-1970's due to the infavourable in t e rna t iona l economic 
environment. Pakistan to obtain IMF Trust Fund loans t o t a l l i n g 
some SDR I32 mi l l i on . A r a t e of r e a l economic growth of about 
6%y to co i t a in the underlying r a t e of p r i ce Increase to ^Q%, 
and gradually to improve the balance of payments. 
177. PATNAIK (Prabhat) . A money l ende r ' s r a t e s . Sunday. 9; 
23; 1981, Nv, 22; ^2-h. 
The IMF loan of SDR 5 b i l l i o n ($ 5.8 b i l l i on ) was 
one of the most important decis ions made by India since i t s 
independence. This step cannot be ccnsidered as a solut ion to 
meet the balance of- payments of the country while c rea te 
d i sas t rous consequences in the economy. 
178. RAJ (Kart lk) . IMF loan : Venkataramans' bluff. People's 
Demo. 5, 50; I98I , De, 13; ^ . 
Finance Minister Venkataraman's defence of the IMF 
loan in parliament was s k i l f u l but dishonest . From the beginning 
to the end h i s speech was a se r ies of b l u f f s , unt ru ths and half-
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t r u t h s . He claimed tha t increased d l l production vnas l ike ly 
to make the th i rd instalment of the loan unnecessary. This 
claim was meant to refute the charge tha t the IMP loan vrould 
push India into a "deb t - t rap" . The payments problems i s so 
t r ans ien t tha t i t becon»s manageable in two years ' time, then 
why did the government have to go in for an extended f a c i l i t y 
loan a t a l l ? Ihe d i s t r i b u t i o n of the 5 b i l l i o n SDR loan 
across the three years i s the followlngs : 900 mil l ion in the 
f i r s t year, 1 ,^ b i l l i 6 n in the second year and 23 b i l l i o n in 
the th i rd year. The th i rd instalment may be unnecessary i s 
to imply tha t the count ry ' s c r ed i t requirement amount only 
to 2.7 b i l l i o n SDRs, or Rs, 2700 c rores . I nd i a ' s quota with 
tl^e IMF stand a t 1.7 b i l l i o n SDRs a t the movement. Up to 75% 
of t h i s can be drawn with v i r t u a l l y no "condi t lona l l ty" , V*iat-
soever. Even drawings up to 120j| of the quota involve l i t t l e 
condi t lona l l ty . In our t r a d e , the d o l l a r plays the most 
Important p a r t . The IMF loan would have made more vulnerable 
to a cessat ion of i t . 
179. RAI (Kart lk) . Reaganism : Hnbarrasses World Bank. 
People 's Demo. 5, 35; I981, Ag, 30; h, 
Regan Administration has cal led upon i t openly 
to stop lending to publ ic sector d l l development p ro jec t , to 
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encourage host countr ies "to ranove Impediments and adopt 
po l i c i e s that f a c i l i t a t e p r iva t e investment in energy deve-
lopmait" to s t ruc ture i t s lending "to maximise i t s mul t ip l ie r 
ef fects on p r iva t e investment". The hike in petroleum pr ices 
was p a r t l y a r e f l ec t ion of t h i s growing Independence of o i l 
producers. The severe payments c r i s i s and even approaching 
the notorious IMF for a massive loan. 
180, RAI (Kartlk) . Trapping the country in debt bondage. 
People 's Demo. 5, ^9 ; 1981, De, 6; h. 
Die apologis ts for the IMF loan, tha t the po l icy-
package d ic ta ted by the IMF for s t r u c t u r a l read jus tan en t "of 
the economy would mean a d r a s t i c squeeze on the common people 
and a strengthening and enriching of the monopolists and the 
mul t ina t iona l s . The IMF package i s not only an t i -people , but 
a l so counter-productive from the point of view of curing the 
payment d e f i c i t . The balance of payments look l ike in 19f^-88 
when the repayment of the bulk of the IMF loan has to begin. 
The IMF Imposed "import l i b e r a l i s a t i o n " , the ac tua l r a t e wi l l 
be ce r t a in ly higher and with the proposed 'Mirage" dea l , i t 
w i l l be higher s t i l l . Ihe bulk of the IMF loan begins to be 
repaid from 1987-88 onward, some payments to the IMF loan have 
to s t a r t even e a r l i e r which can be met only through further 
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borrowings so that the pressure In 1987-88 w i l l be s t i l l 
higher on account of t h i s extra f ac to r . !Ilhe IMF loan i s a 
more gap f i l l e r for curing our balance of payments d e f i c i t . 
India a l so took many of the measures i t know the fund would 
requi re before applying for a loan , thereby dampening the 
p o l i t i c a l Impact of the IMF's condi t ions . 
LOAN, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, OIL PRICE HIKE 
181. AIYAH (Swaminathan S) . Foreign exchange c r i s i s : Real 
or phoney ? Eastern Eccn. 7^, 7; 1980, Fe, l5;330-2. 
TSie l a t e s t o i l p r i ce increases have led scmie govern-
ment experts to the gloomy conclusion thbt our foreign exchange 
reserves w i l l be exhausted In the foreseeable fu tu re . This 
ignorers the fac t t h a t , ever since o i l p r i ces s ta r ted r l s i a g 
in 1973» our reserves have done so too. Our balance of payments 
has been much h e a l t h i e r than in the preceding era of cheap o i l . 
India can surmount the cu r ren t fo re ig i exchange problem jus t as 
i t did in 197* .^ ^ut t h i s requi res economic d i s c i p l i n e and a 
proper mix of p o l i c i e s . 
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182. GHjJJDRASEKHAB (K). I n t e rna t i ona l Monetary c r i s i s 
X-rayed. Son them Econ. 19, 11; I98O, Oc, 1; 21-2^. 
The gradual weakening of the do l l a r as a reserve 
CTirrency led to the col lapse of the Bretton Woods arrangement 
followed by the change-over from fixed to f loa t ing exchange 
r a t e s and the crea t ion of the new reserve a s s e t , SDIt, Vliile 
these changes have helped in preventing the col lapse of the 
world monetary system, they have not been adequate to cope 
with the massive s h i f t in the payments surpluses and d e f i c i t s 
of the member-countries of IMF caused by the o i l p r ice increase . 
In t h i s paper, the author t races the recen t developments on 
the world monetary scene and analyses some of the a l t l t rna t ive 
proposals tha t are being cur ren t ly discussed for Imparting 
greater f l e x i b i l i t y to the exchange mechanism. 
183, DAS OaPTA (Aslm). Alternat ives to the IMF loan. Sunday. , 
9 , 23; 1981; Nv, 22; 17-9. 
The current balance of payments d e f i c i t of India i s 
as much the r e s u l t of o i l pr ice hikes as of protectionism 
aborad and choice of in appropriate technology. I t i s not 
poss ib le for India to control o i l p r i ces or protectionism abDOad 
but as an a l t e r n a t i v e to the IMF package i t i s c e r t a in ly possible 
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to s t a r t changing i t s choice of technology from the exis t ing 
one, dependent on Imports, to one vdiich me^es f u l l e r use of 
al3undant in t e rna l resources and manpower, 
IS^ . GDLATI ( IS) . IMF loan : In deep waters . Bscn and Pol 
Wkly. 16, 51; 1981, De, 19; 2077-8. 
The governmait 's own case for r e so r t i ng to the IMF 
for a f ive b i l l i o n SDRs f inancing. Our balance of payments 
pos i t ion had become rathea? ser ious very la rge ly due to the 
massive de t e r io ra t ion in our terms of trade a r i s i ng in par t icu-
l a r from doubling of o i l p r i ces in the l a s t two years . The 
o i l Import b i l l alone Jumped up from Rs. 1,700 crore in 1978-
79 to over Rs. 5>000 crore in 198O-8I. The t o t a l d e f i c i t on 
our t rade account in 198O-8I came to about Rs. 5,500 c ro re . 
185. OCJPTA (KK). Oil c r i s i s developing countr ies and Ind ia . 
For Tr Bu l l e t in . 10, 5; 1979, Nv; 3-1+. 
The s t ead i ly increasing o i l p r i ces w i l l aggravate 
the growth and balance of payments problems of developing 
count r ies . According to IMF, tiie combined current account 
d e f i c i t of non-oi l developing countr ies w i l l r i s e from $ 31 
b i l l i on in 1978 to $ ^3 b i l l i o n in 1979. Ind ia , ^ i c h Import 
o i l from various sources, face a number of problems, namely 
(a) conserving energy and developing addi t iona l so.urc«^ of ^ 
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supply; (b) l imi t ing Indi rec t Inf la t ionary e f fec t s ; (c) formu-
l a t ing ways of tackl ing the def la t ionary iinpact; and (d) p re -
venting de t e r io ra t ion in the ciarrent account balances caused 
by higher o i l p r i c e s . In the case of non-oi l exporting 
coun t r i e s , the net outstanding debt has been estimated to 
Increase In 1979-80 by $ 82 b i l l i o n , bringing the t o t a l to 
$ 358 b i l l i o n by the end of 1980. The poorest countr ies have 
beai experiencing growth r a t e s anot corresponding to t h e i r 
development needs. The have to import heavi ly in order to 
keep pace with the i r development programmes. Countries l i k e 
India have been able to tackle the higher o i l p r ices to some 
extent because of subs tan t i a l rwnit tances frcrni Indian workers 
aborad. Many developing oi l- import ing countr ies have "high" 
or "very high" resources of o i l . Due to f inanc ia l and technical 
handicaps, these resources are not being exploited f u l l y . India 
using over 1^6 mil l ion ba r r e l s in a year, Phi l ippines and 
Turkey over ^ mi l l ion b e r r e l s , Pakistan oyer 26 mi l l ion ba r re l s 
and Vietnam over 22 mil l ion b a r r e l s . 
ta^ IMPDEPLORES p r o t e c t i v e t rade measures. Eastern Econ. 71 , 9; 
t978, Se, 1; J+17-27. 
Against the background of severe global payments 
imbalances as an aftermath of o i l c r i s i s , there was concern 
t h a t many countr ies faclngbalance of payments: d i f f i c u l t i e s 
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vould turn to trade and payments res tr i c t ions , labile, on 
the exhortation of the IMF, a few countries withdrew trade 
res tr i c t ions , some of ^ i c h were imposed recontly, there are 
many that have not found i t poss ible to remove res tr i c t ive 
trade pract ices . 
187. KANBSA-THA3JiN (S). ' Fund and adjustment po l i c i e s 
in Africa. Fin & Dev. I 8 , 3; 1981, Sej 20-^. 
A rapid increase in IMF assistance has occurred 
due to the increase in o i l prices in the late 1973 and the 
establishment of the IMF's o i l f a c i l i t y to a s s i s t members in 
meeting their payments problems. During the same period 
there was also a substantial increase in the amount of fund 
assistance to these countries, under the compensatory finan-
c ia l f a c i l i t y , which was set up to finance temporary short-
f a l l s in export receipts when they occur for reasons beyond 
the members' control. In 1976 for the benefit of developing 
countries from the prof i ts realized from the sa le of part of 
the IMF's gold. Ja the beginning of 1979) there has been a 
substantial increase in fund support to African countries 
under stand-by arruigements and extended arrangements, in 
support of comprehensive adjustment programme. 
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188. SJLTHYAHJRTY (TV). Po l i t i ca l economic of poverty 
and aid : The case of India. Mainstream. 21 , 15; 1982, 
De, 11; 22-5. 
The main l ink betweoi the p o l i t i c a l economy of 
development aid and the po l i t i ca l ecaaomy of povert;^ of LDCs 
i s present in the claim of MDCs and LDCs alike to the ef fect 
tiiat aid would help abolish poverty. In case of international 
agencies such as the World Bsoik and IMF, Interference in the 
economic po l i c i e s and practices of recepient countries i s 
often sou^t in the name of offers of value-free technical 
advice. The IMP in fact gives loan on the basis of the 
recepient country agreeing to carry out a package of measure 
worked out by the former as a condition of e l i g i b i l i t y for a 
loan. The Indian p o l i t i c a l dynamic underlying the recent 
agreement (I981). On IMF SDR to the l imit of 5.6 b i l l i on 
dollars i^ich the Government of India has successfully 
concluded. At the time of India's entering into these fateful 
negotiations with IMF, i t could count on exchange reserves 
of well over 2 b i l l i o n . The IMF loan was necessitated by 
tile sharp increase in the escalating cost of petroleum imports 
necessary for the economy. 
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LOM, INDIA 
189. AI24R (Swamlnathan S) . First year of the IMF loan. HT,. 
59, 191; 1982, J l , 135 
India has ccme through i t s f i r s t year of borrowing 
from the IMF with flying colours, and the lending programmes 
for the second year has been Approved amidst deserved praise* 
But i t i s worth-recalling that l a s t year "The logic of the 
IMF package, th^efore , i s such that i t s net resul t must be 
an engineered inf la t ion , an engineered recession and unemploy-
ment, a squeeze on money wages and salaries and a cut in 
public expenditure on welfare r e l i e f and subsidies on essent ial 
consultation items. Each of these measures adversely affects 
the low and middle>inccane groups; together their intact can 
be disastrous". India did not go to the IMF as lender of last 
resort . I t went to the IMF as lender of f i r s t resort , to 
provide massive finance on cheaper terms than the commercial 
market. I t did not go as a bankrupt nation. I t had more than 
f ive b i l l i on dollar in i t s foreign exchange reserves at the 
time. The IMF did not Impose growth and investment targets . 
I t limited i t s e l f to ce i l ings an. monetary growth and commercial 
borrowing. Indai*s recent economic success to the conditions 
of tiie IMF loan. Ihe Improvement in coal output, power genera-
tion and r a i l movement had nothing to do with the IMF loan. 
This loan condition amount to no more than a gentle nudge. 
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190. BHATT (VH). Bar ope attacks Reaganomlcs. Eastern Beori. 
77, 23; 198l,De, ^; 1085-6. 
The IMF approval for the $,8 b i l l i on dollars 
loan to India against apposition hy the USA, the most 
i n f l u « i t i a l member of the fund. The problem of India and 
other developing countries which i f l e f t to foster would 
react adversely on the developed world. I t may also be due 
to h i s extreme right wing p o l i t i c a l att itudes that such lEirge 
loan to India would "subside socilaism" or strengthen a 
supposedly pro-soviet coiantry. The Importance of the IMF 
decision about India can have wider Implications. 
191. CHANDRASHKHAP. ^ IMF loan » A deep conspiracy. 
Zaa^* 36, 38; 1981, Nv, 22? 3-^. 
jQie grant of a froeign exchange loan of more than 
Bz. 5)000 crores by the IMF i s claimed by the gorernment as 
an index of great achiev«nent and excellent performance. The 
loan would help integrate India into the world econonic system< 
The decisions taken at the IMF are only those \^ich promote 
and protect the wider interests of the dominant shareholders. 
The government have agreed to consult the IMF and world Bank 
before f ina l i s ing i t s future monetary, f i s c a l and other 
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economic policles>. The IMF and ths IBRD would have the 
r i g h t to assess and monitor the economic p o l i c i e s . The 
phasing of loan Instalments i s r e l a t e d to the implementation 
of the government's assurances vdth regard to re laxa t ion of 
cont ro l on foBlgn cap i t a l and other ccnmltm^ts for making 
India an economy. The long-term Implications of the IMP and 
the newtrust scught to be introduced in na t iona l p o l i c i e s , 
192. GANGQLY (AK). Foreign banks : Anew era of bonanza ? 
SSEffiS£SS.« 1^> 3705; 1982, J e , 12, 1006-9. 
In the wake of the massive IMP loan of $ 5,8 b i l l i on 
granted to I nd i a , which i s a record in i t s e n t i r e h i s t o r y , 
foreign banks are appare n t l y put t ing t h e i r best footward 
in I n d i a ' s expanding economy on which i s blowing a fresh 
breeze of pragmatism under tiie IMF's revamped ^onomic 
p o l i c i e s . Siere i s a fee l ing in banking c i r c l e s tha t foreign 
bfiuiks, many of which entered in to co-financing arrangements 
with the IMF. As the government of India gives a new th rus t 
on expanding exports while in^or t s are being l i b e r a l i s e d under 
the IMF condit ional i t y c luaes . 
193. GHOSH (Rasanta). Ju t e workers prepare for s t ruggle . 
People 's Demo. 6 , 2j 1982, J a , 10; 10, 
I n d i a ' s economy was a l s o in a deep c r i s i s and to 
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ex t r i ca t e i t s e l f from the c r i s i s the congress (I) Government 
of Indi ra Gandhi was surrendering the economic independence 
of the country by taking the IMF loan and by shift ing the 
burden of the c r i s i s on the working c l a s s and the common 
peoples* 
19>+. GROSS. (Sanmatha Nath). Road to social ism. Trough 
IMF? jaa ia* 37, 9; 1982, ^ , h; 3-5. 
The record-breaking IMF loan to India amounting to 
$ 5.8 b i l l i o n approved in November 198I. The Issues involved 
in tiie loan, tiie economic sovereignty and p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y 
of the country, our economic p o l i c i e s in general and planning 
s t r a t eg i e s in p a r t i c u l a r ob jec t ives , a r e , however, of f a r -
reaching consequences. The os tens ib le object of the loan of 
about Rs. 5,000 c ro r e s , tiielargest ever granted by the IMF and 
the l a rges t s ingle borrowing made by Ind ia , i s to overcome the 
c\irrent balance of payments d i f f i c u l t i e s . The loan has been 
granted ilnder the Extended Flind Fac i l i t y vAiich i s designed to 
help the developing count r ies overcome the i r medium-term 
balance of payments d i f f i c u l t i e s without affecting development 
e f f o r t s . India w i l l get the loan in instalments over , a 
period of three years . The f i r s t two instalment of Rs. 300 
crores each have already been withdrawn by the Government in 
Novanber I981 and January I982. The th i rd instalment of the 
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even amount w i l l be drawn in March This year . The IMF 
would Impose for disbursement of the second and th i rd year's 
borrowing are not yet c l e a r . 
195. IMF APPROVES SER loans to Ind ia . Econ I rnd . 10, 22;198l, 
Nv, 16; 17. 
The IMF has approved a 5 b i l l i o n SIH*s laon for 
Ind ia . The money wi l l be given to India over a 3 year 
period and wi l l have a h year gap to s t a r t repaying i t . The 
l a s t payment wi l l be due in 198^-. T^to 600 mil l ion SDKS big 
drawn in the period ending March 2hy 1982 of which 300 mil l ion 
SDR w i l l be made ava i lab le af ter January 1?, 1962, based on 
India having f u l f i l l e d specif ied object ives a t the end of 
November, 1961. The remaining •^,MX) mi l l ion SDRs w i l l be 
avai lable in phased amoulits from time to time upon sa t i s fac to ry 
completion. 
196. IMF LOAN for Ind ia . Econ. I rnd. 9 , I 8 ; 1980, Se, 16; 15. 
India has received a loan of $ 683 mil l ion from the 
IMP. The paymait period i s 10 yea r s , including a f ive year 
grace period with I n t e r e s t a t 0,5/^ a year. 
197» INTERNAL L- ' POLICIES In gear. Econ & Pol Idklv. I 7 , 1-2; 
1982, J a , 2-95 2 . 
The United States pressures r«g€urding the $ 5^ 00 b i l l i o r 
203 
accommodation from the IMF, l^e a id , borrowings, and acccmm-
odatlon market I s s a i l i ng f a i r l y predicably for I n d i a . The 
major source of sustenance wi l l the SDR 5 b i l l i o n IMF loan, 
to be progressively released in annual batches of $ 900 
mi l l ion , $ 1,800 m i l l i o n , $ 2,300 mi l l ion over the next 
tiiree yea r s , subject to i n t e rna l pol icy scru t iny . 
198, ISHWARI PRASAD. ^ IMF loan controversy. J a n t a . 36, 
36; 1981, Nv, 8; 3 - ^ . 
The issue of a loan of $ 5*6 i i i l l i on tha t India 
has appl ied for from the IMF, The problan of loan has r i sen 
because of the d i f f i c u l t balance of payments pos i t i on India 
i s f^icing in the current year, and the foreign exchange 
reserves have dropped to a precar ious ly low l e v e l . The export 
might j u s t touch Rs. 7>100 c ro re s , in^jorts would be around 
Rs. 12,600 c r o r e s , making a t rade d e f i c i t of Rs. 5 , 9D0 c ro res . 
This Jbnbalance has cropped up because vAiile exports during 
the l a s t year grew a t the r a t e of h%f the import b i l l was 
higher by kO%, This de t e r io r a t i on i s continuing in the current 
year . The IMF loan to India became so con t rove r s i a l . Within 
and witiiout the country. By anphasislng tha t developing 
countr ies should r e ly more on the p r iva te sector and follow 
p41icies based on free e n t e r p r i s e , i t has pu t aid receiving 
countr ies in a t i g h t pos i t i on . The th rus t of th i s argument i s 
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t ha t developing countr ies should depend on commercial 
borrowing r a the r than depending upon a funding agency l ike 
the IMF and the IDA. 
199. MAHESHWABI (SC). Loan fran the IMF : I s i t a red r ag . 
Eastern Boon. H, 18; 1981, Oc, 30; 805-6. 
I t I s important that the money borrowed from the 
IMF i s u t i l i s e d for improving the lo t of those people vftio 
s t i l l l i ve below the poverty l i n e . He bel ieves tha t i t i s 
no t necessary to presume t h a t the IMF wi l l intpose draconian 
condit ions of the bargaining power of the government i s strong 
and India has a comfortable foreign exhcange reserves 
p o s i t i o n . 
200, MITRA (Ashok). One year of the IMF loan. Sunday. 10, 
19j 1982, Nv, llf-20; 36-7. 
I n d i a ' s decision to go in for the loan has c e r t a i n l y 
se t back the group of 77 in i t s f i g h t to usher In a l ess unjust 
i n t e rna t i ona l monetary order . Having accepted each of the 
c r i t e r i a set up by the fund's ' c o n d i t i o n a l i t y ' i t would now be 
a l together incongruous for India t o claim to provide leadership 
to the developing count r ies in the i r b a t t l e to have these 
c r i t e r i a re laxed. The group of 'Jl has been of the view tha t the 
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^ « c i f l e a of the fund's teondltionality* m i l i t a t e aga ins t the 
r i g h t of the member countr ies to pursue domestic soc ia l and 
economic p o l i c i e s , according to the i r owi l i g h t s and must be 
reviewed. Many have a lso f e l t tha t a number of the terms 
underlying the *conditionality» a re p o l i t i c a l l y iii5)racticable 
to carry out . T i l l 198I, barely half-a-dozen members ventured 
to seek add i t iona l acconodation from the fvtnd. through i t s 
newly establ ished extended f a c i l i t y i t s underlying terms 
v i r t u a l l y amounted to a wholesale surrender of na t iona l sove-
re ign ty . To them, i t was offensive in the extreme that the 
fund w i l l get away by imposing these terms on the poor na t ions , 
201. PLEASING THE IMF. Econ & Pol Ifelv. 16, 3 I ; 198l , Ag, 1; 
125V. 
India has knocked a t the doors of the IMF for a 
large stand-by arrangement, repor tedly in excess of $ h b i l l i o n . 
As with import of wheat and sugar, the decis ion to seek such 
a large loan from the IMF has been presented as an ac t of 
great fores ight and sound economic management by government. 
The large IMF loan w i l l reduce the need to borrow in the i n t e r -
na t iona l c a p i t a l market where cur ren t ly i n t e r e s t r a t e s a re so 
much higher . By approaching the IMF ear ly i t would be spared 
the fu l l b l a s t of the condit ions that the IMF imposes upon i t s 
borrowers have proved to be base less . 
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202, PRICE OF IMP loan. EGOII & Pol Vklv. 16, if2-If3; 1981 , 
Oc, 17-2^; 1670. 
The SDR 5 b i l l i o n IMF loan to I n d i a . The IMP 
i s t i t l e d ' s ta tement of Economic P o l i c i e s , and tha t i t i s 
approaching the IMF loan to sap por t these p o l i c i e s and 
programmes. These p o l i c i e s i s promotion of expor ts a t a l l 
co s t . The IMF and Government of I n d i a , dea l , i s the opening 
up of the economy to foreign c a p i t a l and the t ransna t iona l 
co-operation through the e levat ion of export growth as the 
foremost na t iona l goal , the l i b e r a l i s a t i o n of iiqports and 
the f ree in^jort of technology. 
203, RAI (Kar t ik) . Borrowing from the IMF. Peonle 's Deom 
^ , 32; 1981, Ag, 9; h. 
India has approached the IMF for a massive h b i l l i o n 
dol la r loan th i s year and the new measures l ike ra i s ing the 
p r i ce of petro-products and banning s t r i k e s conform to the 
d i c t a t e s of the IMF, The IMF an in^or tan t turning point in 
the h i s to ry of the Indian economy. Vftiile India has frdn time 
to time borrowed from the IMF in the p a s t , the amounts 
involved were con$)aratively small and eas i ly repayable . The 
IMF cannot enforce a " s t a b i l i s a t i o n programme" when the amount 
borrowed i s very small , as was the case with India In the pas t , 
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L a s t year , for the f i r s t t ime, India went in for a s izeable 
IMF loan, near ly 1 b i l l i o n d o l l a r s . This year i t s request 
to the IMF i s for k b i l l i o n d o l l a r s . This f igure i s not 
only for higher than the so-cal led •'development a s s i s t ance" 
i s not only near ly two-and a-half times the loans sanctioned, 
I n d i a ' s exports were increasing a t the same time, the payment 
pos i t ion would not be so bad. 
201+. RAI (Kar t ik) , " " fiiike in railway f r e igh t r a t e s . 
People's Daaa. 5, 515 1981, De, 20; h. 
To meet an annual d e f i c i t of Rs. 75 c ro r e s , why i s 
he proposing f re ight -hikes which would y ie ld an annual 
revenue of Rs. 320 crores? The r e a l explanation for the 
f re igh t -h ike i s l inked to the IMF loan. The IMF i s going to 
"review" the economy a t the end of March and a l l budget 
d e f i c i t s have to be closed to i t s s a t i s f ac t ion by then. The 
Ind i ra regime i s he l l -ben t on pleasing i t s master , \fhait does 
i t care i f in the process the people of the country are 
squeezed dry ? I t would go round even fas t e r now to sa t i s fy 
the IMF, which does not l ike d i r e c t t axa t ion , which wants 
"Inducemaits" to the monopolisms and the mul t ina t iona l s , an 
which considers p r i ce - inc reases and ind i r ec t tax- increases as 
only permissible means of r a i s i n g revenue. 
208 
205. RAI (Kar t ik) . ; . Mystery of the W. Bengal overdraf ts ; 
IMF-dlotated p o l i c i e s . People 's Demo. 5, ^ 8 ; I98 I , 
Nv, 29; ^ . 
The Indira regime and press s e r v i l e to i t have 
launched a new offensive aga ins t the West Bengal Government. 
They charge i t with "f inancial i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y " leading to 
massive overdrafts and argue for a cut in i t s plan a l l oca t i ons . 
IBader the IMF-dictated programme, the c e n t r a l government has 
made a massive e f for t to snatch resources out of the people ' s 
hands through a s«r ies of hUtces in administered p r i c e s . This 
"engineered in f la t ion" has caught the State Governments in a 
pincer squeeze. The f inanc ia l c r i s i s facing the s t a t e s , which 
i s manifested in the increased overdra f t s , i s a d i r e c t outcome 
of adopting the IMF-dictated p o l i c i e s . The Government's 
a t t i t u d e to t h i s f inancia l c r i s i s i s a l so shaped by i t s IMF 
masters . 
LOAN, SOUTH AFRICA 
206.IIIUIS (Arul B). India a s s a i l s IMF loan to S. Africa. HT. 
59, 309} 1982, Nv, 10; 16, (1 -2 ) . 
India today condemenad the In te rna t iona l Monetary 
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Fund decis ion to grant South Africa a loan of $ 1 . 1 b i l l i o n 
saying tha t i t would strengthen the apartheid regimes po l i c i e s 
of repress ion. Kamal Nath, an Indian de l ega te , told the UN 
General Assembly that the loan approved was in defiance of an 
assembly r e so lu t ion , opposing , i t would roughly equal to the 
increase South Africa mi l i t a ry expenditure from I98O to I982. 
The voting in the IMP board however i s linked to the contr ibu-
t ion made by i t s members- and the US and i t s a l l i e s were 
therefore able to push the loan decis ion through. India joined 
120 other countr ies in voting for the r e so lu t ion , while the 
ISiited S t a t e s , Br i ta in and Vfest Germany were the only countries 
to vote agains t the fxmd no t being granted to P re to r i a loan. 
NEW INTERNATIONAli ECONOMIC ORDER 
207. AMIN (Slamir) . Collect ive se l f - r e l i ance and the new 
In te rna t iona l order . Dev & Socio-Eeon Prog. 2 , 2j 
1978, Ap-Je; 8-2lf. 
The decades following the second world war were 
marked by the r i s e of the l i be ra t i on movement in the three 
c o n t i n « i t s , the main goals of )^ ich , in Asia and in Africa, were 
the reconquest of na t iona l Independence and i t s defence by 
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refusing the m i l i t a r y a l l i ances through which the United 
Sta tes s o u ^ t to dominate the pol icy of the Third World 
S t a t e s . But in genera l , the goals and methods of economic 
development pursued did not challenge the main fea ture of 
the i n t e rna t iona l d iv i s ion of labour shaped during the l a s t 
century. Hence, an external ly-or iented and dependent 
development model was usua l ly accepted. The object ive f a i lu re 
of t h i s model and the increasingly d i f f i c u l t problems gradually 
induced the Third World countr ies to embark upon a new s t ra tegy 
with the aim of consolidating t h e i r reconquered p o l i t i c a l 
independence by strengthening the i r economic independence, 
208, BHANDABI (Rcmesh), Ciooperation among developing count r ies . 
Indian & For Rev. 19. 9; 1982, Fe, 15-28; 9-10, 
The presen'f'world economic system i s control led 
and Operated through agencies l ike the IMF, IBRD and GATT. 
This system was es tabl ished at a time when most of the 
developing countr ies did not even e x i s t as independent s t a t e s . 
I t i s now being increasingly f e l t tha t i t s functioning i s not 
fu l ly a t ta ined to the speci f ic problans and need of developing 
coun t r i e s . Developing dfountries impelled by these cons t ra in t s 
have been seeking a more balanced economic r e l a t i o n s h i p . The 
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need for f u l l and eq\ial p a r t i c i p a t i o n of developing 
countr ies in the formulation and appl ica t ion of a l l dec i s ions 
concerning the i n t e rna t iona l community was discussed a t the 
6th Special session of tiie United Nations General Assembly in 
197^, The c a l l for the New In t e rna t iona l Boonomic Order 
(NIBO) seeking to e s tab l i sh a more jus t and equi table systan 
of in te rna t iona l cooperation between the developed and deve-
loping countr ies on the bas is of sovereign equal i ty and the 
ranoval of the disequil ibrium exis t ing between than was given 
a t t h i s sess ion . The 7th Special session of the UN General 
Assembly in 1975 adopted a further reso lu t ion ca l l i ng for 
accelerated development of developing countr ies through i n t e r -
nat ion economic cooperation. 
209. HITHOVEW (Adolf JH). Standardized accountancy and 
econcanic development. Fin & Dev. 10, 1; 1973» Mr; 28-31. 
Accounting, as an information system, i s not as yet 
a cohesive auid Unified d i s c i p l i n e . The need for more uniform 
treatment of information in a l l areas of accounting i s well 
recognised, the benef i ts are sounder economic and f i s c a l 
p o l i c i e s , and be t te r planning and c o n t r o l . Such advantages 
are of p a r t i c u l a r in^jortance to developing coun t r i e s . The 
scope and methods of s tandardizat ion in s o c i a l , government and 
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enterpr i se accountancy, and within the overa l l accounting 
framework; and how improved in t e rna t iona l accounting standards 
and conventions might "be a t t a ined . 
210. KHALID (RO). Planning and the budget process : An 
in t roduct ion. Fin & Dev. 15, 2; 1978, J e ; 33-7. 
A familiar problon in developing countr ies r e l a t e s 
to the absence of coordination between planning and budgeting. 
The fiiscal p o l i c i e s , i f any, recommended: in the plan may not be 
implemented by the budget, and the budget may operate according 
to p o l i c i e s not re f lec ted in the plan of the IMF. 
NEW SUBSIDISING SCHEME 
211, BALASUBRAMANIAN (V). IMF a pwan in US hands, say exper t s . 
HT. 59, 238; 1982, Ag, 30; 1 (1+-5). 
The IMF i s preparing to come to town with the World 
Bank for their Joint annual sess ion , two un ivers i ty of Toronoto 
dans p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t Granford Pra t t and economist Kel 
Watkins ^Jiave accused i t of generating fears among developing 
countr ies that i t has becane an increasingly d i r e c t agent of 
Reagan adminis t ra t ion. The IMF for at taching to i t s loans to 
developing countr ies condit ions such as reduct ions in wages 
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and food subsidies tha t " t ransfer the main harden and cost 
on to poorer sections of tiiese coun t r i e s " . This approach 
violated the char ter of the fund which was to help countr ies 
co r rec t t he i r balance of payments imbalances without resor t ing 
to measures " that are des t ruc t ive of na t iona l p rosper i ty" . 
The IMF as "an ideologica l grouping that represented the 
bankers in the world". Given such dismal p red ic t ions about 
eccMiomic recovery, there i s l i k e l y to be much demand a t the 
annual meeting tha t an t i - i n f l a t i ona ry s t r a t e g i e s should not 
ignore the r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of economic a c t i v i t y in i n d u s t r i a l 
countr ies or improvement for tiie developing coun t r i e s . 
212. DUTTA (Satyabrata) , IMF and economic sovereignty. Social 
PersT.. 9, ^; 1982, Mr; 275-83. 
In November, 198I, India was able to secure a massive 
loan of Rs. 5200 crores from IMF under i t s scheme of Extended 
Financing K i c i l i t y . The loan i s said to be the l a r g e s t 
advanced by the fund to any country during the t h i r t y - s i x years 
of i t s e x i s t « i c e . The IMF and to rebui ld in t e rna t iona l monetary 
systiBDi \diich had been ravaged by war and depress ion, i t was 
c lear enough tha t they had no otiier option but to concede the 
dominant r o l e of the United States in the in t e rna t iona l monetary 
order . The IMF's ideology i n s i s t s on devaluation of the 
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cur ra ic i e s of the borrower members. During the f i r s t 
t h i r t y years , more than 100 members have been subjected to 
devaluation and revaluat ion of t he i r cur renc ies . The voting 
power in the fund i s derived from the quotas or a country 's 
share in the fund's c a p i t a l . The f ive major 'share holders ' 
of the fund, i . e . the USA, the UK, Federal Republic of Germany, 
Japan and France. The severe siiffering imposed on a developing 
society through the IMF cond i t iona l i ty i s endured without any 
r e a l propspect of a favourable economic outcome. I t has 
an ideology of econcanic and social development which i t i s 
t rying to impose on poor eount r ies i r r e spec t ive of the i r ovn 
c l ea r ly s t a r t ed p o l i c i e s , 
213, INDIA BENEFIT fTcm IMF's new scheme. Econ Trnd. 10, 3 ; 
1981, Fe, 1; 17. 
To meet Ind ia ' s balance of payments problems. IMF's 
new scheme w i l l be much he lp fu l . The fund has establ ished 
a one b i l l i o n SDR account to subsidise drawings and India wi l l 
be e l i g i b l e for subsidy up to 3% a year. 
2 t^ . IMF TOO l i t t l e for too many. Boon & Pol Vfolv. 16, 8; 
1981, Fe, 21J 255. 
The IMF has announced i t s decision to s e t up a 
separate fund of SDR 1 b i l l i o n to be used for subsidising 
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i n t e r e s t r a t e s on funds l en t to i t s poorer member countr ies . 
The subsidy w i l l be ava i lab le on borrowings by the poorer 
members countr ies under the IMF's Supplementary Financing 
Fac i l i ty (SFF). Die SFF was se t up in February 1979 to help 
member count r ies , which are facing very large balance of 
payments d e f i c i t s in r e l a t i o n to t he i r quotas . The normal 
lending r a t e of the IMF for SFF loans i s ^2%, The amount 
ac tua l ly borrowed by the IMF for SFF was only SDR 502 mil l ion 
upto end i ^ r i l 198O. Die large Trust Fund b u i l t up with the 
p r o f i t s from i t s gold s a l e s , 
SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS 
215. AEPPLI (0) . \ferld energy c r i s i s : New trends in OPEC 
Investment s t r a t egy . Boon Times. 7 , M-8; I98O, My, I 3 ; 
5 (3-6). 
Now people everyvAiere are beginning to complain 
about the u t i l i z a t i o n of energy sources and the fear i s being 
voiced tha t in foreseeable future tiie world w i l l s tr ipped of 
th i s valuable a s s e t . The quadrupling of o i l pr ices by the 
OPEC c a r t e l during the f i r s t o i l c r i s i s of I973 created a huge 
transfer problem between buyer and supplier na t ions . The 
populous o i l na t i ons , such as Alger ia , Nigeria , Venezuela and 
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Bcuader and the genuine surplus nat ions within OPEC, 
notably Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE. The 
currency mix of OPEC's in te rna t iona l reserves i s being more 
strongly d i v e r s i t i e d . Alongside the US d o l l a r , these i s 
growing i n t e r e s t in IMF Posi t ions and SDKs, and a l so hard 
na t iona l currencies such as the German mark, the Pirench 
Franc and s t e r l i n g , !Qie amount placed in IMF pos i t ions and 
SDKs through grea t ly expanded in absolute terms now represents 
a smaller proport ion of the whole than i t did in ^^75• 
216. BAI-ASUNDRMANIAN (V). US for f ree run to IMF, World Bank, 
HT, 59, 165; 1982, J e , 16; 8 ( 3 - ^ ) . 
The IMF and world bank made a programme for the 
co-ordinat ion of economic p o l i c i e s of the p r inc ipa l Indus t r i a l 
na t ions . Sen ior -of f ic ia l s of the five coun t r i es , the U . S . , 
Japan, West Germany, France and the U.K., v^ose currencies 
from the SDR basket , wi l l be meeting the managing d i rec to r 
of the IMF short ly to char t a course for monitoring vdiether 
the i r economic p o l i c i e s are converging on a t rack of low 
in f l a t ion r a t e s and steady economic growth. The US do l la r 
moved up agains t other major currencies as we l l . Taking these 
movements as s igna ls of d isorder ly trading in the American 
currency the Reagan administrat ion intervened to discourage 
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fur ther appreciat ion i t for other major ciirrencies the 
US, p a r t i c u l a r l y by the French to give up i t s stand tha t 
government should not attempt to s t a b l i s e exchange r a t e s . 
Nevertheless market analys is here suggest t ha t the pledge 
extracted from the US government tha t i t would keep an open-
mind on in tervent ion in currency trading was not without a 
bearing on the decision taken by the US a u t h o r i t i e s to step 
the further appreciat ion of the US do l l a r . 
217. BIG ISSUES before the IMP. Capi ta l . 177, ^ 3 3 ; 1976, 
Oc, 7; ^7^-5. 
The SDKs linked to the flow of r e a l resources to 
the developing count r ies ; more adequate balance of payments 
support) and tha t on more reasonable terms, from the IMF. Ihe 
balance of payments support of the fund to i t s member countr ies 
depends p r inc ipa l l y upon i t s system of quotas , v^ich the 
developing countr ies find heavily weighted agains t them. The 
fund's supply of condi t ional l i q u i d i t y to i t s members depends 
a good deal upon the adequacy of i t s quotas . The share of the 
IMF quotas , the share of the developing countr ies in d i r e c t -
d i s t r i b u t i o n of the SDRs, which i s intended to replace gold in 
the monetary system. The use of SDRs in the set t lement of 
in te rna t iona l payments. 
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218. BOECK (Klaus). . ^ u p p l y of In te rna t iona l l i qu id i t y 
to developing coun t r i e s . I n t e r Econ. 12, 5-6; 1977, 
My-Je; 129-39. 
The developing countr ies have been facing the 
prohlem of the supply of i n t e rna t iona l l i qu id i t y i s that since 
197Q. They have been a t a great disadvauitage as far as the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of the newly created i n t e m a t i o n a l l l i q u i d i t y i s 
concerned. The IMF in early October 1976, put for th a demand 
for a fresh a l loca t ion of SERs. In t h i s connection whether 
the developing countr ies are j u s t i f i ed in the i r concerning 
the supply of l i q u i d i t y and whether another SDKs a l loca t ion is 
needed in order to solve the i r l i qu id i t y problems, if any ex i s t . 
219. GHATTERJEE (Sr ikan ta ) . In t e rna t iona l monetary reform : 
Problons and prospec t s . Capi ta l . 180, ^-520; 1978, J l , 
6; 11-15. 
The pol icy options for achieving world currency 
reform would be to use a f reely f loat ing exchange r a t e regime 
so tha t the maintenance of external balance i s l e f t to the 
market fo rces . The IMF t r i ed to combine aspec ts of gold 
standard and f l e x i b l e exchange r a t e . Maintenance of fixed 
p a r i t i e s and avoidance of r e s t r i c t i v e t rade and exchange ra te 
p o l i c i e s were la id down as the ru l e s of mraibership. In order 
^ l y 
for a fixed eoKhange r a t e systan to operate e f f i c i en t ly 
external imbalance? of countr ies have to s e t t l e through 
dcMnestic def la t ion or in f l a t ion . The IMF permitted substan-
t i a l changes in the exchange r a t e s of countr ies with "funda-
mental disequi l ibr ium" in the i r external balances. Each 
membet had an a l loca t ion of SDR in proport ion to i t s IMF 
quota. The SDKs could be used for the purchase of the 
durrency of any other member country through the IMF. 
220, CUTLER (David S) . T :o Operat ions and t ransac t ions of 
the specia l drawing acoount. Fin & Dev. 8, 1; 1971) 
Ja ; 18-23. 
On August 15> 1971 I the United Sta tes announced 
tha t i t would no longer f ree ly buy and s e l l gold against U.S. 
d o l l a r s for the sett lement of in te rna t iona l t r ansac t ions . An 
announcement that had important repercussions through out the 
en t i r e monetary system. Among ottier e f fec ts of created 
fresh i n t e r e s t in a possible expanded ro l e for specia l drawing 
r i g h t s (SDKs), How th i s i n t e rna t iona l ly created asse t has 
operated in i t s f i r s t 21 months of existence i s described ? 
221. DAS GUPTA (M). Sjpecial drawing r i g h t s , "Subst i tu t ion 
Account" and developing coun t r i e s . Southern 'Econ. 19, 11; 
1980, Oc, 1; 1 7 - 9 . 
The "subst i tu ion account" which secured the over-
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wheiUning of support of the r icher nat ions of the world, 
a t the Belgtade meeting of IMF, i s expected to f igure in 
the discussions a t the fund's annual meeting t h i s year . In 
th i s paper , the author analyses the pros and cons of the 
" subs t i tu t ion account" -whose main purpose i s to under pin 
the dol la r and the other reserve cur renc ies . He is of the 
view tha t i t does not in any way help the developing countries 
and adds tha t i t would be much be t t e r to expand the ro le of 
the SDKS proper . 
222. DEVELOPED COUNTRIES want to he lp , bat . . . Eastern Be on. 
50, 8; 1968, Pe, 235 325-9. 
An e f for t to be made by each developing country' 
to maintain pol i t ica l^economic, socia l and a lso demographic 
equilibrium which each developed country was bound to make 
an e f fo r t not only of mate r i a l character but of moral s o l i d a r i t y . 
The system of SDRs worked out in Rio l a s t year and open to a l l 
members of the IMF would be p a r t i c u l a r l y important if countr ies 
with leading currencies t r i ed to cut the i r balance of payments 
de f i c i t s by d ra s t i c measures. The developing countr ies not to 
press for ways to l ink the c rea t ioh of l i q u i d i t y under the scheme 
of SDRs, with development a i d . Althrough th i s objective was 
d e s i r a b l e , the idea remained a cont rovers ia l one and press ing 
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i t would deby the prospect of f i n a l agreement. 
223. FBJERLEIN (W) . ^ D o l l a r and spec ia l drawing r i g h t . 
I n t e r Econ. 1^ ,^ 3 ; 1979, My-Jej 111-5. 
The SDKs issued in I969-71 were defined in terms 
of gold, thus ind i r ec t ly in d o l l a r s , "but due to the probl«ns 
witii the US do l l a r in 197^, t h i s was changed and the value of 
the SDKs from then f i x e * in terms of a basket of 16 of the 
world 's major currencies . Since the SDKs were expected to play 
a r o l e somewhat similar to the l imited ro l e of gold they were 
a lso popularly cal led 'paper g o l d ' . The SDR system also r e f l e c t s 
the idea tha t gold should not resume an in t e rna t iona l monet«ry 
function. The key fundamental c a i d i t i o n s of the expanded SDS 
system and the po t en t i a l creat ion of the subs t i tu t ion account 
should be the res t ruc t ing of the in te rna t iona l monetary system 
and recrea t ion of in te rna t iona l monetary s t a b i l i t y . The revised 
SDR system might be used as an excusing for not pu t t ing pressure 
on d e f i c i t countr ies to equi l ibera te the i r balance of payments. 
tfl%« oaLATI ( IS) . World monetary c r i s i s and under-developed 
coun t r i e s . Econ & Pol Wkly. 6, kO; 1971, Oc, 21; 2098-2IOI, 
Bie value of the do l la r in r e l a t i o n to a few currencies 
which are now under-valued must be adjusted downwards; and the 
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Bretton Woods systaii of in t e rna t iona l co-operation based 
on tiie key currency ro le of the US dol la r must undergo a 
r a d i c a l change. If the new system which replaces i t i s to 
avoid recurrence of s i tua t ion similar to the one now being 
faced, i t must never again give the key currency r o l e to any 
na t ional currency or even a group of na t iona l cur renc ies . 
Instead i t must be based on an in te rna t iona l reserve which 
i s created and can be expanded to meet expanding world r equ i r e -
ments under genuinely in t e rna t iona l auspices . Unless the 
under-developed countr ies are a l e r t to the present goings on 
among the developed coun t r i e s , ce r t ldn basic decis ions might 
be taken with regard to the new world monetary system without 
t he i r i n t e r e s t s and requirements being su f f i c i en t ly taken in to 
account. The Tinder-developed countr ies must aim a t i s to 
secure an agreement tha t any secular expansion in in t e rna t iona l 
reserves would be a l located exclusively to them. They should 
never again s e t t l e for a l loca t ion in the manner of SDKs was 
re t rograde , regress ive and inequi tab le . 
225. GfUBn (DD). I n t e r n a t i o n i l monetary system, second 
amendment, and developing coun t r i e s . Bso Affai rs . 2^-, 
8-95 1979, Ag-Se; 231-^0. 
Analysis the implicat ions of some of these changes 
v i s - a - v i s the r o l e of the Important currencies in the i n t e r -
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na t iona l monetary system. The second amendment of the 
a t r i c l e s of agreement of the IMP having bearings on the 
important key currencies and thei r eonsequences in case of 
the developing coun t r i e s . Bie introduct ion of new and 
f l ex ib le provisions dealing with exchange r a t e s arrangements. 
Reduc t ion in the ro l e of gold in the in t e rna t iona l monetary 
system including the d i spos i t ion of p a r t of the fund's own 
holdings of gold. Changes in the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and expansion 
of the poss ible use of the SDR. Simplif icat ion and expansion 
of the types of the f\mds f inanc ia l operations and t r ansac t ions , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y those conducted through the general department. 
Certain improvements in the organisa t ional and adminis trat ive 
aspect of the funds. 
SPECIAL DRAINING RIGHTS CREDIT (?JOTA, DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
226. BALAStJBRAHANlAN (V). Call to double IMF quotas. HT. 59, 
2h7\ 1982, Se, 95 12 (3-5) . 
The economic d i f f i c u l t i e s of the developing countr ies 
were la rge ly due to the macro-economic domestic p o l i c i e s emd 
in t e rna t iona l t rade and finance p rac t i ces of Indus t r i a l 
coun t r i e s . The developed countr ies extend meaningful ass is tance 
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to the developing countr ies in overcoming the i r payments 
problems. A r ev iva l of the world economy i s a precondit ion 
for the success of the massive e f fo r t s of developing countr ies 
to r e s t ruc tu re the i r economics. The ser ious down turn in the 
economies of the developing countr ies i s mainly due to a 
serious of exogenous f a c t o r s . Vftiile the developing countr ies 
needed to adopt ad^s tments measiares to overcome the i r economic 
d i f f i c u l t i e s , the developed countr ies a lso bound to give them 
econcmic a s s i s t ance . The pos i t ive i n i t i a t i v e s now being 
processed for Improving commitment of funds for the current 
f i s c a l year I983, se t t ing up a briding arrangement. The IKF 
increase was qui te c lear that the dejjreloping countr ies the i r 
denand that the t o t a l of quotas should a t l e a s t be doubled. 
The m u l t i l a t e r a l financing i s being cal led upcxi to assume in 
a s s i s t ing the s t r u c t u r a l adjustment process and the plans for 
econcmic growth in developing count r ies . Supporting for a 
SDR 100 = 125 b i l l i o n range, the " subs tan t i a l " increase which 
the developing countr ies are seeking in IMF quotas. 
227. BALASOBRAMANIAN (V). SDR impasse l ike ly to p e r s i s t in 
IMP. H|^ 59, 229; 1982, Ag, 21j 5 .(^-3). 
Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) a l located by the fund 
to member countr ies are a s se t s tha t can be used by a holder to 
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finance a blanace of payments d e f i c i t without having to 
adhere to pol icy conditions as a re attached to c red i t 
exteaded through various fund f a c i l i t i e s . They a r e , the re -
fore great ly valued by developing countr ies as a source of 
uncondit ional l i q u i d i t y . They have a l so been r e s i s t i n g the 
developing coun t r i e s ' demand for continuing creat ion of SDKs 
on the ground that there i s , as of now, suf f ic ien t l i q u i d i t y 
in the in te rna t iona l monetary systan to take care of the 
borrowing, requiranents of developing countr ies they add that 
l i qu id i t y through more SDKs would be inf la t ionary in ef fec t . 
The developing countr ies argue t h a t , since SDRs ccxist i tute 
only a small f rac t ion of the In te rna t iona l monetary reserves 
and addi t ions to them cannot conceiveably have any inf la t ionary 
signif icance of t h e i r own. 
228, HORSEFIELD (J Ke i th ) . Fund quo ta ' s . Fin & Dev. 7, 3 ; 
1970, Se; 7-12. 
"Each member sha l l be aasi^ied a quota. The subs-
c r i p t i on of each member sha l l be equal to i t s quota". These 
provis ion , in the Ar t i c les of Agreem«it of the IMF, are the 
basis for the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the IMF's members in many of 
i t s a c t i v i t i e s , the Executive Directors to the use of i t s 
resonve«s. The r e l a t i v e share of the developing countr ies 
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in the IMF has increased since 19'+5» not only because a 
large number of developing countr ies have joined the IMP 
since tha t time but a lso because a t ce r t a in period the 
developing countr ies had l a rge r than gwaeral quota increases 
as a r e s u l t of the small quota pol icy or of increase under 
the compensatory financing dec is ion . 
229, MAHBUBQL HAQ. | 2^ea for human san i ty . Pak & Qulf Econ. 
1 , 3^5 1982, Nv, 13-19; 12-5. 
In the near future an in te rna t iona l monetary and 
f i n a n c i a l system that can serve the needs of a l l na t ions for 
accelerated world econanic recovery, for continuous economic 
grodrth and for Increasing expansion in world t rade . An energy 
Investment bank can be set up by a few c o u n t r i e s , even without 
the US, to finance energy exploration and development in o i l -
importing developing coun t r i e s . The changing composition of 
in t e rna t iona l c a p i t a l flows, and the high l eve l of i n t e r e s t r a t e s , 
have placed a number of developing countr ies in a l i q u i d i t y 
squeeze today US can exercise a v i r t u a l veto over the doubling 
of quotas of IMF. The IMF has l o s t considerable power and 
influence af ter the fixed exchange r a t e s gave way to the f loat ing 
r a t e s , a f t e r the gold l ink was served with the US d o l l a r , a f t e r 
the surplus countr ies refused to accept any pol icy condi t iona l i ty 
227 
or birden of adjustment prescribed by the IMP, and a f te r 
the powers of the IMP to crea te SDKs were severely cu r t a i l ed . 
The IMP pres ides today over a monetary chaos that i t has no 
way of po l ic ing . The best i t can do i s to knock a few weak 
and poor countr ies on the head r a t h e r rudely from time to 
time to prove i t s own manhood. 
SPECIAL DRAIfffNG RIGHTS CREDIT QUOTA, INDIA 
230. IMF LOm i only ha l f needed t Econ & Pol Vklv. 16, ^9 ; 
1981, De, 28; 1 9 7 0 - 1 . 
The government may not draw the th i rd intsalment 
of the IMF loan. As i s well known, the IMF loan i s in three 
instalments : SDR 900 mi l l ion in the f i r s t year upto June 30, 
1982, SDR 1.8 b i l l i o n in the second year upto June 30, I983, 
and the remaining SDR 2.3 b i l l i o n in the th i rd year upto 
June 30> 198^. India was not facing a ser ious enough balance of 
payments problem to warrant the SDR 5 b i l l i o n loan. More impor-
t an t , i f the government expects that i t would no t have to use 
almost one-half of the loan under i t s exteided f\ind f a c i l i t y . 
The major economic pol icy changes by making i t appear tha t 
these changes had to be effected as p a r t of IMF condi t iona l i ty 
attached to the IMF loan. A bi lance of payments c r i s i s which 
may in the «id ccxnpel us to draw the IMF loan in f u l l . 
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231. IMF SETS seal on loan. Banker. 28, 10; I981, Dej 35. 
The IMF approved on November 10, a loan of 5 'bil l ion 
SDKs for Ind ia . India wi l l get the loan , which w i l l bear on 
average r a t e of i n t e r e s t working out to l e s s than 12^ over a 
period of three years and then w i l l be allowed four years to 
s t a r t rpaylng i t* The loan can be divided into two p a r t s . 
The f i r s t p a r t of upto 600 mil l ion SDKs can be drawn in the 
period ending March 2k, 1982, of which 3OO mi l l ion SDKs wi l l 
made avai lable a f te r January 15> 1982, based on India having 
f u l f i l l e d specified object ive c r i t e r i a a t the end of November 
1981, The second p a r t cons i s t s the remaining k-,kOO mi l l ion 
SDKs -vrtiich wi l l be avai lable in phased amounts upon sa t i s fac tory 
compilations of revievs approved by the fund. This yea r ' s 
current account d e f i c i t was projected a t about 3 b i l l i o n SDKs. 
This was 2% of the gross domestic product. 
232. INDIA'S PUND for the IMF. Econ. Trnd. 9 , 3; 1980, Fe, 
1; 15. 
India has made ava i l ab le foreign exchange resources 
of 259. 6 mi l l ion SDK's, equival« i t to about Rs. 271 c r o r e s , 
through the IMF for the use of other fund members since 
September 1976, 
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233. INDIA'S QUOTA of SDK's. Eastern Econ. 5^, 2; 1970, J a , 
9; 66. 
Vlbrld monetary reserves have been boosted by 
$ 3.lf1^ mi l l ion with the f i r a t a l loca t ion of SDKs to ^(U 
countr ies . The IMF has approved $ 126 mi l l ion to India for 
the development purposes. The quota i s based on a n a t i o n ' s 
s ize and economic s t reng th . 
23M-. SDKs FOR Ind ia . Econ Trnd. 9, 3; I98O} Fe, 1; 15. 
India has received I19 mill ion SDRs as the second 
Instalment of the a l loca t ion made by the IMF and added to 
i t s foreign exchange r e se rves . In I978 decided to a l loca te 
about ^ b i l l i o n SDR in each of the three years 1979 to 1 98O 
and 1981. 
SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS CREDIT (JTOTA, MEMBHl COUNTRIES 
23?. TYSON (Geoftfery). IMF inaugrates Special Drawing Rights. 
Capital . 163, ^ 8 3 ; 1969, Oc, 9; 656-7. 
The main business before the IMF was to ac t i va t e 
a new scheme for spec ia l drawing r igh t s (SDRs). I t was f i r s t 
put forward about two years ago. A t o t a l a l loca t ion of $ 3 .5 
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mill ion on 1s t J an , 1970 and a further a l loca t ion of $ 3 
mi l l ion on 1st Jan , 1972. The amount of SDRs any one 
country w i l l get w i l l be in proport ion to i t s quota of 
the fund. In 1970, if a l l members of the fund joined in 
the scheme, i t would give about $ 850 mil l ion of new reserves 
a s se t s to the USA and about $ ^ 0 mil l ion to the UK, This 
i s toitamount to adding something l i k e h% a year to the 
$ 7.5 b i l l i o n of monetary reserves in the form of gold, foreign 
exchangeetcetra. The SDRs carry an absolute gold guarantee 
and are in effect in te res t -bea r ing gold c e r t i f i c a t e s , 
236. WILLIiiMS (David), Increasing the resources of the fund 
borrowing. Fin & Dev. I 3 , 3 ; 1976, Sej 19-23. 
The IMF has Increased i t s resources through two 
major borrowing episodes, the General Arrangements to Borrow 
(GAB) and the o i l f a c i l i t y . The Gaaeral Account to a member 
for i t s currency, or by borrowing the currency. Such r e p l e -
nishment Operations increase the fund's holdings of usable 
currency which i t needs to flnace t ransact ions by other 
members. Up to May I976 the fund solve over SDR 3,9 b i l l i o n 
of gold, of vdiich the equivalent almost SDR 1,5 mil l ion was 
sold to the United States in replenishment of i t s holdings 
of U.S. d o l l a r s . 
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SPECIAL LOAN, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, BANGLADESH 
237. BANGLADESH SIX new banks in p r i v a t e sec tor . Commerce. 
lMf, 3692; 1982, Mr, 13^1+60-1. 
Witholding by the IMP of instalments under i t s 
Extended^ Rind J k c i l i t y (EFF) had fur ther ajggravated externa l 
l i q u i d i t y problem. Vftiile IMF i s yet to resume i t s SDR credi t 
under EFF as per agreement signed in the l a s t f i nanc i a l year 
i t has recen t ly a l located a sum of s ix ty mi l l ion SDR under i t s 
compensatory fund f a c i l i t y tohhelp Bangladesh meet i t s shor t -
f a l l in export earnings. 
SPECIAL LOAN, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, INDIA 
238, BALANCE OF payments. Margin, ^h, ^-j I982, J l ; 25. 
The balance of payments' pos i t ion continues to be 
under severe s t a i n , due to t toa izeab le d e f i c i t on foreign 
trade account. The decl ine of Rs. Ak67*6 crores from Rs.^,822,1 
crores a t end March I981 to Rs. 3>35^«5 crores a t end March 
1982, in foreign exchange reserves during the year I98I-82 does 
not r e f l e c t the sever i ty of t he s i t ua t ion because of the support 
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provided by the loans acquired from the IMF under i t s 
Extended Ilind F a c l l i | | ^ The fresh instalment of the IMF 
loan due in November 1982 w i l l , however, improve the 
reserves pos i t ion even through t<r,'porarity, 
239. CRISIS OF resources* Econ & Pol likly. 17, 1-2; 1982, 
J a , 2-9; 1-2. 
The Government of I n d i a ' s commitment to the IMF 
in connection with the SDR 5 b i l l i o n extended f a c i l i t y . The 
IMF sees a sharp r i s e in petroleum production as the only way 
for India to ijeep down i t s balance of payments d a f i c i t s , 
while maintaining a regime of l i b e r a l import as required by 
the fund. The economic.^rfrangements which have become increa-
singly prominent in recent years and which wi l l now be fur ther 
developed and consolidated in the wake of the IMF loan. The 
IMF that no fur ther scope ex i s t s for r a i s ing resources through 
d i r e c t taxat ion. Langer inflow of ex te rna l r esources , such 
as through the IMF loan. 
2lf0. GDLATI IS) . Under the IMF's watchi The 1982-83 budget. 
Econ & Pol Vklv. 17 , 17-18; 1982, Ap-My; 727-32. 
How can one find f a u l t with a budget that proposes 
a 21^ increase in Plan outlay even when defence spending has 
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to be ra i sed subs t an t i a l l y , reduces d e f i c i t f inancing 
from the l eve l i t had obtained in the year immediately 
preceding by almost 20^, keeps d i r e c t taxes more or less 
undisterbed and a t ths same time i s able to offer add i t iona l 
r e l i e f and/or concessions to savings, expor ts , inwards 
remittances from abroad and increased i n d u s t r i a l p roduc t iv i ty? 
Even i f a l l t h i s has been achieved under the d i i e c t or 
i nd i r ec t guidance from tiie IMF, how can one object to the 
budget on object ive considerat ion ? The drawings from the 
IMF«s Extended Rind F a c i l i t y are l i ke ly to be of the SDR 1.65 
b i l l i o n during the course of the next f inancia l year . Ihe 
f i r s t time tha t drawings fran thelMF have not been shown as 
budgetary r e c e i p t s . This has been the standard p rac t i ce 
because of payments support and not i t s government with 
budgetary support, 
2M. INDIA FOR more IMF c r e d i t . Econ Tmd. 9, 16; I98O, 
Ag, 16; 17. 
India expects to draw more than Rs. 8OO crores 
from the IMP to b u t t r e r s i t s foreign exchange reserves which 
dropped sharply by near ly Rs# 550 crores between April and 
J u l y . Government of India has concluded discussion with IMF 
for drawing ass i s t ance under the t r u s t fund of Rs. ^kO crores 
and another Rs, 30 crores under the compensatory financing 
f a c i l i t y . 
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2^2. INDIA GATES IMF help again. Commerce. 107, 2725; 
1963, J l , 13; 86-7. 
The IMF has provided thecredi t of $ 100 mil l ion 
to Ind ia . The stand-by arrangement i s an extension of the 
one entered in to betwewi thefund and the governm«it of India 
in July 1962. That arrangement has authorised the government 
of India drawing up to $ 100 mi l l ion . This c r e d i t wi l l help 
the a u t h o r i t i e s t o meet any d i f f i c u l t i e s in balance of payments, 
should no such d i f f i c u l t i e s a r i s e the c red i t would not be used 
a t a l l . 
2^3, SEW (Sunanda). Financial r e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of I n d i a ' s 
balance of payments, ^ o n & Pol Wklv. 8, ^-5; 1973, Nv, 
10; 2009-16. 
To be use fu l , ths balance of payments statement 
of a country revea l information which i s re levant for policy 
malting. The accounting concept of balance of payments, i t is 
now accepted, i s both out-dated and unsa t i s fac tory as a t o o l 
for analysis of count ry ' s ln tern*ional f inanc ia l pos i t i on . 
A new approach to c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of balance of payments was 
adopted by the IMF. This approach may provide a be t te r 
indicat ion of a developing country 's c red i t worthiness as a lso 
of i t s vu lne rab i l i t y in i t s payments r e l a t i o n s . 
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SPECIAL LOAN, BALAHCB OF PAYMENTS, PAKISTAN 
2^^. ALIMULLAH (Qazl M). Pakis tan ' s balance of payments 
pos i t i on . Pak Adm. 19, 1j 1982, J a - J e ; 28-39. 
Pakistan has been facing serious balance of 
payments probi«ns since mid-seventies as a r e s u l t of i n t e r -
na t iona l in f l a t ion and ins ign i f i can t aid r e l a t i o n s h i p . A 
f lexible and gradual approach towards balance of payments 
adjustment has been adopted. Pakistan has a lso been able to 
secure financing of the adjustmmt e f fo r t s from the In te rna-
t i ona l agencies . The Government was ab le to negot ia te in 
September, 198O an extended fund f a c i l i t y programme and obtain 
a medium term c r e d i t of about $ 1*5 b i l l i o n on the s t rength 
of performance and ac t ions taken in the economic and f inanc ia l 
f i e l d s . The extended fund arrangemsnt with the IMF also f a c i -
l i t a t e d tile rescheduling of o f f i c i a l debt by the consortium 
for a period of I8 months commencing from January, I981, Oil 
Import developing countr ies l ike Pakistan have problems of 
growing balance of payments d e f i c i t as a r e s u l t of Imported 
i n f l a t i o n , inadequate aid inflows, r i s i n g r Oetit servicing 
burden and adverse terms of t r ade , 
2if5, IMF EXTENDED f a c i l i t y to Pakis tan. Eastern Bson. 75, 18; 
1980, o c , 31 ; 997. 
Pakistan is to get 1,5 billion dollars of "Extended 
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Fund Fac i l i ty" ' from the IMF. The f a c i l i t y i s intended to 
support Pakis tan ' s balance of paymmts pos i t ion and the 
s t a b i l i s a t i o n programme over a three year period. Sources 
in touch with the negotiations point out tha t the IMF's 
will ingness to advance such a big amount r e f l e c t s the increa-
sing confidence in tiie rapid recovery of Pakistan economy and 
recognit ion of the effectiveness of the measures, 
SPECIAL LOAN, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
2V6, GANDHI ( I n d i r a ) . Restructuring world economy. Commerce. 
TMf, 3692; 1982, Mr, 13; ^5-7. 
The MF has played an important r o l e . When deve-
loping countr ies already have a low growth r a t e aM are 
ccaiqpelled to make s t r u c t u r a l adjustment in order to overcome 
balance of payments problems» they need f l ex ib l e responses 
from the IMP. The usual shot term s t a b i l i z a t i o n programmes 
w i l l not suffice in th is new s i t ua t i on , 
2h7» IMF ASSISTANCE for ce rea l imports. Econ Tmd. 10, 13; 
1981; J l , 1j 25. 
The IMF has decided to extend f inanc ia l ass i s tance 
to members th* face a balance of payments d i f f i c u l t y due to 
hefty r i s e in the i r cBreal Imports. The new f a c i l i t y would 
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help members to prevent cerea l consumption l eve l from 
f a l l i n g in the face of surges In import cos t s caused by 
fac to rs such as taoporary decl ine in domestic production 
or a sharp r i s e in import p r i c e s . The schane i s designed 
sole ly to bwaefit IOM income coun t r i es , suscept ib le to 
balahce of payments d is rupt ion from crop short f a l l s or 
steep increases in import p r i c e s . 
2V8. IMF CRACKS the whip. Eastern Beon. 78, 17; 1982, Ap, 
30; 1015. 
The IMF has r e c o i t l y suspended disbursement of 
more than 2^% of the loans made ava i lab le by i t to 15 countries 
for one to three years under the extended f a c i l i t y arrangement. 
India does not f igure announcing tiiese. In f a c t , i t has drawn 
the th i rd and f i n a l instalment of SDKs 300 mil l ion for the 
f i r s t yea r , r e f l e c t i n g the commendable job done in the face 
of many hurdles and tough global t rading condi t ions . The 
countr ies eiffected are Rcsnania, Zai re , Morocco, Bangladesh, 
Zambia, Groiada, CtostaRica, Tanoania, Guyana, Modagascar, 
a n e g a l , Togo, Uganda, Honduras and the Sol(»nan Is lands . The 
problems of the developing nat ions ; most of the countr ies to 
iirtiich IMF-assistance has been cut off belong to the th i rd 
world. The assisitance by the IMF for overcoming the balance 
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of trade d i f f i c u l t i e s too has to be made avai lab le for 
larger durat ions so tha t adjustment programme can be well 
thought of and reasonably phased, 
2\9, IN SHEER s e l f - i n t e r e s t . Anrit Baz Pat . H ^ ; I982, De, 
lif; 6 ( 1 - 2 ) . 
The Third Vforld countr ies as their ovn s e l f - i n t e r e s t 
which weighted with the f ive leading indus t r i a l i sed countries 
to decide to se t up the lending capacity of tbe IMF by hO% 
through an accelerated Increase of quota subser ipt ion. Instead 
of approaching the IMF, thedeveloplng countr ies should try to 
r a i s e ccxnmercial lo€uis frcxn the i n t e rna t i ona l money market 
to finance the i r developmental imports and meet the i r balance 
of payments d i f f i c u l t i e s . The IMF makes more funds avai lable 
to them through rescheduling t h e i r deb t s . India does n o t , 
however, belong to the category of country of countr ies the 
f ive r icher na t ions had in mind. The IMF's ^5*7 b i l l i on loan 
has fur ther ra ised Ind i a ' s c r e d i t . 
250. MAITRA (Pr iyatosh) . -^^nergy c r i s i s - some in^jl ications, 
B9on A f f a ^ ? . 2 1 , 1-2 J 1976, Ja-Fe; ^9-50, 
The IMF has decided to se t up- spec ia l o i l f a c i l i t i e s 
which are expected to sa t i s fy under-developed coun t r i e s . The 
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granting of loans by IMF a t a low r a t e of i n t e r e s t to 
finance the purchase of o i l by developing coun t r i e s . This 
fund to enable needeer na t ions to t ide over the i r balance of 
payments d i f f i c u l t i e s i s a big he lp , p a r t i c u l a r l y , to those 
obliged to import crude o i l , food grains and f e r t i l i s e r s . The 
IMF scheme bears a f a in t resemblance to what 166 developing 
countr ies including the o i l produdng s t a t e s , agreed in l a s t 
January. 
251. NOVAK (Jeremiah). IMF loan : Oil i s the key. Maina^tream. 
20, 15; 1981, De, 12; 9-11. 
India i s to receive a 5 b i l l i o n dol lar IMF loan 
over the next three years . And i t i s well tha t the furore 
has a r i s en . For t h i s IMF loan i s not l ike any in the pa s t . 
I f i t i s successful i t could s e t off a new approach to ba la i ce -
of-payments f inance. For with t h i s loan the IMF i s fu l ly imple-
menting a number of changes in i t s operating methods. The IMF 
loan was granted to countries which had a trade d e f i c i t , which 
made e f for t s to ccn t ro l imports by def la t ing the i r domestic 
economy to l eve l s consonant with the i r reserves and export 
capacity. In a developing country, reduced consumption meant 
not only reduced employment, but t o t a l l y reduced consunption 
of food, c lo th ing , and housing. I t meant be l t t ightening In 
countr ies where people did not have b e l t , 21% of the IMF loan 
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w i l l be used t o develop energy-coal and o i l . That means 
two b i l l i o n do l la r w i l l be used to develop a new o i l f i e ld 
in the Arabian Sea - A new f i e l d over and above the current 
cal led Bombay High. The o i l f i e ld has been developed by 
Ind i a ' s governmental agency for petroleum and na tura l gas. 
The new o i l f i e ld w i l l produce s ign i f i can t quan t i t i e s of 
na tu ra l gas whose use in nitrogenous f e r t i l i s e r s can make 
India independent of world markets for Agricul tural inputs . 
SUBSIDIES,. OIL 
252. IMF m> for o i l . Econ Tmd. 10, 1^; 1 9 8 l , J l , 16; 17. 
The IMF had given aid to 23 poor countr ies to heJp 
them to pay for o i l over the pas t six years . Among the poor 
countries e l i g ib l e s for the subs id ie s , India i s one of them. 
Over the years subsidies risceiied by India from the IMF i s 
$ 31*8 mil l ion. 
253. IMF PLAN. Beon Tmd. 10 , 1; 1 98l , J a , 1; 16. 
The IMF has announced the d e t a i l s of $ \,25 b i l l i on 
subsidy plan to cut i n t e r e s t cos t on loans ava i lab le to 83 low 
income coun t r i e s , facing an economic c r i s i s due to the high 
o i l p r i c e s . Addi t ional ly , another $ 2687 b i l l i o n would be 
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avai lable in 198if-85 for much eas ier l oans , a t half a per 
cent i n t e r e s t or seme other favourable r a t e . I n t e r e s t on 
loan i s a t present running a t 11.5^. 
TRUST FOND, CREDIT, BAI-iiNGE OF PAYMENTS 
25V. GUPTA (Dhruba) . : - O p e r a t i o n of the t r u s t fund. Fin & 
Dgv. 15, 3 ; 1978, Se; 3 7 - ^ . 
The considerable d i f f i c u l t i e s that emerged in the i n t e -
ina t iona l monetary system in 197^, and, in pa^rt icular , the 
balance of payments d i f f i c u l t i e s of developing countr ies tha t 
arose as a r e s u l t of a subs t an t i a l adverse s h i f t in t he i r terms 
of t r ade . To keep in the view t h i s problem, the IMF has 
established the Trust fund in May 1976. The Trust Fund was s e t 
up to disburse balance of payments ass i s tance to e l i g i b l e 
members of the trust mainly from the p r o f i t s derived from the 
sa le of gold of IMF. I t s f i r s t two years of operations were 
completed on June 3 0 , 1978. 
255, CRJPTA (OP) and MAHESHWARI (GC). How ef fec t ive i s IMF 
Trust Rind ? Finan Bcp. 7, 208; I98O, Se, 22; 5 ( 7 -8 ) . . 
The Trust PUnd (T50 which was se t up by the i n t e r -
na t i ona l Monetary Fund (IMF) in May I976 with a view to providing 
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•balance of payments ass i s tance a t concessional r a t e s to 
e l i g i b l e developing member coun t r i e s , completed four years 
of i t s operations on June 30, I98O. The working of the 
t r u s t PUnd during the f i r s t four years of i t s operat ions. 
In 197^-, the IMP created an o i l f a c i l i t y to meet the increased 
cost of petroleum imports of tiie developing coun t r i e s . In 
1975 spec ia l subsidy account was a l so s e t up to provide 
I n t e r e s t r e l i e f on drawings from o i l f a c i l i t y to MSA count r ies . 
I n d i a ' s balance of payments weakened markedly during the 12 
months, Apri l 1979 - March 198O as surplus in the ove ra l l 
balance of payments which had averaged subs t an t i a l ly in excess 
of SDR 1 b i l l i o n in preceding three years shank to SDR 3^ 40 
b i l l i o n . In the x lx th disbursanent of loans held on June 30, 
1980. India has received loan amounting to SDKs 526.^-60 mil l ion, 
256, INDIA TO borrow from IMF t r u s t fund. Boon Irnd. 9, 10; 
1980, My, 16; 3 I . 
India w i l l be borrowed Rs. 550 crores from the IMF's 
Trust Fund. The country has been compelled to t h i s step 
because of serious balance of payments pos i t ion created by the 
steep r i s e in the p r i ce of imported crude. 
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